The relationship between Britain and Germany has never been more important

Our parties, and our countries, have much in common: shared threats; a shared need for strong armed forces alongside an ambitious agenda on inequality and insecurity; and a shared willingness for closer cooperation

Nato’s new 10-year plan, agreed in Madrid a couple of weeks ago, confirmed that the war in Ukraine “has shattered peace and gravely altered our security environment” and Russia is that “most significant and direct threat to allies’ security”.

But it also clearly highlighted how this defensive alliance of democracies offers a strong way forward together, as “investing in Nato is the best way to ensure the enduring bond between European and North American allies”.

For Labour and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), our commitment to Nato is unshakeable and it is the primary defence alliance for Europe. We share the desire for this to be the basis of a strong partnership between our countries and understand that European Nato members should be willing to take greater responsibility for European security. Germany, as part of the EU, and the UK should sit at the heart of a strong European pillar in Nato.

The German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, has talked about a “turning point” in Europe caused by Putin’s war. Labour too has repeatedly argued that the UK’s Conservative government should reboot defence planning. This should be seen within the context of the SPD and Labour’s deep commitment to international rules and multilateral structures – with Nato’s Strategic Concept noting adversaries are pursuing “a deliberate effort to undermine multilateral norms and institutions”.

There is good reason to believe that our parties, the SPD and Labour, can and should offer a distinctive security agenda. We recognise the security threats posed by inequality, climate change, and a lack of food, water, and healthcare. But we also recognise this goes hand in hand with proper investment in our armed forces and military cooperation. That is why one of Nato’s three core tasks is crisis prevention, and the alliance is committed to becoming “the leading international organisation when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change”.

Strengthening industrial collaboration with joint procurement programmes is one of the most visible and important forms of military collaboration. We’ve seen this with the Boxer armoured vehicle programme for the British army with vehicles being built in the UK and benefitting from German expertise, data and collaboration, just as Tornado and Eurofighter jets – the product of collaboration – kept Europe safe. There is also potential to promote greater energy security through offshore wind projects to achieve our climate and security objectives.

We want to explore the scope for a British-German Lancaster House-style agreement on defence and security – struck post-election by SPD and Labour governments – which encourages both countries to look for and consult on prospective programmes. Similar to the UK-France Treaty, this could also improve collaboration between defence companies, increase the sharing of facilities, and facilitate defence exports.

We would also support regular joint consultation arrangements between our governments which extend beyond the limited dialogue in the UK-German Joint Declaration.

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The EU has proved that it has much to contribute to defence and security, with its sanctions against Russia, technical legal and economic support to Ukraine, and plans for enhanced military mobility, and why the Strategic Concept states that “the EU is a unique and essential partner for Nato”.

Labour and the SPD want better complimentary collaboration between NATO and the EU, and Labour will seek to formalise a security pact with the EU to help strengthen UK and wider EU security. For Germany, the EU is core to its national interest. Having a functioning partnership with the EU, based on trust and cooperation in areas like security, is also clearly in the UK’s national interest.

Our parties, and our countries, have much in common: shared threats; a shared need for strong armed forces alongside an ambitious agenda on inequality and insecurity; and a shared willingness for closer cooperation – bilaterally and also between the UK and the EU.

This relationship would be based on reliability and respect to achieve the prize of European security. As Ukraine has shown, allies and alliances matter. And we believe that Germany and the UK can be a stronger force for good in the world when we work closely together.

John Healey is Labour’s shadow defence secretary, and Nils Schmid is Germany’s Social Democratic Party parliamentary group spokesperson for foreign affairs