Turkey's failings in Syria have piled the pressure on itself as Idlib falls prey to al-Qaeda style extremists

Erdogan tied himself to an agreement which lumbers him with responsibility for flushing out the Islamist groups from the city to avoid an Assad assault

The northern Syrian city of Idlib is threatening to become a flashpoint all over again. The al-Qaeda splinter group Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) has put down roots in the midst of diplomatic inertia, and left the major powers scrambling to keep up.

In the east of the country, Isis is facing its final hours as the US-backed Syria Democratic Forces close in on the few remaining fighters.

Idlib, meanwhile, is the last remaining rebel outpost in the country, and in 2018 there had been expectations of an assault by the forces of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. That – and the civilian catastrophe which would have potentially accompanied it – was averted by the Sochi agreement, a ceasefire deal brokered by Russia, Turkey and Iran and signed in September last year.

But over the intervening months, HTS has brutally suppressed rival Islamist groups and established a strategic hold of vast areas in the beleaguered province, taking control of key roads. Under the Sochi deal, it had been Turkey’s responsibility to disarm and push back HTS. The country shares a large border with Idlib province.

Turkey’s failure has been front and centre ever since. Erdogan’s strategy has been distracted by his security concerns over Kurdish fighters in Syria (and by an aggressive spat with Donald Trump – and perhaps too by the fall-out from the murder of Jamal Khashoggi), and he missed the chance to do his homework in Idlib. Now the biggest military group in the city is a rogue band of extremists.

Most worrying have been efforts by HTS to establish some form of legitimacy. The group, which is designated as a terrorist organisation by the US and the UK, has taken at least partial control of things like education and energy provision in Idlib, and has made overtures to Russia and Turkey in the hope of presenting a veneer of pragmatism.

Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, however, must realise that an emboldened HTS raises again the prospect of an assault by forces loyal to the Assad regime. In September last year that was what sparked the fears of a humanitarian disaster in the area around Idlib, home to around 3 million civilians, and prompted the Sochi deal.

So where did Turkey go wrong? One possibility is that HTS’ rise is not accidental and that Erdogan is overplaying his hand with a strategy that tries to combine running with the wolves and playing with the sheep.

Turkey tied itself to a Sochi agreement which lumbers it with flushing out the Islamist groups from Idlib to head off that Assad assault. On the other hand, might Erdogan see an advantage to maintaining long-term relations to a group – however dangerous – that would act as a buffer between Turkey and Syria?

The risk is that Turkey’s softly-softly approach helps – deliberately or otherwise – install an al-Qaeda-style group as a de facto opposition in Syria at a time when the other opposition fighters and factions have fragmented, or are seeking to make their voice heard from abroad.

That could, if not countered, deliver a Hezbollah-like militia in the north of the country. Just like Hezbollah, which runs the southern district of Beirut in neighbouring Lebanon, HTS has established its own designated rule in most parts of Idlib. And just like Hezbollah, the group has put in place a so-called “political arm” too.

Just like Hezbollah, which became the absolute and undisputed umbrella for political Shi’ism in Lebanon after crushing the shi’i Amal movement in the late 1980s, HTS has emerged from ferocious battles with Sunni rivals in Syria.

For Turkey, cheap but fragile influence gains made by some short-sighted piggybacking tactics could therefore come at the expense of a patient, long-term power projection strategy. And at the expense of cordial relations with Russia. Putin will surely be furious at Erdogan’s failure to deal with HTS effectively.

It seems that HTS has spotted the opportunity. Its ultimate leader Abu Mohamed Al Joulani has supported a Turkish demand that the US-backed Kurdish YPG forces, which are right now leading the final rout of Isis, abandon their historical homeland on the east of the Euphrates River, the long border edge between Syria and Turkey. His message was well received in Ankara, which may explain why, when HTS was busy taking every town and village on its way to becoming Idlib’s dominant force, Turkey chose to watch.

It is not the first flirtation. In October 2017, the first Turkish intervention in Idlib raised eyebrows, not so much for the controversial invasion of another country for political gain, but more because Turkish soldiers were escorted by HTS fighters.

Last week Russia demanded that Turkey do more to tackle the militants in Idlib province and fulfil those original Sochi promises. As Erdogan, Putin and the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani return to Sochi for a summit today; the pressure on Turkey will be immense.

There is a broader game afoot here. If Erdogan really wants Putin’s support for his strategy towards the Kurds, he will first have to hand over the Islamic militants in Idlib. And in Putin’s efforts to slowly break the Islamist hold on Idlib, he must square the circle of Turkey’s ambiguous meddling. He seems to have the backing of the Arab states to carry out the work, but the danger is that HTS might have entrenched itself to the point that its removal will be deeply painful for everyone involved.