Is Russia really the big winner in the battle for the Middle East?

While the nation may find itself in a happier position than it expected over Syria, it did not plan for the US withdrawal, nor the Kurdish-led SDF’s decision to seek government protection rather than face Turkey alone

The pictures are evocative. Military vehicles flying the Russian flag enter what had until the day before been a Kurdish stronghold in northern Syria; Russian journalists wander freely around what had been a US military base. According to reporters on the ground, there had even been something akin to an orderly handover from the US to Russian forces – though neither side was prepared to admit as much in public.

The Russian advance followed Donald Trump’s declaration on 13 October that he was ordering the withdrawal of all US forces in northern Syria. He had announced something similar last year, then reversed track after lobbying from his top brass. This time the order was for real. Within days, the US military had packed up, destroyed any sensitive installations they could not take, and left. It was as simple as that, but an act fraught with immense implications nonetheless.

In political circles back in Washington there was condemnation from both sides of the congressional aisle, where the withdrawal was taken as a dereliction of the God-given duty for the US to police the world, a shameful betrayal of a loyal ally, and a green light for Turkey to do its worst. There was condemnation, too, from the EU, and private bewilderment at the defence ministries in London and Paris, as both countries had special forces quietly supporting the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (without, in the UK case, any parliamentary or public mandate).

There was also concern, to put it mildly, in other Nato capitals, where US reliability as an ally suddenly looked rather shakier than it had previously.

Whether this heralds the eventual disengagement of the US from the Middle East is another question. No sooner had President Trump ordered the Syria withdrawal than the same President Trump announced the dispatch of 2,000 US troops to Saudi Arabia to help bolster its defences against Iran. So withdrawal from the region as a whole may be a way off, or not on the cards at all. It is hugely significant nonetheless.

At its most limited, it amounts to an admission of defeat for the US and UK policy of supporting the rebellion against Bashar al-Assad. But, the Saudi deployments notwithstanding, it is hard not to see it also as potentially marking the start of a much wider US military disengagement, in terms of potential involvement in conflict, that could go beyond the Middle East and affect the rationale for the US presence around the world.

After all, when Trump points out that the Turkey-Syria border is “not our border”, he is right. He is also right that, for all the furore in Washington about dereliction of duty and betrayal, he was elected on a promise to bring the troops home and not to embroil the United States in any more foreign wars. It is a policy that continues to find favour with his voting base, as he starts campaigning for re-election.

But there is another aspect of the withdrawal from Syria that has drawn political flak in Washington and elsewhere. This is that any loss, any ceding of influence or territory, by the United States – especially in this region – is automatically seen as a win for Russia, and not just as a win, but the latest evidence of Russia’s post-Soviet territorial advance, exemplified in the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

While this obviously fits right into the “new Cold War” mindset, as it has evolved notably in Washington since Trump’s election, and might seem to be supported by the pictures of the Russian military smoothly moving into territory just vacated by the United States and its Kurdish ally in Syria, I am not convinced that it is entirely true. Yes, there has been Russian coverage – including film of Russia’s reporters in the vacated US base, and triumphal headlines in Russian papers, such as “Putin has won the lottery” – but the overall picture is more complex.

First, as the Middle East specialist, Mikhail Rostovsky wrote below that “lottery” headline, Russia’s latest gains have by and large not been Russia’s doing. “All of Russia’s most significant successes in Syria... simply descended on Putin and Moscow as manna from heaven as a result of the peculiar behaviour of the western countries and Turkey.” In other words, the US withdrawal – and the decision of the Kurdish-led SDF to seek Syrian protection rather than face Turkey alone – was not something Russia set out to achieve. So while Russia may find itself in a happier position than it expected, it was not part of Russia’s plans – which may now require some adjustment.

Second, the reason the west more often imputes to Russia to explain its involvement in Syria – to keep its ally, Assad, in power at all costs – also reflects a misunderstanding. When he first sent Russian troops to Syria in 2015 – legally, at the request of the UN-recognised government – Putin was less concerned about keeping Assad in power than preventing Syria from descending into anarchy, as had happened in Iraq and Libya, after a western attempt at regime change. Russia supported Assad as the only power it saw as able to keep Syria together – but it was always open to a change of constitutional arrangements, including a change of leader, by negotiation – and appears to remain so.

Fourth, Russia wants an end to the conflict in Syria as much as anyone and has long eyed a role as a peacemaker. It is possible that the US withdrawal, and Russia’s role with Syrian government forces now moving through Kurdish-held territory towards the Turkish border will enhance Moscow’s position as power-broker for the Syrian end game. Previous Russian mediation attempts, through Kazakhstan, failed largely because the United States refused to take any part, so the US withdrawal may simplify things here. On the ground, though, the prospect of a direct Syria-Turkey clash, the now-shifting allegiance of the Kurdish-led SDF, and the former Isis forces newly on the loose, could make the end-game even more unpredictable than it already was.

Fifth and last, maintaining its involvement in Syria could turn out to be not just more unpredictable for Russia, but more costly. On the plus side, Russia may come to wield more influence, not just in Syria, but further afield in the Middle East, and this could meet what appears to be one of Putin’s long-term objectives as president: restoring Russia’s dignity and its status as more than a “regional” player.

The Russian public, though, is wary of foreign military engagements, both because of the cost to the exchequer, but still more because of the human cost. The shadow of the failed Afghan war still hangs heavy over Russia and the return of coffins from eastern Ukraine and burials in secret brought an angry public reaction. Russian forces becoming bogged down in Syria or its borderlands is a risk Putin cannot take.

So while the US withdrawal gives Russia an immediate and unexpected military and diplomatic bonus, the gains are not as simple or unthreatening as they might look. Russia may have “won the lottery”, but it must be extremely careful how it dispenses its winnings, lest it ends up poorer in all sorts of ways than it was before.