disputation:Making a crisis out of a tunnel

Christian Wolmar argues for less, not more, cross-Channel rail security

The Channel tunnel was the target of an unexpected security attack at the weekend. A Sunday newspaper reporter uncovered lots of nooks and crannies in the trains where bombs could be hidden, and "left" a holdall on a train at Waterloo which "went unnoticed" to Paris. The Department of Transport was galvanised into promising immediate action. A junior minister, John Watts, was trotted out, wearing a ghastly bright green golf shirt, to express concern. The Opposition, knee-jerk as ever, jumped on the bandwagon in the form of Michael Meacher, fulminating with shock and outrage.

They should all know better. Privately they probably do. But to the public, security has become like motherhood and apple pie - apparently you can never have enough of it.

Hold on though - why should security be so much more important on the trains going through the tunnel than, say, an InterCity express linking London with Glasgow? Nobody is suggesting that a bomb could destroy the tunnel itself: it has been built to withstand a medium-sized earthquake. And if it is because the trains are international, then why should security be stricter than on the trains that go through lengthy Alpine tunnels linking France, Switzerland, Austria and Italy?

In part, the Government has only itself to blame. Last year, the then railways minister, Roger Freeman, promised that security on the international Eurostar trains would be equivalent to that at airports, a silly commitment given that trains are much bigger and much more difficult to protect than aircraft, not least because they run on the ground. If terrorists really want to blow up a train, virtually nothing can stop them, as has been demonstrated in countless cowboy and Indian films.

There is a price to pay for this obsession with security, beyond the cost of the guards and the X-ray equipment. Last week the poor passengers who were delayed by a fire on a train just outside Brussels for three hours found themselves turfed off the back-up train for another half an hour at Lille because it had not been "security swept". Moreover Mr Meacher, who represents an Oldham constituency, was obviously not aware that because of the extra security demanded of international trains, once services to Paris start running next year from Manchester, his constituents who want to visit London or other intermediate stops will not be allowed to use them. Likewise, Ashford commuters will have to confine themselves to the old Network SouthEast trundlers, instead of hopping on the Eurostar trains. This is madness - I've travelled from Brussels to Liege on an international train bound for Germany, without any such security restrictions.

In addition, imposing security on people when there is a very low risk leads to sloppy practices and much resentment, making it more difficult to introduce proper procedures when increased security really is needed.

The Channel tunnel trains are no more a terrorist target than the ferries - which have much lower security requirements - or London Underground trains or football crowds.

There is the whiff of a Euro-sceptic plot here. If we really want to be part of Europe, the tunnel should be subject to the same level of security as, for example, the border between Belgium and France, where most traffic is just waved through.

And as for the inquiry, European Passenger Services, which operates the Eurostar trains, is no longer part of British Rail but directly owned by the Department of Transport. Soministers will be urgently inquiring into themselves.