Putin’s end of year address was a strange masterclass in propaganda

The Russian president didn’t give away anything he didn’t mean to, writes Mary Dejevsky. In doing so, he showed the world that despite reports to the contrary, he is still very much in control of his country – and himself

If Vladimir Putin’s intention had been to dispel the many recent rumours about his health or the effect that pandemic isolation might have had on his mind, he could hardly have done better (Reuters)

Russia’s annual Vladimir Putin extravaganza was cancelled last year, so this was the Russian president’s first combined news conference and nationwide phone-in since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As such, it was always going to be observed with particular attention to what it might say about the state of Russia, the state of the war – and the state of Putin. And the runes would be read just as keenly by the audience inside Russia as they inevitably were from abroad.

Let’s take the state of Putin first. Nearly four hours in, and 20 minutes or so before the Kremlin spokesperson began to draw proceedings to a close, the 71-year-old president was giving no sign of flagging. He was delivering as commanding a performance as I have seen him give on such occasions He exuded confident authority, combined – when he so chose – with geniality. He seemed at ease in a way that he rarely had done immediately before and in the early stages of the war.

As always, no question was too trivial or too local; he gave the impression of being at least as interested in those highlighting small regional issues as those asking about great affairs of state. He was his customary well-briefed and articulate self. From the reasons for the fluctuating rouble to the state of particular rural hospitals, to the rate of inflation in Argentina and why Russia should have invested more in its own aviation industry, rather than rushing to buy foreign planes, he never faltered, save maybe accidentally-on-purpose in response to one question which I will come to in due course.

In all, if Putin’s intention had been to dispel the many recent rumours about his health or the effect that pandemic isolation might have had on his mind, he could hardly have done better. He looked fit and he was as sharp intellectually and politically as ever. Something similar might be said of his political authority. Whatever wobbles there might have been in the early summer, when the head of the Wagner private military grouping mounted what some saw as a limited mutiny and others as an attempted coup, they have clearly been overcome.

If Putin’s authority was at all dented by that episode – and it should be remembered that Yevgeny Prigozhin’s troops got two-thirds of the way to Moscow from Rostov-on-Don in the south before apparently “agreeing” to turn back – it has recovered, at least for now, no doubt helped by the complete evisceration of Prigozhin since his untimely death in what appears to have been a sabotaged plane. At his press conference and phone-in, Putin gave not the slightest sense that he was in any way looking over his shoulder or trying to cover his back. He looked and sounded more in command than at any time in what have been for him two quite difficult years.

If the evidence on Putin was that he was back at the top of his game, the same cannot be said about the state of Russia. Now it is always true that these occasions invariably throw up particular local concerns, and that is part of the purpose: to act as a safety valve for grievances that could run out of control. One past phone-in even had regional governors on the line, who were asked directly by Putin to say what they were doing about this or that complaint.

What distinguished this year’s crop of Russia questions, whether from journalists or selected callers, was the recurrence of certain themes. One was inflation, in particular the price of eggs and chicken – the staples of the rural diet. Another was the state of provincial, and especially rural, healthcare, including dilapidated hospitals not repaired since Soviet times, periodic shortages of medicines, including measles vaccines, and specific difficulties with rail and air transport to further-flung parts of Russia.

Another line of questions, however, related in various ways to the war, and might cause the Kremlin more worry – though the fact that they were asked at all, and spelled out on a big screen above Putin’s desk, suggests that the powers that be wanted to assure Russians that the problems were known about at the top and being addressed. One concerned unpaid wages for troops; another, a sharp disparity between the pay – and especially benefits such as insurance and compensation for the families of those killed in action – as between volunteers in the regular Russian armed forces and those serving in private military (ie mercenary) detachments. At one point, Putin indicated that the Kremlin had been surprised by the number of such groupings that had sprung up. Wagner, it appears, was the biggest and best-known, but not unique. This might well be a source of concern to Moscow.

Which leads to the state of the war, its prognosis, and related international matters. In general, Putin seemed reasonably satisfied with the state of the military conflict from Russia’s perspective, although he conceded that Ukraine’s ability to jam Russian communications had caused difficulties. At the same time, however, he sent what seemed to be two different, indeed contradictory, signals about where things were going.

The first was a defiant re-statement of why Russia had resorted to military force, summed up as “We are not afraid to fight for our national interests,” which included a history of failed attempts to improve relations with the West, and what Russia sees as a US-inspired coup – otherwise known as the Euromaidan popular uprising – that ousted Ukraine’s then-president, Viktor Yanukovych, in 2014.

Asked when the war would end, Putin restated his familiar position that it would end when Russia has “achieved its objectives”. On occasion, Russian officials have left those objectives undefined, hinting perhaps at some flexibility. This time, however, he returned to Russia’s initial demands: the “de-Nazification” and “demilitarisation” of Ukraine. So, no change there, apparently.

In answer to a different question, however, Putin seemed to send a quite different message. Somewhat to my surprise, a New York Times journalist was not only in attendance, but called on to ask a question, which she used to enquire about the detained Wall Street Journal correspondent, Evan Gershkovich. This is where Putin (deliberately?) faltered, seemingly confused about the nationality of the person concerned.

Thereafter, though, he said this: “We have not refused to return them to the US. We are trying to agree on conditions that will be acceptable to both sides. We are in contact with our American colleagues on the matter, and dialogue is ongoing. It is complicated, but ongoing...”

It is rare for talks such as these to be mentioned by either party while they are still in progress, and Putin would have been well aware that he was addressing an international, as well as a Russian, audience. All of this raises many questions, including whether the US and Russia might be talking about other things, too – including the war in Ukraine, even what is sometimes termed a “diplomatic off-ramp” for the combatants. Putin also mentioned the possibility of a meeting with French president Emmanuel Macron. One conclusion might be that while Putin wants to show an implacable face to Ukraine for the time being at least, he might also be angling to end the freeze with the West.

In all, Putin’s end-of-year marathon conveyed three quite significant messages. First, that the Russian president is thoroughly fit and in charge; second, that Russians are grumbling about some effects of the war, including high prices and unfairness in troops’ conditions and pay; and third, that there may be more East-West diplomacy going on than might appear. For those willing to listen, they offer a chance for both Western leverage and hope.