How two men met to change the world as we were looking the other way...

With all eyes were on the wars raging in Gaza and Ukraine, a quiet meeting on a San Francisco country estate passed without fanfare. But Joe Biden’s summit with China’s Xi Jinping could signal a major shift in global power, writes Mary Dejevsky

Does Biden’s meeting with Xi Jinping signal a shift in global power? (New York Times)

In retrospect, it may turn out to have been the most significant encounter not just of this week, but of this month and this year. It took place neither in the Middle East or Ukraine – the two regions that currently dominate the Western news media – but about as far from these conflict zones as it was possible to be.

In a meeting confirmed only at the last moment, the president of China, Xi Jinping, crossed the Pacific for talks with the president of the United States, Joe Biden, at a country estate on the edge of San Francisco.

It was the first time the two leaders had met for a year, but a year’s interval between national leaders is nothing uncommon. What made this a landmark event were the doubts that it would happen at all, Xi’s willingness to travel to the United States, and the considerable shifts in the dynamics of global power that have taken place over that year.

As to why this superpower summit in all but name made so relatively few waves in Europe, there may be many reasons, starting with the preoccupation with wars close to home. Prosaic though it might be, the time difference could be another reason. President Xi arrived in San Francisco with his formidable motorcade just as most of Europe was preparing for bed. The US president’s closing press conference the following day – there was no joint appearance with Xi – took place when most Europeans would have been fast asleep.

And there is a downside of 24/7 news: an event may not survive in the news until even the following day, especially when the pictures are of formal talks around a table, rather than the drama and horror of war.

But you could say that one of the purposes of the former is to fend off the latter – which is something, in a way, that Biden confirmed. “My responsibility,” he told reporters, “is to make this relationship rational and manageable, so it doesn’t result in conflict. That’s what I’m all about.”

Of only two areas of agreement announced, one – about exports of components for the drug fentanyl – reflected a particular US domestic concern as the country enters an election year. The other, on the resumption of military-to-military contacts, suspended after Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taiwan, restored some welcome normality after a tense year. The more substantial indicators of what was discussed, however, came in subsequent statements and read-outs from officials of the two countries.

For the United States, the chief objective seemed to be to signal no change, and particularly no weakness, on the defence of Taiwan, with the context making this more pointed than it might otherwise have been. There is a widespread view in the West that, if China felt US support for Ukraine or Israel was weakening, it could try to reincorporate Taiwan sooner rather than later. The US could thus find itself simultaneously exposed on three fronts – to Russia over Ukraine, to Iran over Israel, and to China over Taiwan. Personally, I see no particular link, real or potential, between Ukraine and/or Israel and Taiwan, but that is by the by.

Of at least as much import as Biden’s lack of change on Taiwan, it seems to me, was what Xi Jinping said himself and was reported to have said. This included not only a denial that China had any timetable for “reunification” with Taiwan, but statements to the effect that China and the US should not be seen as competitors, and that “Planet Earth is big enough for the two countries to succeed”.

“China has no plans to surpass or unseat the United States,” he said, “and the United States should not scheme to suppress or contain China.” What this suggests is that it is not just the US, but China as well, that sees current events as perhaps heralding some sort of tipping point in the global balance of power.

Last month, in his nationwide address after the Hamas attacks on Israel, President Biden referred to what he called an inflection point in history – “one of those moments where the decisions we make today are going to determine the future for decades to come”. It seems that President Xi agrees on the dangers of the time and is concerned so far as possible to minimise the risks.

It is tempting at this point to cite the statements, and especially the images, from the Biden-Xi meeting and conclude that global power is already passing – may already have passed – from a US in decline to an ascendant China. And some of the obvious images are there: a Chinese president, energetic and ostensibly in robust health, and a US president, markedly less so. Biden’s statement for the media was brief, even perfunctory. He stumbled, admitted memory failings and referred repeatedly to notes. It was, frankly, hard to see him exercising the power of the presidency for another four years.

It would be premature, however, to declare that the changing of the global guard has already taken place. China has certainly been more active and extended its diplomatic reach in the past year, and done so with what, to many, has been unexpected success.

In the Middle East, it brokered a resumption of ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It presented a ceasefire plan for Ukraine on the first anniversary of the Russian invasion, and Xi has increased contact with President Putin, in person and by phone. It has been active in the Brics grouping and it has increasingly emerged in the UN as a rallying point, if not an actual leader, of the so-called global South or “non-West” – a large grouping of countries that has refused to take sides in Ukraine, and accused Western countries of double standards over Palestinian statehood.

While China is undoubtedly increasing its international weight, it is too soon to predict with any certainty either that its recent rise will continue as smoothly as it has begun, or that the dominance of the US is in terminal decline. The US still commands superior economic and military power, and its political model still acts as a magnet for many. China, meanwhile, faces a suddenly faltering economy and demographic anxieties that could call into question the speed, or even likelihood, of any further rise.

What we may rather be seeing is not the end, but the beginning, of a contest for global pre-eminence, as two mighty empires find their spheres of influence increasingly coming into contact with each other and potentially overlapping, on land and sea. This week’s Biden-Xi summit, in the city and state widely seen as offering a foretaste of America’s future, concluded quietly in a preference for vigilance and peaceful coexistence.

That may not last. But if it does, it is why this encounter, which took place largely out of the limelight at a time Biden defined as an “inflection point in history”, may turn out to be a lot more important than it looked this week.