Why does Washington concentrate its fire on Iraq rather than North Korea?

Many are terrified of a scenario in which weapons of mass destruction make their way from North Korea into the hands of terrorists

Think of a country that possessed weapons of mass destruction, had already waged war on its neighbour, which kept its citizenry in a state of abject misery and fear, and you would think of a certain country which was shortly to be the target of a US military invasion. Well no, actually. North Korea might be part of George Bush's "axis of evil", it might have all the attributes of the Iraqi state but it isn't going to be an American target any time soon. This is because North Korea has one major advantage. It's a great deal more dangerous than Iraq.

This week we had the extraordinary spectacle of a rogue state exporting medium-range missiles to an unstable state that is in the frontline of the war on terror. Never mind the fact that Yemen is what Washington describes as "an important partner" in the war, or that Mr Bush welcomed the country's President to the White House last year. What on earth do the Yemenis need Scud missiles for? The country's territorial dispute with Eritrea has been resolved as has the border problem with Saudi Arabia. The enemy in Yemen is within, among the ranks of Islamic fundamentalists, and it is chilling to imagine what might occur if they were to take power in a coup.

But the most worrying question in all of this has nothing to do with Yemen. If the North Koreans are willing to export missile technology, what else do they possess and might they be ready to sell to a willing buyer? For one thing, we know they have a nuclear capability and biological and chemical weapons as well.

There are a few puzzled heads in Washington, such as Senator Bob Graham, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, who want to know why Iraq is America's immediate military priority. Many in the US intelligence community are terrified of a scenario in which weapons of mass destruction make their way from North Korea into the hands of terrorists.

Few of the big-league sceptics could be described as doves. They just don't see why President Saddam is uniquely or more immediately dangerous to the United States. Consider Bob Graham's recent comments: "If you put the two, North Korea and Iraq, on the scales and ask the same question – which today is the greater threat to the people of the United States – I would answer the question, North Korea... and I think that needs to be part of the re-balancing of our foreign policy priorities."

The White House would undoubtedly counter that it is acting against Iraq to make sure President Saddam doesn't become a North Korea (i.e. a state which is already so unpredictable that America can hardly contemplate a military strike).

The US has 37,000 troops stationed in South Korea within easy striking distance of even the smallest North Korean artillery. There is a very strong suspicion that the North Koreans possess the missile technology to threaten American territory, not to mention Japan, the key US ally in the region. The consequences of a war on the Korean peninsula represent, in Lord Denning's immortal phrase "a vista too appalling to contemplate".

Any military conflict would result in millions of refugees taking to the roads, flooding into South Korea and across the northern border into China. Also factor in the likelihood of North Korean missiles landing in Seoul and Tokyo and the probability of a swift escalation to nuclear war. At that point, you start talking in terms of hundreds of thousands of casualties.

Of course, the Americans would ultimately win but nobody, with the possible exception of North Korea, wants to think about that. When you talk about "win" in a nuclear war, it is stretching the definition of the term to its outermost reaches. Just now, it's the "possible exception" that is giving President Bush and the Pentagon pause for thought, and which makes Senator Graham's call for a tougher line harder to justify.

The Americans will fight Saddam Hussein because they can. They know he doesn't have a nuclear capability and are willing to trust their special forces and air power to draw the sting of his other weapons. Fighting street by street in Baghdad or Tikrit is something they fear but the possibility of significant US military casualties is one they are willing to bear. Having done a cost analysis, the White House believes the damage caused by a war in the Middle East will be limited and possible to rectify. A whole army of Middle East experts might disagree but, for now, it is the prevailing wisdom in Washington.

There are no such "guarantees" when it comes to North Korea. In recent years the regime in Pyongyang has wavered between pragmatism and irrationality, the product of years of isolation and a leadership which is insecure and rightly fearful of domestic implosion. Its population is enduring famine and its economy is an indescribable shambles. The small band of North Korea experts see the latest nuclear stand-off as evidence of a leadership trying to gain through threat what it has failed to secure through negotiation. Pyongyang wants foreign money to dig itself out of the mess made by 50 years of ultra-Stalinist rule. Pyongyang will never say it outright, but the threat is clear: we have the technology and raw materials and if things get bad enough we might just pass it on.

In part, the White House is paying a price for neglecting foreign policy, particularly in Asia, during the first year of the Bush administration. The tentative détente with North Korea, spearheaded by Bill Clinton, was regarded with contempt by many on the Republican right. They viewed Clinton and his unofficial ambassador, Jimmy Carter, as naïve appeasers. What they never came up with was an alternative. Now the Bush White House is learning how terribly complicated the world is, and how it demands all kinds of disagreeable compromises.

It is a little like dealing with a hostage-taker. Of course, the North Koreans might be bluffing. It may simply be a strategy to force the US and its allies to bankroll the regime's survival.Would Pyongyang really risk certain destruction by launching nuclear missiles? The White House clearly believes it might. That is why we are more likely to see American diplomacy going into overdrive in the region in the next few weeks. The formerly despised détente of Jimmy Carter seems to offer the least painful way out of the imbroglio, with America putting its hopes in the long-term disintegration of the regime.

In all of this, the most important partners will be the Chinese. As an aspirant superpower, China is wary of US influence in the region but is equally worried about the dangers to security posed by North Korea. The Chinese also understand the determination of Washington to act decisively if diplomacy doesn't pay off. If the US believed that North Korea was on the verge of launching a military assault, or passing on technology and materials to terrorists, it would strike pre-emptively. That thought should make us all hope to high heaven that diplomacy works.

The writer is a BBC Special Correspondent