Has Biden ended America’s love affair with Israel?

Faced with Netanyahu’s unsparing belligerence in Gaza and the contempt he has shown to global concern, the US special relationship with Israel has been pushed to breaking point. But what happens next could help reshape Middle East politics for the better, says Mary Dejevsky

Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu greets president Joe Biden in Tel Aviv (AP)

Viewed with the benefit of hindsight, the UN Security Council resolution passed on Monday was no more than the logical conclusion of a painfully gradual revision of US policy that has been going on since at least January. That does not make it any less of a landmark.

Practically every word of Resolution 2728 illustrates just how far the US stance has changed, and how far what was once unacceptable to the US – and its ally, Israel – has now been accepted by the US. These include the demand for an “immediate ceasefire”, although initially only for Ramadan, the fact that it should be “unconditional” – that is, not linked to the release of the hostages, which is the subject of a separate demand.

There is no mention of Hamas, and the resolution implies the release of hostages/prisoners by both sides. A second clause “emphasises the urgent need to expand the flow of humanitarian assistance and reinforce the protection of civilians in the entire Gaza Strip”, which amounts to direct criticism of Israel.

Now, it is true that the US abstained, rather than voting for the resolution, but with all 14 other votes in favour – including, by the way, that of the UK – it became the first calling for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire to pass since Israel began its military operations in Gaza. The US would have known how the other votes would go, and its abstention was essentially acquiescence. As such, it was a demonstrative break in US diplomatic support for Israel that has held more or less solid in international forums for the best part of 50 years.

Confirmation of how exceptional this was came in Israel’s swift and very public response. It included the last-minute cancellation of a high-level visit to Washington and a statement from prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office that accused the US of harming the war effort and work going into securing the release of Israel’s 134 remaining hostages.

Now it is true that US-Israel relations, and more particularly relations between president Biden and Netanyahu, had been progressively cooling since the unconditional support provided by the US in the wake of the Hamas killings of 7 October. It is also true that Washington had eyed Netanyahu’s plans to “destroy Hamas” with a certain wariness from early on, with statements by Biden and the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, becoming more urgent and public as the Palestinian casualties mounted and food and medical supplies to Gaza ran short. Most recently, Israel was warned that its conduct in the war risked damaging its own cause.

What could happen if the United States is no longer anchored in the Middle East by a near-unconditional alliance with Israel?

There are various theories as to how one of the most durable US alignments anywhere in the world has reached the breaking point it stands at today. One suggests that Netanyahu actually contrived to bring it about, with a view to thwarting any plans Biden might have to resurrect the “two-state solution”, with designs for a Palestinian state to rise from the ashes of Gaza. Or that Netanyahu wants to continue military operations to delay the likely collapse of his coalition and his removal from office when the war is over.

On the US side, Washington was certainly embarrassed by the growing opprobrium it faced at the UN, including from otherwise staunch allies, and its resulting diplomatic isolation. Even the UK, which has more often than not followed the US in UN votes concerning Israel, has kept its distance over Gaza, abstaining in all recent votes where the US cast its veto.

Popular support for Israel in the United States also seems not to be the given it once was. Plus, this is a presidential election year. US voters increasingly dislike association with foreign wars – a factor that could favour Donald Trump – and the US has a small, but growing Muslim minority, many of whom live in Michigan, a key swing state.

Whatever lies behind the evolution of the US position at the UN, and Biden’s electoral calculations may have quite a lot to do with it, the very open US diplomatic break with Netanyahu could have implications far beyond Gaza. In fact, the Gaza war may be less affected than almost anything else, given the disregard of both Hamas and Israel for international opinion. It is rather the big picture, the dynamics of the region as a whole, that could change.

To put it another way, what could happen if the United States is no longer anchored in the Middle East by a near-unconditional alliance with Israel?

This, of course, depends in part on how far the current break is primarily with Netanyahu, or part of a longer and deeper trend. Certainly, Netanyahu, a political veteran whose first term as prime minister began in 1996, has caused grief to practically every US president since Bill Clinton at one time or another, and there would be few tears at his departure. His implacable opposition to the two-state solution – the heart of US Middle East policy for decades – is one reason; another is that he may know the US almost too well, having spent some of his youth, education and early career there.

If, once the Gaza operation is over, Netanyahu has to pay the political price for the security lapses that facilitated the Hamas killings in October, and the failure or delay in securing the release of Israel’s hostages, then it may be that the US has decided to pause, and make a new start with a successor. But this would probably not be straightforward, given that any new government in Israel is likely to have national security as its out-and-out priority and could be even more averse than Netanyahu to a Palestinian state. The growing clout of religious conservatives and the legacy of the 7 October attacks could make Israel, even without Netanyahu, a very awkward ally for US and European leaders for many years.

This opens the prospect that the change in Washington’s relationship with Israel could survive Netanyahu’s departure and even become the norm. Such a move would probably not present the existential threat to Israel it might have done in the past. Israel is probably better equipped to defend itself than it has ever been, and most of its neighbours are more accepting of its presence than they once were.

It has been striking how the conflict with Hamas has not, for the most part, spread far beyond Gaza. Egypt, Turkey and Iran and its proxies have all mostly kept their distance. Saudi Arabia is still pursuing normalisation, despite Israel’s assault on Gaza, and the Abraham Accords between Israel and the Gulf states – a largely unsung achievement of the Trump presidency – still stand. What is more, the Palestinians still have no leadership worthy of the name.

Could it be that, without the current extent of US support, Israel would find its place in the region in a way that would eventually lead to its acceptance of a Palestinian state, with accompanying safeguards enshrined in a regional agreement? Could US disengagement, in effect, force Israel to establish stable relations with its neighbours, as it has never really had to do?

And might a new US administration consider scaling back its engagement in the Middle East? This is easier to imagine in the event of a second Trump presidency than during a second Biden term, given fears that Russia and/or China could fill some of the space left by the US. But what reason is there for the US to stay? Thanks to policies initiated by George W Bush, it is no longer dependent on the region for energy, and its security priorities are shifting to the Pacific. It could want to keep a military presence in the Gulf to parry China’s advances, as the new energy-hungry power.

At the same time, a less special relationship with Israel could make the US a more amenable partner to others in the region than it currently is. A policy change forced on the US by an international consensus, domestic electoral considerations and, just perhaps, a soupçon of morality could, over the long term, help reshape relationships in the Middle East in a positive way.