Where are our principles now?: In Gorazde, the West's masquerade is exposed. The honest course is to abandon the enclaves and negotiate frontiers, argues Jonathan Eyal

THE bankruptcy of the West in Yugoslavia is now total: in military terms, the UN is a joke; legally, its mandate is a nightmare; politically, UN troops have become part of an elaborate farce. All the dreams for a post-Communist New World Order are now dying, along with the citizens of Gorazde.

Air strikes are part of the aerosol approach to international relations: if you don't like what some nations do to each other, but don't consider your own interests vitally affected, spray the guilty parties with some bombs from the air. The Europeans ultimately went along with American proposals for air strikes mainly because they did not want to have another bruising argument with Washington. Last week's decision to launch an air attack on the Serbs was a catastrophic mistake, for which the Americans bear chief responsibility.

It is now fashionable to claim that the Serbs' offensive against Gorazde was prompted by US Defense Secretary William Perry, who suggested that America would do nothing to protect UN 'safe areas'. Nothing could be further from the truth: the Serbs prepared for their operation well in advance.

The US-brokered alliance between Muslims and Croats allowed Bosnia's forces to redeploy against the Serbs, and notch up some successes. The destruction of Gorazde, the only remaining Muslim enclave of military significance, was intended not only to improve the Serbs' strategic position, but also to convey to the Muslims the need to accept their republic's irrevocable division. Every Western government knew about the Serb preparations days in advance, but all chose to ignore them.

From the very beginning of the Yugoslav war, the West espoused a set of principles which it pledged to uphold. These included not rewarding ethnic cleansing and aggression, and not participating in the carve-up of Bosnia. Behind the scenes, however, the very same politicians urged the Bosnian government to accept the republic's division. The West would keep its principles intact, while the Bosnians would be consigned to their fate. However, the Bosnian government refused to play along, and Western governments may have calculated that a dose of 'realism' might bring them to their 'senses'.

In spite of claims to the contrary, the decision to launch air strikes came from the top down, not from the bottom up: it was spurred by a US administration that wanted to appear strong, not by the UN commanders in Bosnia. For an American President with a record of foreign policy blunders, air strikes were the only way to paper over an embarrassing dispute between his chief advisers. And, once Washington made up its mind, the UN Secretary General, himself keen to dispel accusations of failure, was in no position to object. General Rose would hardly have requested air strikes without knowing in advance that this was what Washington was aching for. Yet puerile justifications and outright lies were what the world was offered.

The air strikes were concerned less with saving Gorazde, than with defending a handful of UN personnel, many of whom were introduced into Gorazde to direct the very air strikes supposed to defend them. Essentially, the claim that the UN was engaged in 'close air support' of its forces was intended to communicate a sense of urgency that would preclude consultations with the Russians (who were bound to object) and place some limits on the scope of the action. It is noteworthy that neither the UN nor the Americans ever called on the Serbs to withdraw to their previous positions around Gorazde.

President Clinton, a master at shaking off personal responsibility, claimed that the action had been undertaken by Nato, on behalf of the UN at the request of commanders on the ground. A more idiotic argument can hardly be imagined. In effect, the whole world was asked to believe that the Americans, British and French - the main players within Nato - were asking the Americans, British and French - the most important members of the UN Security Council - to authorise the Americans, British and French to undertake air strikes in Bosnia. All within the legal limits initially defined by those same Americans, British and French.

The logic behind the air strikes was even more foolish. Although the Russians were not in a position to stop Nato's initial action, their subsequent involvement ensured that any further air attacks would jeopardise

the whole East-West relationship - a

price nobody was prepared to pay. What is more, no amount of air attacks could have saved Gorazde; the town could only have been saved by introducing Western

troops - something that had been ruled out by every Western government from the start.

Most important of all, air strikes would deter the Serbs only if they sent a message to the Serb decision-makers. But who does take their decisions? Is it President Milosevic in Belgrade? Or Radovan Karadzic in Pale? Or General Mladic, 'the butcher of Bosnia'? No conclusive answer to this question has ever been given. The only thing that does emerge clearly is that the air strikes have strengthened those Serbs who believe that the West can be defied with impunity.

So what can be done now? First, the West must admit that, if it is not prepared to fight, it has no more principles to defend in the former Yugoslavia. The UN agencies should therefore be authorised to evacuate the refugees from the various enclaves, which have always been impossible to defend. Second, Washington's attempt to negotiate with the Muslims and the Croats, but not with the Serbs, must be abandoned. All those involved in the conflict must be brought together to negotiate, and they should negotiate frontiers - not some hazy ideas about new confederations that nobody is prepared to enforce.

True, this means that the West will participate in further ethnic cleansing. But is it preferable to watch while the Serbs perform the same task in a piecemeal but even crueller fashion? Appeasement wrapped up in high principles is the worst of all worlds.

The current debacle exposes the reality: that a UN force was introduced into Yugoslavia in order to keep a peace that did not exist, in the hope of enforcing a peace that cannot be enforced. The UN is now expected to deliver humanitarian assistance, act as an impartial negotiator and deliver air strikes - all at the same time.

Far from providing the bedrock of future global security, the UN has reverted to its traditional role as dustbin for the world's inherently insoluble problems. Few governments will contribute troops to its peacekeeping operations in future.

And the disaster in the Balkans is sapping the foundations of European security. President Clinton always claimed air strikes would restore Nato's credibility. What has happened is the opposite: by insisting that America could only administer painless strikes from the air while European troops were left on the ground, Clinton has broken the cardinal principle of the alliance: that of sharing risks in equal measure. Nato's much-vaunted plans for sharing responsibilities among its members have failed their first post-Cold War test. Since 1989 the West has sought to avoid two problems in Eastern Europe: exporting its soldiers and importing instability. It has now achieved both, and in equal measure.

The chances are that none of these conclusions will be drawn: unable to pull back but unwilling to escalate their involvement, UN forces will remain on the ground, negotiating a ceasefire here, another there, while their political masters express surprise when they find out that the Serbs are liars. And the message that Western leaders will heed is the one you see written inside every public lavatory: 'Now wash your hands - please.'

(Photograph omitted)