Can Putin survive – or will he be overthrown?

The fiercest public criticism of the war in Russia is coming not from the liberal left, but from the nationalist right, writes Mary Dejevsky

There is scant evidence – yet – that Putin himself is in trouble or at risk of an imminent challenge (AP)

What appears to be a string of recent setbacks for Russia in Ukraine has fuelled speculation about whether Vladimir Putin can survive as Russia’s leader. And even if he can, for how long. Not all autocrats lose power after a failed military campaign – Saddam Hussein survived even after Iraq’s disastrous war with Iran – but sooner or later many do, as their authority is so entwined with their nation’s battlefield prowess.

The most emblematic of Russia’s losses to Ukraine has to be the 8 October attack on the Kerch bridge – a pet project of Putin’s that provided road and rail links between the Russian mainland and Crimea. Completed in 2018, four years after Russia annexed the peninsula, it was damaged, apparently by explosives, the day after Putin celebrated his 70th birthday.

The bridge was speedily returned to operation. But the attack was not something Putin could afford to leave unavenged. Within 48 hours, Russia had launched a missile blitz on cities across Ukraine, including – for the first time – the very centre of the capital, Kyiv.

The attack on the Kerch bridge, however, was only the latest evidence that Russia could be losing this war. In the past month, Ukraine has taken back complete control of the northeastern Kharkiv region, recaptured the strategically important town of Lyman, and continued its advance in the southern region of Kherson just days after Putin declared its annexation by the Russian Federation.

Russia’s losses are reflected in what appears to be a mood of growing unease in Moscow about the course of the war. In the latest of several reshuffles of the military command, Putin appointed a reputationally ruthless veteran of the Syria conflict, General Sergei Surovikin, to overall command of operations in Ukraine.

This followed Putin’s announcement three weeks ago of the “partial mobilisation” of reservists, a move suggesting that the war was lasting longer, and taking a higher toll, than planned. The mobilisation was followed by street protests in many parts of Russia and an exodus from the country of more than 200,000 young men trying to escape the draft.

The call-up ran into more trouble, with public complaints about abuses and inconsistencies coming from, among others, such a pillar of Putin’s establishment as Margarita Simonyan, the head of the state overseas broadcasting service RT. An unusual Kremlin apology for “mistakes” was just one among many signs that the Kremlin might not be completely in control of the message.

Another is the increasingly forthright criticism of the war from the Russian right. These are people who supported Putin’s decision to go to war, but who are now losing faith in how it is being fought. They see incompetence in the Russian command and accuse the Kremlin of being “soft” on Ukraine.

As if this wasn’t enough, from outside the country – from Ukraine and its Western allies – come reports of dissent in the Russian ranks and claims that Russia is running out of crucial equipment and munitions. The US also “leaked” an intelligence report to the effect that a senior Kremlin “insider” (unidentified) had upbraided Putin directly about the conduct of the war.

For all this negativity, however, there is scant evidence – yet – that Putin himself is in trouble or at risk of an imminent challenge. Popular protest, both in February and after the mobilisation decree, fizzled out. Allowing people to leave the country may in fact have provided a judicious safety valve. While some outside observers discern jockeying for advantage in the Kremlin, at least the facade of official unity has largely held up.

Then again, in closed-door systems, such as Russia’s today, the first that anyone may learn of a change at the top is after it happens. The hardline coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991 came out of the blue. It is also worth noting that it was defeated.

Also worth noting is that the fiercest public criticism of the war in Russia is coming not from the liberal left, but from the nationalist right. This means that those loudly agitating from abroad for the downfall of Putin need to be careful about what they wish for. A new leader in the Kremlin could be the very opposite of the more compliant individual they crave.

This does not mean that a new leader in the Kremlin might not presage a U-turn in Russian policy, with minimum loss of face, and the chance for a new start in relations with Ukraine and the West. It might. But it might also produce a tougher version of the same.

Which is where it might also be worth questioning two premises. The first is that there can be no peace while Putin remains in power. A Western consensus seems to have built around this idea, now enshrined in a Ukrainian presidential decree. And this is regrettable, because the Kremlin may be starting to hint at a new interest in diplomacy.

When Putin announced the annexation of four Ukrainian regions on 30 September, he slipped in a sentence about his readiness for talks with Ukraine. In the last few days, Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, proposed exploratory talks with the US or Turkey in an interview for Russian state television. Then there is the bizarre “peace plan” advanced by Elon Musk, which may or may not have had Russia’s say-so, as well as another possible initiative from Turkey. All these proposals and half-proposals have been dismissed out of hand by Ukraine – understandably so. But the fighting goes on, and the losses mount.

Kyiv’s refusal to talk – and the reluctance of the United States and Ukraine’s other Western supporters to commit to talks without Ukraine’s agreement – is predicated on the belief that Ukraine is either winning or can win this war. This is the second premise that might need another look.

Russia’s missile strikes in response to the Kerch bridge attack show the reach of Russia’s power, should it choose to use it. Whether Russia is losing, or could lose, also depends on what its real objectives are (as opposed to those imputed to it by the West). In Putin’s statements, Russia’s territorial ambitions remain limited to the Donbas and its defensive ambitions to Ukrainian neutrality. In his mobilisation speech, Putin stressed that Russia’s objectives had not changed.

There is also a need for caution in assessing the actual state of the battlefield and the resources on either side. Information about Russian casualties and surrenders comes exclusively from Ukrainian sources. Ukraine may have made advances in the east and south, but so far they are small compared with the land Russia still holds from the first weeks of the war.

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What is more, the West has been forecasting a Russian dearth of munitions, especially missiles, for months, with precious little supporting evidence. Western sanctions may have some effect in the longer term, but so far, they have only rebounded on Europe in the form of vastly higher energy prices.

As for Ukraine, it remains, and will remain, hugely dependent on Western support. In the recapture of Lyman, there were spats between civilians over a shortage of rations. What if a time comes when Ukraine’s water and power supplies are too damaged to be quickly repaired? How soon does morale – even Ukraine’s formidably resilient morale – start to crack? When and how might the US and others start to baulk at the cost (in all senses, including to the West’s own security) of supplying Ukraine with ever greater quantities of ever more advanced weapons?

Even if the prospects for Russia’s defeat and Ukraine’s victory have been exaggerated, of course, this still does not mean that Putin is safe in his Kremlin. In waging war on Ukraine, he made a terrible miscalculation, for which he may still ultimately have to pay. But Putin is the person in charge of Russia at present, and if there is talking to be done, it will have to be with him. Nor will Russia’s chief preoccupations change in the event of a new leader. Any successor will have the same concerns about the security of Russia and the vulnerability of its Western borders.

As Lord Palmerston and Henry Kissinger both said in different ways, friends and enemies may come and go, but interests stay the same. And interests are what any national leader has a duty to defend, whether they sit in Moscow or Kyiv, Washington or London.