The political fallout of the Turkey earthquakes could be profound

Will the devastating earthquakes topple President Erdogan from power, asks Mary Dejevsky

The earthquake could change the political dynamics – but the question is how (Reuters)

Some natural disasters, however devastating, remain just that: natural disasters. Others trigger changes that might have taken much longer or never happened at all. The earthquakes that struck Turkey and Syria this week could turn out to be among them, if not now, then in the coming months.

There can scarcely be any part of the world where such a disaster could potentially have a greater impact than here, along a fault line that is not only geological – but political and cultural. With the chaotic aftermath of the US-led invasion of Iraq, the rise of Isis, and Syria’s still not ended civil war, the region has experienced quite enough volatility in recent decades – without the addition of this major catastrophe.

That the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, had been gradually reasserting his power over most of Syria and was preparing for a meeting with Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan – intended as a first step back to international acceptance – is a particularly grim irony. The fate of this encounter, and the prospects for a Turkey-Syria rapprochement, is just one of the big uncertainties created by the disaster.

One of the greatest imponderables concerns Erdogan himself and Turkey’s immediate future. Erdogan announced last month that he was bringing presidential and parliamentary elections forward to May, from June, with the decision to be confirmed next month. Although he is fully expected to seek a third term, his re-election is not seen as a foregone conclusion: his decision to run contravenes a constitutional limit of two terms, the country faces a serious economic crisis, and opposition parties have formed a bloc in an effort to unseat him.

The earthquake could change the political dynamics – but the question is how. If the central government is seen as incompetent in helping the stricken region, could this hand an advantage to the opposition parties? Might Erdogan postpone the elections he has just brought forward –  by declaring a state of emergency, for instance – and would this be in his favour? The worst devastation has been in the largely Kurdish southeast. Erdogan has not been averse to using repression against Turkey’s Kurds in the past for political advantage. Could a new move against Kurdish resistance be on the cards? And if it is, what effect might this have on national elections?

The picture becomes even more complicated across the border – or what passes for the border – into Syria. This part of Syria remains a patchwork of rebel fiefdoms and shifting alliances, where the civil war remains largely unresolved. This makes delivering disaster relief even more difficult than it would otherwise be. But the difficulties go beyond practicalities.

The Syrian government has insisted that all international aid is directed through official government channels, even where the affected territory is held by rebel groups. This is an echo of the quarrels that arose at the height of the war, when international agencies tried to get food and medical aid into besieged areas – and it puts donors in a bind. If they refuse to work with the government, disaster relief may not reach those who need it. If, on the other hand, they submit to the government’s demands, they could effectively be helping Assad reclaim lost territory.

It is a dilemma which points to another big question about the longer-term effects of the earthquake. Could it assist Assad in extending his authority, as afflicted areas look to the central government for help? Or could it have the opposite effect, and reverse Assad’s recent gains, if the central authorities prove unable, or unwilling, to help? The odds must be on the earthquake assisting Assad’s retrenchment; also perhaps on the disaster speeding the mooted Erdogan-Assad rapprochement, as the two leaders are pushed to join forces to address the emergency.

Whether this translates further into a joint effort to clamp down on rebels sheltering in disputed areas of northern Syria is a separate issue, but it cannot be ruled out.

A trickier question is what effect the earthquake could have on Erdogan’s ambitions to be a regional arbiter. Will his attention be so focused on the disaster and its domestic and bilateral (with Syria) ramifications, for instance, that he has less time and energy for other projects, and specifically for his diplomatic initiatives with Russia and Ukraine?

Erdogan has been one of few aspiring mediators in the Ukraine-Russia war to have the ear of both sides, periodically at least. In particular, he has kept lines to Russia open. He now faces an emergency in the southeast of his country and an election campaign that could be more difficult as a result. How much attention might he have left to try to calm the troubled waters in and around the Black Sea? Might Erdogan find his best opportunity to make Turkey a major diplomatic player passing him by?

That said, there is no sign that either Russia or Ukraine has much appetite for diplomacy just now. But the earthquake could have an effect here, too, and it is not one that will help Ukraine. For all the theatrics of Volodymyr Zelensky’s trip to London, the war has been thoroughly eclipsed in the international news headlines, and may not return very soon. It may also find that there is more competition for humanitarian aid.

Ukraine has thrived on publicity and presenting its case to the Western world. That advantage is diminished if Western attention is directed elsewhere. Whether Russia could exploit the lesser prominence of the war in the western media for its own ends – to launch its long-awaited offensive, perhaps – is another matter, as is the possibility that less attention for the war might somehow push the two sides towards talks.

The earthquake could, on the other hand, present Russia with an opportunity. Any closeness between Erdogan and Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, can be exaggerated, but they do have mutual interests and can make common cause. Putin talks to both Erdogan and Assad, and Russia has been quick to send disaster relief to both countries. Putin can build up Russia’s credit at relatively little cost, at a time when it has almost no friends in the West.

Turkey’s difficulties could also assist Russia in its efforts to calm the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan, backed by Turkey, had been gaining the upper hand in fighting during recent months, but Turkey may now have more pressing concerns. The result could be a return to the previous stalemate, which would suit Russia better than victory for Azerbaijan.

It is far too early to forecast how the earthquake in Turkey and Syria will play out, but not too early to raise some flags. Erdogan could be weakened, with implications for Turkey’s regional status; Assad could consolidate his hold on Syria sooner than expected, forcing some hard decisions on the part of those sponsoring his opponents. Russia could gain, and Ukraine could lose, if international attention shifts elsewhere.

Nor would this natural disaster be unique in affecting wider political currents. I recall the twin earthquakes that struck Armenia, then part of the Soviet Union, in December 1988, as Mikhail Gorbachev was embarking on his quest to reform the Soviet Union. More than 60,000 people died.

The aid effort mobilised by Moscow was inadequate and exposed both the economic weakness of the Soviet Union and the extent to which the constituent Soviet republics were escaping Kremlin control. The scale of destruction also highlighted a multitude of Soviet ills, including shoddy workmanship and pervasive corruption.

In an unprecedented move, the then-foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, solicited foreign help and opened the Soviet borders to foreign aid. The earthquake, or rather the response to it, had the effect of not just opening the door of a still largely closed country, but showing Soviet citizens in general and Armenians in particular, the possibility of a friendlier and more collaborative outside world.

In so doing, the Armenian earthquake became one of many factors that accelerated the Soviet collapse. The political implications of the earthquakes in Turkey and Syria could be at least as far-reaching in terms of influencing the politics and reshaping the region. Those countries’ enemies and allies alike need to prepare for change, even if it is not yet clear what that change might be.