Will Keir Starmer calling the president of Iran make any difference to its retaliation against Israel?
That the call happened at all reflects the alarm gripping much of the Western world at the prospect of a full-scale war engulfing the Middle East, writes Mary Dejevsky
In a league table of the surprises this summer has brought, Monday evening’s phone call between the prime minister of the UK and the president of Iran has to rank pretty high up.
This was the first – at least the first publicised – call between leaders of the two countries at this level since Boris Johnson spoke to Iran’s then president, Hassan Rouhani, more than three years ago. Much water has flowed beneath many bridges since then.
The UK found a way of paying its 40-year-old debt to Iran, with interest; Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe was freed to return to the UK after six years in prison, along with another dual national, Anoosheh Ashoori; and the two countries have changed prime ministers and presidents more than once.
That the call happened at all, however – and happened when it did – reflects less the elimination of many (though not all) obstacles in the long-chequered UK-Iran relationship than the alarm gripping much of the Western world at the prospect of a full-scale war engulfing the Middle East.
The fear is that Iran will launch a direct attack on Israel and/or escalate the conflict on Israel’s northern border through its proxy, Hezbollah, in response to the assassination of the Hamas political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, two weeks ago in Tehran.
To some, the fact that it has not done so yet suggests hesitation, and the chance that Iran could be open to dissuasion; to others, it means merely that Tehran is biding its time, so that every day brings the dreaded reprisal closer.
Dissuasion appears to have been very much at the heart of Keir Starmer’s message when he spoke to Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian. In the summary of the 30-minute conversation issued by No 10, Starmer said he was “deeply concerned” by the situation in the region and urged Iran to “refrain” from attacking Israel, arguing that “war is not in anyone’s interests”.
There was, he warned, a “serious risk of miscalculation, and now was the time for calm and careful consideration”. Starmer reiterated his support for an immediate ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, the release of all hostages, an increase in aid for Gaza – and more diplomacy to achieve this.
It is not known how the Iranian president replied. What was clear, however, was that Starmer’s call was just one part of a concerted, and perhaps last-ditch, Western diplomatic effort to avert a wider conflict.
In what was a busy day on the diplomatic front, Starmer also took part in other calls, which produced two joint statements – one with Germany and France, which repeated calls for a ceasefire in Gaza, with an appeal for restraint from Iran; the other with the addition of the United States and Italy, which struck a rather tougher tone, pledging to defend Israel in the event of an attack and warning of “serious consequences for regional security” should Iran decide to act.
With the US also announcing new naval deployments in the region, including the accelerated arrival of the USS Abraham Lincoln strike group, this is a classic example of good cop, bad cop, although it was not clear what Iran was being offered to stay its hand beyond – perhaps – diplomatic engagement.
There was no mention, for instance, of softening sanctions. While the UK prime minister’s phone call with President Pezeshkian, along with the accompanying statements, was clearly prompted by the West’s shared concern about the immediate risks of a wider war, there are details that suggest there were other factors at work.
One would be a desire on the part of the new UK government to make its mark as a collegiate diplomatic player – and as a European player, not just as an acolyte of the United States. Hence the two statements, one reflecting primarily European priorities, with a specifically European tone. By coincidence of timing, Starmer received a flying start internationally, by dint of the Nato summit in Washington and the European Political Community gathering at Blenheim Palace, both taking place within days of his entering No 10. This was a start not to be squandered.
Another would be a desire to explore – even at this difficult time – whether a new president in Iran could make any sort of positive difference to the prevailing hostility between Iran and the West. Pezeshkian was the unexpected victor in the election held after the death of his predecessor in a helicopter crash last May. Whether this could bring any change, to either domestic or foreign policy (or both), is the subject of continuing conjecture.
For some, hopes are misplaced, as it is not the president but the supreme leader who makes the decisions in Iran’s theocracy, so there can be and will be no change without change at the very top. Others point to Pezeshkian’s reputation as a relative (stress, relative) liberal; the fact that he won the election; and the still-seething social ferment – and discern something less bleak.
The difficulty is that now may not be the time to capitalise on such a prospect, even if it exists. No government can afford to look weak if its sovereignty is violated. Iran made a largely symbolic response to the presumed Israeli strike on its representation in Damascus.
It cannot afford a repeat, not least because the attack of 31 July was on a building in Tehran and killed a foreign dignitary who was, as a guest, under its protection. It is not just national security that comes into play here, but dignity and honour. Iran might yet restrain its response, but a response there will have to be. That such intense efforts are being made to hold Iran back, however, says something else as well.
One of Donald Trump’s better reasons, as president, for trying to start talking specifically to Moscow and Pyongyang was that each generated a disproportionate amount of instability elsewhere. Settle one problem, and you would settle others as well. The same could be said now of Iran.
In his call on Monday, Starmer warned Iran’s president against giving further support to Russia against Ukraine, asked for better treatment of detained foreign nationals, and demanded a halt to threats against Iranian nationals in the UK. Intriguingly, the two sides agreed that “a constructive dialogue between the UK and Iran was in both countries’ interests”, albeit the UK set the conditions.
And this is true. Re-engagement with Iran could help defuse the sort of bilateral and third-country problems mentioned in the Downing Street account of the call, as well as defusing a whole set of tensions across the Middle East.
Unfortunately, it is unlikely there will be any progress before Iran has avenged the killing of its Hamas guest; and – depending on what it decides to do – any re-engagement with Iran may then be even less likely.
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