Iran’s Qassem Soleimani was a risky target for Trump – but neither Tehran nor Washington will want all-out conflict

Both sides understand that an all-out confrontation will only harm them both

By all accounts, Qassem Soleimani was a risky target for the United States to assassinate – for that is what his extrajudicial killing does in fact represent. Despite his relative obscurity to the western public, he was a serious figure in Iran’s complicated and opaque power structures. While he is best understood as an amalgam of chief of staff, an unofficial foreign secretary and head spy, Soleimani still managed to maintain some distance from the more theocratic elements of the Tehran’s ruling class.

Thus he was more popular as a purely national figure than most of those ruling the Islamic republic with such authoritarian methods. For the Iranian public, and the wider Shia community pleading into Iraq itself, Soleimani represented Iran’s defiant attempts to defend its interest in a hostile region and, above all, anger at the (perceived) never-ending indignities imposed by America’s imperial ambitions.

Soleimani may, indeed almost certainly did, have American blood on his hands, being believed to have masterminded a series of operations against US personnel since George W Bush’s ill-starred invasion of Iraq in 2003. He would certainly have had knowledge of the protests and attempted invasion of the US embassy compound in Baghdad. Soleimani might have had further attacks on the Americans in mind (Washington hints that they had intelligence to this effect). He could be regarded – though it must surely push at the very limits of international and US law – as someone who would personally justify a lethal pre-emptive strike by drone. Still, his execution by presidential order is a remarkable act, even by contemporary standards. We are not quite back to the days when the CIA would happily try to knock off dictators in Vietnam, Cuba or Guatemala who had outlived their usefulness or were inconvenient – but not so very far away.

It is difficult to imagine that the American action will pass by with no reaction whatever from Iran. The supreme leader himself, Ali Khamanei, has vowed “severe revenge” on the great Satan. That is vague enough to allow for freedom of manoeuvre by Iranian and Iranian proxy Shia militias on the ground. It could mean another attack on surprisingly vulnerable (given their economic value) Saudi oil installations, from the bases of Iranian allies in Yemen, as has happened before. Hence, of course, the immediate spike in the price of a barrel of oil when the news of the death of Soleimani broke. It might also mean similar remote actions, such as the seizure of western oil tankers making the hazardous journey through the straits of Hormuz, again as has been seen before. Washington has repeatedly accused Tehran of surreptitious funding of terrorists, with the ultimate victims of their activities American or Israeli citizens, forces or property. No doubt the White House believes it should be prepared for an increase in such action. It will in any case prompt a more determined push by Tehran to acquire the nuclear armaments that they believe will protect them from further pressure by the United States.

Much the most likely reaction, though, is some ratcheting up of tensions in Iraq itself, and potentially an assault on the remaining 5,000 US military in the country. Almost 17 years since the American-led invasion of Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein, the nation is about as unstable as they day when President George W Bush declared, with absurd optimism: “Mission accomplished.” Two presidents later, and Donald Trump is still trying to wind down an unwinnable war. So, far from bringing the troops home, as he promised in the 2016 election, President Trump enters election year with that pledge far from fulfilled, and with America in danger of being humiliated by some further reckless act of reprisal by the Ayatollah’s private security arm, the Revolutionary Guard, of which Soleimani was such a prominent commander.

The real question, then, is not so much whether and how Iran will react – this can be guessed at easily enough – but how America will react to that that further and direct provocation. Though neither side would ever concede it, it comes down to politics in the early part of a presidential election year. If Donald Trump decides to escalate the conflict, then he surely invites further humiliation – because the deterrent effect of American retaliation is never going to be sufficient to deter a country intent on preserving its power and pride and using proxies to connect terror ops or capture hostages.

Mr Trump, unstable as he may be, or appears to be, is not so foolish (one would hope) to jeopardise his hopes of re-election in a game of chicken with the Ayatollahs. By the same token, the Iranians also have no wish to be in a trial of strength with a superpower - a trial they know they cannot, in the end, win. And so it may be that, despite the ratcheting up tensions, the escalation of hostilities may turn out to be less steep and rapid than feared, as the weeks wear on. America and Iran both understand that, on the most basic assessment of self-interest, neither has anything to gain from an all-out confrontation with an unknowable end point. Important, popular and symbolic a figure as Soleimani was, his bones (or what remains of them) are not worth a third world war.