Why populism is so seductive – and how to counter it

Illuminating political research emerging from the world of data science gives us some clues about why Boris Johnson won in the first place

Within a few days we may have a war in Europe and the end of King Boris. Despite appearances in the Commons, this may be the calm before the storm. It is a good moment to draw on some illuminating political research emerging from the world of data science, which gives us some clues about why Johnson won in the first place, and why leaders like him have been successful.

Eric Protzer at Harvard and his Australian collaborator, Paul Somerville, have crunched vast amounts of data from opinion polls and social surveys to address the question “why populism?” and they give us some clues about how to counter it.

In recent years there has been a wave of successful political movements which reject conventional political parties and philosophies and the authority of  traditional “elites” and claim to speak for the “ordinary voter”: Trump in the US; Brexit in the UK; the “gilets jaunes” in France; the Five Star movement and assorted extreme right parties in Italy; Bolsanaro in Brazil and left-wing populists who have won power in Mexico, Peru, Argentina and Chile; Orban’s Fidesz Party in Hungary; the Hindu nationalist BJP in India; and Duarte in the Philippines.

These movements are very different, and some are not new. Some are broadly “left” and others broadly “right” to the extent that these labels are still meaningful. Some are committed to democratic government; others are authoritarian. But they all tap into popular anger at the way the “political class” has failed to respond to their grievances.

The researchers recognise that data crunching is only as good as the data which is crunched. And there are familiar problems separating out causation from correlation. But they come to some highly significant conclusions. The usual explanations from the left (that populist politics is a response to growing inequality) or from the right (that it is due to permissive immigration policies) both appear to be wrong.

Rather, what lies behind the political rage which produces populist politics is a generalised sense of “unfairness” which arises from a decline in social mobility and frustrated opportunities. In other words, people have little objection to a minority becoming “filthy rich”, provided it is achieved through hard work, risk taking or good luck when opportunities are open to all and provided the wealthy are contributing as well as being rewarded.

There is little public anger about the staggering sums paid to sports superstars or pop idols; unless they seem to be dodging the rules that apply to everyone else (Novak Djokovic). Billionaires like Jeff Bezos or Elon Musk appear to enjoy high public regard, but respect turns to resentment if the super-rich are engaged in egregious tax dodging or dependent on special favours from politicians. It is the “unfairness” which counts.

So it is now with a populist leader hoist by his own petard. The prime minister was elected as a campaigning populist battling the “out of touch” pro-European elite. Now he is in terrible trouble for the unpardonable “elite” mistake of ignoring rules others have to observe. The rage this has provoked is comparable to that during the MPs’ expenses scandal in 2009.

Protzer and Somerville’s data also suggests that while large-scale immigration may cause unease, what converts the unease to anger is the perceived unfairness when immigrants are seen (or said) to be getting access to benefits without having “paid in”; or to have “jumped the queue”; or are undermining pay and conditions by operating in the “black economy”.

The analysis shows that the United States has been especially vulnerable to populism because there has been a decline in real wages and job security for many “blue collar” jobs combined with a sharp reduction in social mobility. The “American dream” has become an increasingly unlikely story. Trump’s political genius was to portray himself as an anti-establishment self-made man and to gloss over his inherited wealth.

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By contrast, the Scandinavian countries, have contained (though not escaped) populist politics much more successfully than the US, Britain or southern Europe. Denmark is top of the “happiness” league tables and has gone to some lengths to demonstrate that its social democratic model also addresses a popular notion of “fairness”. Everyone’s tax contribution is published and generous help for the disadvantaged is accompanied by some “tough love”.

The policy implications of the study are familiar, suggesting we should embrace the Nordic model (with a nod too to Canada and Australasia): create a sense of solidarity and security through a welfare state built around social insurance to which all contribute; invest heavily in education and “early years” to ensure that there is sense of “equal opportunities”; tax to create a sense of fairness but not to kill enterprise and hard work; and keep an open, competitive, market economy.

These are hardly new ideas but the challenge now – as for most of my time in British politics – has been creating a winning electoral coalition behind them. For all Johnson’s travails, there is work left to do on that front.

Sir Vince Cable is the former leader of the Liberal Democrats and served as secretary of state for business, innovation and skills from 2010 to 2015