Britain is paying the price for not taking the China threat seriously

Editorial: As ever, there is a balance. It seems we have erred on the side of complacency – if not carelessness

The UK alone cannot fight cold wars simultaneously with Russia and China (PA)

Though the latest report from parliament’s intelligence and security committee (ISC) on China sounds dry, it reads more like a fast-paced and terrifying thriller than the usual official report.

One particularly racy passage, for example, warns that “we are on a trajectory for the nightmare scenario where China steals blueprints, sets standards, and builds products, exerting political and economic influence at every step. This presents a serious commercial challenge, but also has the potential to pose an existential threat to liberal democratic systems.”

Against a well-organised, comprehensive, and long-term Chinese strategy of gaining technology, influence and a kind of hold on Britain, successive governments have done little to resist – and indeed don’t seem to have been much more than useful idiots in the face of a determined and serious Chinese onslaught.

As the ISC notes, “China’s size, ambition and capability have enabled it to successfully penetrate every sector of the UK’s economy, and – until the Covid-19 pandemic – Chinese money was readily accepted by HMG with few questions asked.” There has been some official consciousness of Chinese infiltration: but no joined-up thinking, still less counterespionage.

The ISC describes in excruciating detail how China has targeted certain areas with a highly strategic sense of purpose – particularly civilian nuclear power, universities, and “elite” influence.

Against all that, successive British governments look amateurish at best. The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, for example, was far too starry-eyed a decade ago when it sent David Cameron, George Osborne and Vince Cable plus a hefty delegation of British businesspeople to Beijing to launch the “golden age” of Sino-British relations.

By the time Theresa May became prime minister in 2017, the official mood had cooled, and she “called in” the plan for a huge new nuclear power station, Hinckley Point C, a joint venture between the Chinese and the French. It was too far advanced to cancel, and the British had little realistic choice in the matter.

Yet the ISC is rightly appalled that this decision has led seamlessly to another for the use of Chinese technology and Chinese operational control at Bradwell B nuclear plant: “It is unacceptable for the government still to be considering Chinese involvement in the UK’s Critical National Infrastructure at a granular level, taking each case individually and without regard for the wider security risk.”

Boris Johnson’s decision to scale back Huawei’s role in the 5G network a couple of years ago was a rare example of vigilance on the part of the UK. Otherwise, it has been a sorry story of appeasement and a “yes, please” attitude to investment. Depressingly, nor is there any immediate signal that this attitude is to change, though it echoes the failures of British policymakers in the 1930s to comprehend the rise of Germany.

Rishi Sunak is always careful to avoid describing China as a hostile state or its rise as a threat, but merely a “systemic” or “epoch-making challenge”. His response to the excoriating words of the ISC is bland and weak: “We are not complacent and we are keenly aware that there is more to do. Wherever China’s actions or intent threaten the national interest, we will continue to take swift action.”

Perhaps Mr Sunak is being diplomatic; but he has also made it abundantly clear before now that he thinks disengaging from China more decisively, as the ISC might wish, leaves the economy badly exposed. Put bluntly, though minsters can never admit it, one of the most unfortunate aspects of post-Brexit Britain is that it no longer enjoys the clout and security of being a member of the world’s largest trading bloc, the European Union, which would make it far easier to stand up to President Xi, both at home and in Hong Kong, Xinjiang and the South China Sea.

The UK alone cannot fight cold wars simultaneously with Russia and China, and having lost full membership of the EU single market desperately needs dynamic trading partners wherever it can find them. It is a painful dilemma.

The cross-party ISC group, all granted special security clearance, spent a good deal of time assessing how China is pursuing its national interests in the UK. They have had the best of access to UK government and security service sources, and some highly respected independent experts.

These are sober people characterised by a rational outlook and fact-driven analysis. They are not a bunch of paranoid Sinophobes. Yet they are alarmed. What they say deserves to be believed and, in fact, represents one of the most damning accounts of British policymaking in decades.

As ever there is a balance, and it seems the British have erred on the side of complacency, if not carelessness. The UK can and should trade with China – it’s inevitable – but the security services need to put on a much better display of showing that we look upon certain aspects of the Chinese presence in this country, such as sponsorship of universities, as suspicious, to say the very least.

Britain may no longer be a global imperial power, as China is now becoming, but it need not be taken for a mug.