The Middle East is closer than ever to all-out war – but there is a path to peace

As Israel refuses a ceasefire with Lebanon, the future of the region is again on a knife edge – but this time, says Mary Dejevsky, the key to any peaceful settlement rests elsewhere

Israel’s airstrikes in Lebanon have brought the region closer to all-out conflict than it has been for many years (AP)

It is a gauge of the alarm with which the West and its Gulf allies view the latest escalation in the Middle East that all the G7 states and a clutch of others issued a joint call for a 21-day ceasefire in Lebanon, in the hope of paving the way for talks.

There was the coincidence, of course, that so many national leaders had converged on New York for this year’s UN General Assembly, facilitating top-level meetings at short notice. But the will had to be there, and it was.

There was also some tentative diplomacy by the French president, Emmanuel Macron, which produced a joint statement with the US president, Joe Biden, calling for a settlement that enabled civilians to return to their homes – the professed aim of Israel’s campaign.

The appeals fell on deaf ears, however. It was a matter of hours before Israel responded that it was not done yet. President Benjamin Netanyahu ordered his country’s forces to continue the fight “with full force”. And with the campaign – which began with the exploding pagers and walkie-talkies a week ago – so far going well for Israel, why would it not carry on?

It remains to be seen whether what is planned is, as Israel says, a limited operation designed to secure the border and ensure the return of Israeli residents, or whether – as has been mooted – the missile attacks, which have extended into the Bekaa Valley and so far killed an estimated 600 people, might be the prelude to a ground invasion, designed to disarm, or even root out, the Iran-backed militia known as Hezbollah once and for all.

Whatever the purpose (and it may not yet have been decided), the truth is that, with Israel now fighting on two fronts – to its west and south in Gaza, and to its north in Lebanon – the region is closer to all-out war than it has been for many years. With the spread of the war into southern Lebanon, any operations cannot but be haunted by many ghosts from recent history – by no means all of which has gone well for Israel.

It is 24 years since Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon after an occupation of more than two decades, leaving Hezbollah largely in place. Six years later, it was back in a month-long war after a series of incursions by Hezbollah, but again, there was no real resolution.

And the difficult history goes back further. To the massacre by Israeli forces of Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila camps in Beirut in 1982; to the suicide bombing at the US barracks at Beirut airport the following year, which killed more than 250 US marines; and to what became seen as the ignominious end to the US military presence in Lebanon, when President Reagan took the decision to pull US forces out the following year.

With hindsight, this decision can be viewed as the start of the decline of US influence in the region. It is also seen – as in the recent BBC TV documentary, Corridors of Power– as helping to inform Barack Obama’s decision 30 years later not to enforce his stated “red lines” in Syria. What, his argument went, would really be achieved?

For all the evidence that the region could be on the brink of all-out war, however, there are compelling reasons why that might yet not happen. Quite simply, there are many – most – inside and outside the region who do not want it to happen, and are doing their best to stave it off.

The most obvious is Lebanon itself, where memories of the 15-year civil war are still fresh, and where the political and demographic balance is so fragile that any upset in that balance could precipitate chaos. It is an extraordinary situation, where a part of the country and a part of its border are not under central government control, but the accommodation of Hezbollah has fostered a strange kind of stability.

Fears that Hezbollah might exploit Israel’s war against Hamas after 7 October last year to intensify their attacks on northern Israel were also not realised, whether because the militia lacked the capacity or because it was restrained by its Iranian masters.

Other Arab states also held back after 7 October. Qatar and other Gulf states initiated various mediation attempts – without success. Egypt and Jordan, perhaps for reasons to do with their own weakness, or harbouring their own fears of Hamas, also remained on the sidelines, as Israel laid Gaza waste.

The European countries, for the most part, have no interest in any all-out Middle Eastern war. Not only are they preoccupied with a war much closer to home, but many are finding it ever more difficult to persuade their voters of the need to keep their belts tightened for the sake of Ukraine. The new energy price spirals that could be caused by a Middle East war are the last thing they need.

All-out war in the Middle East is also the last thing that President Biden needs at this point. There had been reports, in the weeks after 7 October, that the US administration might be eyeing a new peace process with the Gulf states, in the hope of using the new instability in the region as a pretext for trying to formulate a wider regional peace.

Any efforts to that end now seem very far away. What is more, now that Biden has given up his ambitions for a second term, he has his legacy on his mind, and – perhaps secondarily – the prospects for a Democratic victory in the November election. Neither would be served by a conflagration in the Middle East, which could be the last word on his presidency and doom the Democrats to defeat.

From a parochial perspective, the UK also has every reason to try to prevent the spread of war in the region. It would not just divert attention from Ukraine – one war is enough at any one time – but it could also revive the disagreements among Labour MPs about Britain’s policy towards Israel, at a time when Labour’s entry into government has not gone as smoothly as they might have hoped.

The very public preparations for evacuating UK citizens from Lebanon also suggest an awareness somewhere of the criticism of the last Labour government over what was seen as the inadequate operation to evacuate UK nationals from the same country in 2006.

The key to any escalation – or not – of the current conflict has to lie in Tehran. The signs so far have been that Iran is as averse to any spread of the conflict as is any country in the region – and that is not for want of provocations, including an attack on its diplomatic buildings in Damascus and the assassination of a Hamas leader in Tehran.

The most articulate exposition of Iran’s concern not to become embroiled in a Middle East war, however, came only this week, in the speech given by Iran’s new president to the UN. While Masoud Pezeshkian launched the standard attacks on Israel, and on the West for the sanctions that have so impoverished his country, the rest of what he said and how he said it seemed designed to send a rather different message.

First, Pezeshkian appeared in Western dress. Second, he emphasised his election and the reform platform on which he had stood. He made a point of saying that Iran wanted to be an international player, and – unlike, notoriously, at least one of his predecessors – he expressly allowed for the right of Israel to exist.

Proposing a referendum of all Palestinians on self-determination, he said: “We are confident that through this mechanism, we can achieve a lasting peace, with Muslims, Christians and Jews living alongside one another in one land in tranquillity and peace...”

As a final olive branch, he suggested that Iran could return to a nuclear agreement – noting that it was Donald Trump who had ended the last one – in return for a loosening of sanctions. He concluded by saying that he hoped his message would be “carefully heard”. It should be.

Objections may arise that the president of Iran is not the supreme leader, and that his word on the subject may not necessarily be the last. But none of his points suggest a country that is trying to shut itself off, still less preparing for war.

So if Iran, and practically every other country in the region, and with interests there, is so clearly opposed to a wider war, this leaves Israel, and Hamas – where this conflict began.

In such a perilous situation, the possibility cannot be excluded that a wider war erupts by mistake, or that Iran might be provoked beyond its patience. But with the consensus as it is, and including Iran, there is surely a chance that it can be avoided.