Putin, Kim and the special relationships plunging the world into crisis

With multiple threats to humanity engulfing the world, regional and global alliances are now more important than ever, writes Edward Howell. Pariah states will only come closer together and the West cannot stand idly by as threats grow

(AP)

North Korea is not one’s usual pit stop between Russia and Vietnam, but for Vladimir Putin, it was too good an opportunity to miss. Reaffirming Russia’s relations with its allies of old, Putin’s diplomatic mission to Pyongyang and then Hanoi offered an occasion, firstly, to garner support for his ongoing war in Ukraine at a time when Russia has few international friends.

What is more, both visits aimed to send a clear signal to the United States, its allies, and the West, that no matter what Western leaders say, Russia will do all it can to cause trouble in international relations.

Putin’s visit to Hanoi, after spending two days in North Korea, has more than a hint of irony. It was in Hanoi, five years ago, when the notorious presidential summit between Kim Jong-un and then US president Donald Trump – their second in under two years – ended without a deal. The two leaders did not even manage to have lunch. Since then, North Korea has only increased its delinquent behaviour, which reached new heights with this week’s visit by Putin.

The North Korean leader pulled out all the stops for his Russian counterpart. The streets of Pyongyang were lined not just with Russian flags and cheering crowds, but also with portraits of Putin himself. Bizarrely, it was almost as if Putin were the North Korean leader, ready to be lauded and adored by the North Korean population.

It is well known that ever since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Putin has provided North Korea with substantial food assistance and cash in exchange for millions of rounds of North Korean artillery.

The exchange of high-level military technology, not least missiles and satellites, has also taken place between the two rogue states, although concerningly, the true extent of this cooperation remains less well-known. The two countries signed a mutual defence pact this week, highlighting how such military cooperation looks set to continue.

Putin knows full well that assisting North Korea by supplying satellite technology is a clear breach of multilateral and unilateral sanctions, and a sure way to tarnish what’s left of one’s global standing; not that the Russian leader seems to care about that. In another sanctions-violating manoeuvre, Russia has, in recent months, provided a direct supply of oil to North Korea, thereby allowing the country to free up financial resources to expand its missile and nuclear programmes.

Only seven years earlier, in 2017, Russia and China actively supported the imposition of several United Nations Security Council sanctions on North Korea, including those that called for the return of North Korean labourers overseas (many of whom, in fact, continued to remain in Russia and China, and are still there), and restrictions on North Korea’s fuel imports.

Seven years on, and how things have changed. Russia has spent the past year actively courting North Korea and pledging to do all it can to support its former Cold War client state. The very fact that Putin reached out to North Korea to replenish his munitions highlights just how desperate the Russian leader had become. In Kim, Putin not only found a willing supplier in desperate need of cash, but another delinquent state that sought to leverage the war in Ukraine to criticise their common foe of the West, and also gain valuable advanced knowhow and technology to bolster his own nuclear and missile capabilities.

Crowds greet Putin in Pyongyang during his state visit earlier this week (AP)

Whilst Kim may be pleased with Putin’s visit and the signing of their treaty, China’s president, Xi Jinping, will be more wary of these relations, and hope that the ties between Russia and North Korea do not go too far.

Putin has met Xi no fewer than 43 times since the Chinese leader’s ascendancy to power in 2012, and has visited China twice in the last two years. On both occasions, the two leaders have repeatedly reasserted their relationship as a “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for the new era”. Bilateral economic relations are booming, with Chinese exports to Russia reaching over $111bn at the end of 2023, in contrast to declining US and European exports.

It is not just North Korea to whom Russia has been turning for weapons, which, though numerous in quantity, may be far from optimal in quality. China has continued to deny that it has supplied Russia with lethal weapons, and has long espoused its ambiguous role as a “mediator” between Russia and Ukraine.

Yet, we cannot rule out China’s more active role in Russia’s war, not least as a useful middleman to deliver weapons to Russia. Even though Putin and Xi face their own domestic and foreign policy battles beyond the war, the two leaders – together with the likes of Kim – remain intent on presenting an alternative “multipolar” world order in stark contrast to that led by the United States.

Xi and Putin have not shied away from highlighting their dissatisfaction with the current world order. Officials in Beijing have been quick and unrelenting in deriding institutions such as AUKUS (the security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), and even the G7 as being anti-China and emblematic of malign Western supremacy.

The two leaders driving a car around Pyongyang (Reuters)

In what seems a continuation of China’s behaviour during the Mao era, Russia and China have also sought to court the developing world, in an attempt to coerce them into shunning the United States-led international order. Instead of choosing to follow the US, the path put forward by China and Russia will, in the view of the two dictators, allow the voices of developing countries to be heard.

History has told us, however, that even if there is a common adversary, countries do not always get on. The notorious Sino-Soviet split in the Cold War took place even as Moscow and Pyongyang were supposedly united in the face of the capitalist US-led Western bloc.

Just how much value do these two authoritarian countries place on maintaining economic relations with allies of the United States, particularly South Korea and Japan? The answer to this question could influence how their own ties develop. Do they value economics more than politics and ideology?

As the United States readies itself for its presidential election in November, global crises continue to ravage the world. These instances are not limited to the ongoing Ukraine War or the conflict in Gaza.

A possible Taiwan contingency and the likely bolstering of arms exchange between North Korea and Russia all present worrying situations that will not just be confined to the states involved but will have substantial spillover effects into neighbouring regions.

The current nature of international relations is perhaps best summarised by the idea of a “polycrisis”, as the South Korean president, Yoon Suk Yeol, mentioned last year.

Vietnam president To Lam greeting Putin on Thursday (AP)

With multiple, simultaneous crises and threats to humanity, regional and global alliances are now more important than ever, especially as an anti-democratic alignment of pariah states looks only to bolster with time. Global problems may need global solutions, but in a world where the United Nations Security Council is sclerotic, the importance of bilateral, trilateral, and regional alliances cannot go unnoticed.

Relations between China and the United States have far from improved under the Biden administration. China’s rhetoric towards Taiwan has only increased in aggression following the recent election of Taiwanese president, Lai Ching-te.

Whether a Trump presidency will reignite what Trump’s former national security adviser, John Bolton, termed a “clash of civilisations” – between Washington and Beijing – remains to be seen. But with Xi proclaiming that China is a “civilisational state” and not just “any other ordinary socialist state”, conflict, which need not be conventional war, and could take place either in economic, cyber, or other domains, remains possible.

Will a second Trump presidency see another attempt to engage in the “art of a deal” with “little rocket man”? Will South Korea and Japan be forced to give greater consideration to acquiring their own independent nuclear deterrents given Trump’s recent disparaging comments about Washington’s alliances with Seoul and Tokyo? These are all important questions that only time will reveal the answers to.

The adage “I want, doesn’t get”, seems not to apply to China or Russia, both of whose intentions to disrupt international relations are now clearer than ever. The West cannot sit idly by until it is too late.

Dr Edward Howell is a lecturer in politics at Christ Church, University of Oxford, and a fellow with the Asia-Pacific programme at Chatham House