Time is running out for Donald Trump to flex his foreign policy muscles in the Middle East

After successfully brokering deals between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Sudan, the US president boasted more were ready to sign agreements. So far, that hasn’t happened

The window for Donald Trump to secure a last-minute pre-election foreign policy boost is fast closing with just three days until the vote.

The rapid fire of Trump-brokered deals between the US’s closest ally Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Sudan no doubt increased support among evangelical voters and the powerful pro-Israeli lobby.

The agreements were a welcome break for Mr Trump from tricky conversations about the soaring numbers of coronavirus cases and the struggling economy in the US. And a diversion from this year’s somewhat disastrous Israeli-Palestinian peace deal which was rejected by the fractured Palestinian leadership before it was even delivered.

And so, it is not surprising that during the September signing ceremony for the UAE and Bahrain deals, a triumphant President Trump boasted that many more states would imminently follow suit. Possibly even before the 3 November election.

“We’re very far down the road with about five countries,” he said with characteristic gusto. "We'll have at least five or six countries coming along very quickly, we're already talking to them.”

So far, beyond the initial three, no country has stepped up. But the seeming impossibility of getting Sudan, the historic foe of Israel, to tentatively agree to a deal has fuelled wild speculation, that Saudi Arabia, whose king is the custodian of Islam’s holiest sites, and whose economy is the largest in the Arab world, might step up.

The other “sure bet”, at least according to Israeli media, is Oman. The country was widely speculated to agree to a deal ahead of the vote this coming week.

After all, Muscat controversially hosted Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 2018, years before UAE and Bahrain normalisation was on the cards.

In 1979, Oman was one of only three Arab League members that refused to take diplomatic action against Egypt following the Camp David peace treaty. Unlike its neighbours, Oman has always respected Egypt’s right to formalise full-fledged relations with Israel.

Dubbed the “Switzerland of the Middle East” for its careful backchannel diplomacy and staunch refusal to take sides in conflicts, Oman occupies a unique position in the Arab world.

Perhaps part of the reason is because the country is majority Ibadi Muslim, and so not beleaguered by the challenges of the tricky Sunni-Shia divide that has underscored so many regional fights.

It has allowed Oman to, on one hand, host Mr Netanyahu but at the same time maintain close ties with Iran, serving as a rare conduit to Tehran and its allies including the Houthi rebels in Yemen.

But it is this strategic position that could conversely mean that Muscat will likely politely decline to forge formal diplomatic ties with Israel. For now.

Experts say signing a deal with Israeli would hurt its strategic positions as a diplomatic bridge for very little domestic gain.

“I can’t see any leverage that the US has on us to make us go into this deal,” said Ahmed Ali M al-Mukhaini, an Omani independent political researcher and former assistant secretary-general for the Shura Council in Oman.

He added that while the trade, tourism and investment benefits of an agreement would be welcomed given Oman, like many countries across the world, is struggling amid the pandemic, a hasty deal could irreversibly jeopardise relations it holds dear.

In fact, Al-Mukhaini said that Omanis were quite surprised when the UAE-Israel agreement was first announced, and some spoke of the  “hypocrisy” of the Emiratis whose leaders initially said the diplomatic deal was hinged on Mr Netanyahu halting the imminent annexation of the occupied West Bank, an action which is illegal under international law and widely seen as the death blow to any peace process.

The Israeli prime minister was quick to assure his support base that annexation plans were not shelved, and the final text of the UAE-Israel deal made no reference to the issue at all.

“From the Emirati perspective this deal is economic and political. It is very evident that the UAE is trying to place itself as a major player in the international arena, this is one way to do this,” Al-Mukhaini added.

“It seems this discussion is being handed down, or pounded down rather, from the US to the UAE without clear objectives or benefits of the Palestinians. This is not something that Oman would do. “

Oman’s new Sultan Haitham bin Tariq, who succeeded his cousin the late Sultan Qaboos bin Said in January, is keen to maintain Oman’s close relationship with Iran, which joining the Abraham accords would threaten.

He will not want to appear like another foreign policy win for Mr Trump, Al-Mukhaini added.

Oman aside, there may be further disappointment on the horizon for Mr Trump, in the deals he has already tentatively secured.

Although Sudan’s transitional leaders tentatively agreed to normalise relations with Israel, a final decision is contingent on approval by the country’s legislative council which has yet to be formed.

The economic incentives for Sudan are obvious: the agreement with Israel was likely part of a package of US requirements Washington demanded to remove Sudan from the US state sponsor of terrorism list.

Sudan was barely limping along. According to Hamid Eltgani Ali, a Sudanese economist, the local currency has tanked in value, inflation is at over 200 per cent, while half the country is under the poverty line. Unemployment, meanwhile, is hovering around 40 per cent and expected to get worse in the pandemic.

But despite the potential economic and trade incentives, many in Sudan are not happy.

Sudan's main political parties - including the country’s largest the National Umma Party, the Communist party and political coalition the National Consensus Forces – have rejected the transitional government's decision calling the deal unconstitutional and a threat to national interests.

Ali, who is dean of the School of Public Administration and Development Economics at Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, described the decision to push ahead anyway as Sudan’s transitional leaders “holding their noses and diving through to get de-listed from the US terrorism list”.

“Deprivation, poverty and isolation have created conditions that make it easy to wave a white flag. But I doubt that the deal will be formally ratified unless coercion is applied,” he said.

“The gap of mistrust and years of animosity cannot be overcome by such a superficial deal until the root causes of Israeli-Palestinian conflict are resolved.”

And this may be a sticking point for several other countries in the region – including others rumoured to be next on the list like Kuwait.

For now, it seems Mr Trump won’t be given that pre-election leg up he hoped for.