How to tackle the murder and mayhem

Bruce Hoffman explains what governments can do to fight terrorism

Events this past week have again demonstrated the continuing threat posed by terrorism to peace processes in both Northern Ireland and the Middle East, and even more so the difficulties governments everywhere face in effectively countering this menace.

The murder of 17 Greek tourists in Cairo yesterday morning is the latest and most lethal in a series of more than 30 attacks against foreign travellers that have occurred in Egypt since 1992. Only hours earlier a bomb had exploded in London, shattering any hope that the hiatus in IRA attacks following the Canary Wharf, Aldwych bus and Brompton cemetery bombings would last until the all-party talks scheduled to be held in June.

Meanwhile, Lebanon entered a second week of harsh Israeli military reprisals designed to end Hezbollah's cross-border rocket attacks; while the US Senate, on Wednesday, enacted sweeping new anti-terrorism legislation in the wake of last year's bombing in Oklahoma City. Indeed, today marks the first anniversary of that tragic incident.

Though otherwise unconnected, this series of events inevitably raises the question of what governments can do to combat so diverse and amorphous a phenomenon as terrorism - if indeed there is anything that can realistically be done.

The fundamental problem is that terrorism erupts and flourishes due to an idiosyncratic combination of factors- historical, ideological, religious, social and economic to name but a few. Not surprisingly, therefore, the strategies and tactics used by governments throughout the world to counter terrorism have varied just as widely, from such highly visible actions as declarations of states of siege, or martial law, enactment of anti- terrorist legislation, and strengthening of judicial powers, to less visible measures such as the establishment of computerised data banks, enhanced intelligence capabilities, and covert operations.

Some of these countermeasures have been more successful than others, such as Italy's use of so-called repentant laws, whereby imprisoned terrorists confessed to their crimes in return for reductions in their sentences. Some have not only failed, like Britain's short-lived policy of interning terrorist suspects in Northern Ireland during the early Seventies, but have proved counterproductive, alienating the public from the authorities and further polarising an already fractured political environment. Other government countermeasures have had mixed results, such as amnesties and offers of cash rewards for information.

What the legacy of nearly three decades of counter-terrorist measures has shown is that the individual application of selected tactics and policies, outside a cohesive strategic framework or coherent national plan, can prolong a conflict or even lead to complete failure. Any plan, for example, must contain at least these three elements: legitimising measures, co- ordination within and between national intelligence and security services, and collaboration among governments.

Legitimising measures are critical to deprive the terrorists of legitimacy, undermine their claims as a viable alternative to the government, negate popular support or sympathy for them and redress any popular grievances that may indirectly fuel unrest, or be exploited for anti-government purposes. Such measures can include political concessions to nationalist, ethnic or religious minorities and defensive steps to protect the public from terrorist reprisals.

At the same time, anti-terrorist legislation must aid the government in the capture and prosecution of terrorists, but must not alienate the general population. The role of the civilian population in the success or failure of a terrorist campaign is key and cannot be underestimated. Indeed, short of the complete suppression of civil liberties, a government cannot hope to defeat a terrorism campaign using coercive measures alone.

Equally vital is co-ordination within and between national intelligence and security services and with law enforcement agencies. The success of any counter-terrorist effort will rest not only on the type and quality of information gathered, but on the timely and effective dissemination of that information to all relevant branches of a government's counter- terrorism apparatus. Given the inherently clandestine nature of terrorist organisations, the emphasis must of course be on the cultivation and exploitation of human intelligence sources - what is known in the intelligence trade as "humint".

Collaboration between governments is also essential to prevent the trans- national movement of terrorists, their supporters and increasingly, the finances supporting their campaigns. Such co-operation will also facilitate the co-ordination and sharing of intelligence collection and dissemination as well as the efficacious processing of extradition requests. For example, terrorists operating in Western Europe during the Seventies and early Eighties were able to find political refuge in France, East European countries, and the Middle East and this seriously hampered international counter- terrorist efforts.

Since circumstances that allow implementation of all of these policies are unlikely to exist, it is critical for governments to devise counter- terrorist efforts that play to their strengths. Clearly, a democratic government will be unable to pursue intelligence or counter-terrorist operational activities as rigorously or repressively as a government less cognisant of civil liberties would do. On the other hand, without capitulating to terrorists, a democratic government can, for example, emphasise the development of thoughtful legislation that reflects popular concerns.

All governments face new problems in developing effective countermeasures, and these are likely to render combating terrorism even more difficult than it has been in the past. But while new challenges and threats will ineluctably require new responses and new approaches, these countermeasures can be effectively developed and built upon from the lessons from previous experiences. The wheel should not always have to be re-invented, nor should certain inherent prerequisites to effective counter-terrorism campaigns based on past experience be ignored or forgotten.

The writer is Director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at St Andrew's University.