Leading article: An accurate snapshot of an uncertain nation

The first thing to observe is that the inconclusive result presented an accurate snapshot of Germany's conflicted mood. Germany's PR system may have brought uncertainty but it is an uncertainty that accurately represents the views of the public. The reason Mr Schröder went to the country was because he was losing the support of his parliamentary party for the economic reforms he deemed necessary. He sought a new mandate from the voters, and he has not really obtained one.

But neither has his opponent, Angela Merkel. In his barnstorming campaign, Mr Schröder successfully scared Germans away from what he presented as her party's brand of "shock therapy". The social state remains as sacrosanct in Germany as the National Health Service in Britain. Ms Merkel overestimated the appetite of her fellow-countrymen for change.

It would be too pessimistic, however, to conclude that Germans had rejected change outright and forever. The choice was between Ms Merkel's radical version and more of the gradualist approach pursued by Mr Schröder. In the end only 8 per cent of voters opted to reverse tracks - the option presented by the new Left Party of Gregor Gysi and Oskar Lafontaine. A full 45 per cent backed Ms Merkel and the even more free-market FPD; slightly fewer supported Mr Schröder's "red-green" coalition. This comes close to a national consensus for reform.

Seen like this, it is hardly a disaster. If, as is possible, the labour market reforms begun by Mr Schröder at the start of this year start to reduce unemployment and improve economic growth before the year's end, far from all is lost. What is - or could be - a disaster is the political stalemate that looms. The last thing Germany needs is a distraction that stops even Mr Schröder's modest reforms in their tracks and gives Germans an excuse for luxuriating in a new bout of introspection.

Technically, the way forward is clear. Ms Merkel's centre-right alliance is the largest party in the new Bundestag even by the slimmest of margins. It is her right to try to form a coalition. Only if she fails, should the alternatives be canvassed. A grand coalition, opposed by Mr Schröder, is likely to work only if the two parties agree on priorities. During this campaign, however, Germany's two mainstream parties were as far apart on policies as they have ever been.

Other coalitions look equally improbable, even if it is hard at this stage to ascertain what is the true bargaining position in the statements of the party leaders. The inescapable fact is that this election campaign was unusually hard-fought. It was contested by five parties with identifiably different policies and articulate leaders. It is a compliment to all to say that Ms Merkel was presentationally the weakest.

Whatever happens next, it should happen as fast as Germany's ponderous political system allows. It is a strange world in which Ms Merkel, the arithmetical winner of this election, could be its greatest loser. But if anyone has emerged with political momentum, it is Mr Schröder. He could yet form a coalition, risk a minority government or contest new elections.

Many will greet even the prospect of his return to power as evidence that Germans are set against change. But that would be wrong. On 18 September Germans voted for change: what they could not decide was how radical and how fast that change should be.