As he pursues a fight on five fronts, does Netanyahu even want peace?

It certainly doesn’t seem to look that way, writes Bronwen Maddox, who wonders whether Israel – for all its tactical victories – has any long-term strategy at all

Netanyahu’s belligerent speech to the United Nations last week led diplomats to ask whether he was preparing the ground for an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities (Reuters)

One year on from the invasion led by Hamas terrorists that has been called the greatest trauma in Israel’s history, in which 1,200 Israelis were killed and more than 200 taken hostage, Benjamin Netanyahu’s government claims sudden success.

For much of the past year, it has been accused by Israelis of failing to defeat Hamas, capture its leaders or return the hostages. The 7 October attacks left the reputation of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the intelligence agencies in tatters. Israel’s subsequent assault on Gaza, which has led to the deaths of more than 40,000 Palestinians, has shredded its international reputation.

In just two weeks, Israel has killed the Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, destroyed the communications network of the group, and now, sent forces into southern Lebanon. Netanyahu has vowed to retaliate for Iran’s missile strikes on 1 October (which were, in turn, retaliation for the assassination of Nasrallah).

Most important, perhaps, is the fact that Netanyahu has extracted a change of tone from the US. The Biden administration had steadily called on Israel to show restraint over Lebanon and was pushing for a ceasefire in Gaza. In contrast, this week it pledged to back Israel in exacting “severe consequences” on Iran for the missile strikes.

Netanyahu’s belligerent speech to the United Nations last week, to an almost empty chamber (many countries having walked out), led diplomats to ask whether he was preparing the ground for an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. The prime minister has long called Tehran’s nuclear programme an intolerable threat. The US said that it did not back such strikes (many doubt they would impede the programme) but it would support further sanctions against Tehran.

However, Netanyahu and his government have shown no interest in a wider strategy in which Israel does not just survive by beating back threats, but thrives through better relations with its neighbours. His government has vowed not to pursue a two-state solution with the Palestinians, and it has shown no interest in talks to normalise relations with Saudi Arabia.

The Saudi deal is the great prize above all others for Israel – offering it an ally to help counter Iran and a gateway to connections with the Sunni Islamic world, say, with Malaysia and Indonesia too. But the kingdom has made clear that talks are a non-starter without a ceasefire in Gaza and a commitment to a path to a Palestinian state.

One year on, the trauma of 7 October is palpable across Israel. Posters for the missing hostages begin at the airport, their ages struck out and one year older written in. A few people have begun to return to live in the kibbutzim that were the prime target of Hamas’s attack, but many houses remain burned and vacant, and the gas supply pipes used to ignite them are still severed.

Of the hostages in Gaza, around a third are thought to have died or been killed. Many fear more hostages will die, kept in underground tunnels with little light, air, food or water. There is a deep rift in Israeli society between those who want Netanyahu to strike a deal to bring the hostages home – tens of thousands still demonstrate in Tel Aviv on Saturday nights – and those who want to pursue Hamas until Israel has captured or killed its leader, Yahya Sinwar.

The economy is suffering, too, from the call-up of reservists to the IDF, and from the quiet exit of some in the tech sector to calmer locations on the US west coast and in Lisbon’s booming digital community.

Less measurable is the damage to Israel’s international reputation – but it is huge. Much of the world has been appalled by the pictures of Gaza turned to rubble and stories of Palestinian families of 50 or 70 people entirely wiped out. The International Criminal Court’s (ICC) chief prosecutor is seeking arrest warrants against Netanyahu as well as Hamas leaders.

The UK, a committed supporter of Israel, has toughened its stance (while continuing to affirm Israel’s right to defend itself). It has suspended export licences for some arms, declined to stand in the way of the ICC action, and restarted funding of UNRWA – the UN agency that distributes most aid in Gaza but is accused by Israel of helping Hamas.

In the US, a country with a long commitment to Israel, student protests have been passionate. This has been called a “Vietnam moment” – a point when students became alert to their country’s actions in the world, and (even if not masters of all the details) tried to change it.

Meanwhile, international concern is rising about violence carried out by Israeli settlers on the West Bank, land earmarked for a future Palestinian state, which has been occupied by Israel since 1967.

Two Israeli cabinet ministers, Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir, have led what many see as a new land grab. The cabinet has authorised five new settlements in the past two months and since 7 October has backed government support (paved roads, electricity, and water) for 70 illegal outposts, according to Peace Now, an Israeli NGO. The EU and the UK are actively discussing whether to sanction those two ministers, but are held back – for the moment – by concerns about sanctioning democratically elected politicians.

Is it still folly to talk of a two-state solution – that phrase redolent of the 1980s and 1990s peace process? Inside Israel, other than in the now-tiny peace community, there is little audible interest. Even among those who were previously sympathetic, this is now often dismissed as a solution that would reward terrorists for their actions. Yet for other countries in the region who want a peaceful relationship, that diplomatic route remains the focus of a solution – if a ceasefire can be achieved.

However, a ceasefire is not close. Israel has added new conditions – retaining control of the “Philadelphi corridor” along Gaza’s border with Egypt. Hamas has added new names to its demands for the release of Palestinian prisoners. This week’s escalation in Lebanon risks diverting attention entirely.

More importantly, there is little sense that the Netanyahu government has much interest in this route. It is hard to see, though, how Israel can find a way to thrive in the region – not just to survive – while it pursues a fight on every side at the expense of the alliances that would help it achieve a wider peace.

Bronwen Maddox is the director of Chatham House