Israel is getting closer than ever to many Arab nations – but Trump has made sure it is nothing but an illusion

Benjamin Netanyahu will find cooperation harder than he thinks, thanks to the actions of the US president

Donald Trump, left, with Benjamin Netanyahu during a recent visit (Reuters)

When the speaker of the Kuwaiti parliament, Marzouq al-Ghanim threw a copy of Donald Trump’s “deal of the century” in the dustbin in front of hundreds of Arab parliamentarians on Saturday, it was quite the moment.

Less because of the performative nature of the move and more because it goes against a trend of increasing relations with Israel , that is every day picking an Arab state after another.

During a recent visit to Uganda, Benjamin Netanyahu held talks with Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the head of Sudan’s sovereign council. Shortly after news about the meeting surfaced, Israeli TV said Netanyahu proposed arrangement to the Moroccan government that would see the US recognise Moroccan claims in disputed Western Sahara, in exchange for Rabat improving relations with Israel. Several media outlets have quoted former officials talking about a non-aggression agreement that might be signed between Arab countries and Israel as a next step to Trump’s ”peace plan”.

The question now among every Arab official and activist I’ve spoken to is: Who is next? But the question needs to be different, more like: Are such visits and coordination on Iran and the Palestinian issue a sign of full “normalisation” of ties? The answer is no. While a number of Arab nations are seriously engaged in diplomatic discussions with Israel, it more resembles a rapprochement. Some essential conditions of normalisation are not being met.

Official diplomatic relations alone are not adequate. Egypt and Jordan already host Israeli embassies and maintain open security and political ties following their peace treaties signed decades ago with Israel. But, the peace is somewhat cold and both countries are still far away from “normalising” their relations with either the government or the people of Israel.

Long-term normalisation of relations would include setting up official and public diplomatic relations as merely the first step of mutual recognition. Then comes the advancing of intense cooperation on military, culture, trade, investment, technology, visas and other aspects of linking people together. This requires a new acceptance within each society, breaking down long-held views that perceive Israel as an enemy and replacing them with other dominant ideas of acceptance. It will always be as complicated as it sounds.

The US, led by the Trump administration, is throwing its weight behind Netanyahu. Diplomats in the region have told me that they believe the US is using its influence to “coerce countries in the region to speak to the Israelis as a first condition to improve their relations with Washington.” This happens through procrastinating over lifting sanctions imposed on Sudan, seducing Morocco with the Western Sahara conflict, promising Gulf States with security assurances, and using diplomatic support to pressure Egypt and others. Although the White House would deny that it has, or would, employ such tactics.

This brings a likely new strategic reality. In the wake of the recent American disengagement in the Middle East, US and Israeli policy will likely lump together and make Israel the new regional cop around which the US will draw its new objectives. But the Arab and the Israeli governments have completely different values. This makes the excitement limited to the official circles around Netanyahu and his new Arab friends. In the streets, things look different.

On the strategic side, politics in the Middle East are extremely fluid. The Israeli common-enemy policy towards the anti-Iran Gulf States could prove to be a mistake. At the time of Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran, this policy proved effective in bringing Gulf countries closer to Israel.

But many forget that the very purpose of the painful economic sanctions imposed on Iran is actually to force the Iranians to negotiate a new deal on their nuclear programme with Trump. If he gets re-elected, he could reach a new deal with Iran – even if that appears unlikely now. This would leave holes in Netanyahu’s policy and diplomatic gaps created by a lack of a common-enemy narrative. Although Washington would likely try and limit the diplomatic damage to Israel, any “normalisation” policy will no longer be on the solid ground it currently is.

This proves that the biggest hitch will always remain the Arab people’s acceptance. Despite of what state media tries to tell them, many are still adamant that in order to be accepted and recognised in the region, Israel has to show a real desire for making peace with the Palestinians based on their aspirations of a sovereign state. There has to be movement on the most entrenched questions around settlements, Jerusalem, the refugees and the land. For many Arabs, any rapprochement with Israel now is no less than stabbing the Palestinians in the back.

The reality now is: after standing with Trump as he laid out his “deal of the century,” Netanyahu and Israel may find real connection with the Arab world more elusive than ever.