Keir Starmer’s silence over Storm Shadow missile strikes could be deadly

The British public ought to be up in arms about UK-made long-range weapons being used by Ukraine, as it could make us a prime target for Putin – so when will the prime minister tell us what’s going on, asks Mary Dejevsky

Where is the outrage… or, at the very least, concern?

In the aftermath of Kyiv launching an as-yet unknown number of British-made Storm Shadow missiles into Russian territory, this clear step-up in the UK’s contribution to Ukraine’s defence has caused barely a ripple in the public realm.

Aside from a few worried callers to phone-ins and sporadic indignation on social media, it has been left to the inveterate peacenik Jeremy Corbyn to express any sort of indignation – and these days, his views are easily dismissed.

The public tranquillity has been more than matched by the silence from UK officials, even though the strike by Storm Shadow missiles can mean only one of two things. Either, Ukraine has unilaterally breached the terms set by the UK and the US for their use – or the UK has followed Joe Biden in giving Ukraine the green light that Volodymyr Zelensky has sought to fire Western long-range missiles into Russian territory.

Either explanation ought to have prompted an announcement of some sort from UK officials and, given the possible implications, preferably the prime minister himself. Shouldn’t questions about whether UK troops in Ukraine assisted with the launch be asked of Keir Starmer in the House of Commons?

The official silence has been all the more deafening, especially in light of the armed forces cuts announced this week by defence secretary John Healey. Each Storm Shadow missile costs around £2m, and Ukraine fired several at once – so that’s a £10m bill right there.

The implications of Ukraine’s use of British-made, long-range cruise missiles against Russian territory could be momentous. So why was there so little by way of public response?

Russia has warned more than once that it would regard a strike on its territory by US- or UK-made long-range missiles as a hostile act by those countries. The German chancellor has refused to supply Ukraine with equivalent Taurus missiles on the grounds that German troops would have to assist on the ground.

One reason why debate has been absent in the UK is that public sympathy for Ukraine has largely held up. This could soon change, however, as the arrival of Donald Trump in the White House threatens to pose a problem for the UK’s position. If the UK continues as Ukraine’s loudest cheerleader – albeit not its biggest arms or finance donor – it risks being seriously outpaced by events.

Increasingly, it would appear that Trump’s boast of ending the war within 24 hours could be for real. Firstly, because he is better organised for his second term and very adamant on this one subject – and secondly, because even some of his erstwhile enemies are less averse to the idea of talks to end the war than they once were, in part because of Russia’s advances on the ground.

A slight shift can also be observed in Russia’s policy, with the prospect of talks being dangled that could start sometime in January. Biden’s sudden loosening of conditions on Ukraine’s use of US-made missiles has been attributed to maximising Ukraine’s hand before Trump enters the White House.

In the UK, however, so far there has been no perceptible shift at all in the public statements by the government. The rhetoric is still all about supporting Ukraine for “as long as it takes”, insisting that Ukraine must, and can, win. If it does not, so the argument goes, then the whole liberal democratic order will be imperilled, China could be emboldened to seize Taiwan, and Russia will set its sights on the Baltic states and beyond.

A so-far largely unspoken consensus is nonetheless building around the terms on which the war in Ukraine could end. They include freezing the conflict at or near the current front lines; allowing, but not officially recognising, at least some of Russia’s territorial gains, and an agreement under which Ukraine will revert to the constitutional neutrality enshrined in its constitution between 1991 and 2014. In other words, no Nato membership for, say, 20 years.

It goes without saying that any, or all of this, will be difficult in the extreme for Ukraine. But it will also be difficult for the UK, unless it starts to adjust both its expectations and how it expresses them.

Several factors could help that process along. One is the realism that is growing among military experts and the media about the state of the war. An unusually long, multi-authored report by the BBC’s Verify unit has set out the risk, among other things, of a Ukrainian collapse; it should offer food for thought.

Another is a recent poll finding that a similar proportion of Ukrainians as Russians now favour an end to the war. For all the extravagant language, there is more distance now than there was between the UK and Zelensky, who recently expressed his disappointment with the state of relations.

Yet another might be some revised definitions of victory and defeat. Russia’s stated openness to the prospect of talks in January was headlined in some UK reports as signalling Russian concessions, even defeat. That is pure spin – but, as the countdown to Trump’s inauguration ticks along, it might just allow diplomacy to begin.