The seven hurdles Blair must pass to save his premiership

Tony Blair has been out of his depth on the international front since the war against Afghanistan. A leader with no previous ministerial experience has blundered around the Gulf, attempting to woo Syria, trying to hoodwink the UN into backing a war that had already been planned, blaming France when the UN failed to play ball, and convincing himself that he was taking the bold course by backing the world's only superpower.

The blundering has come about partly for well-intentioned reasons and partly out of a fear of appearing weak. Mr Blair is by no means alone to blame for the chaos, but to regain authority he needs to clear seven hurdles over the next few weeks.

The Cabinet has rallied around. Dissenting MPs are fairly quiet. Parliament has given its assent. But to retain a whiff of credibility he has to complete the tortuous political course I am about to describe. There have been many graphics in newspapers highlighting the military campaign. Here is your cut-out-and-keep guide to Tony Blair's hurdles, the obstacles set up partly by himself. He has left the starting post. Now he needs to clear them all.

A short war

It was often said before the start of the conflict that Mr Blair's political future depended on the war being brief, with few civilian casualties. In fairness to him, he never raised expectations about a speedy war himself, although the private assumption in Downing Street was that the conflict would be over quickly. Many of the Labour MPs who backed him in the Commons 10 days ago did so with deep misgivings. They were not expecting – within days – a Bush-Blair press conference implying that the war could go on for months. If this proves to be the case, Labour MPs, including some of those who backed the Prime Minister, will become increasingly restless, expressing their discontent – not just about the war. Ministers with private doubts will find it less easy to hide them. The backbenchers will target more readily and angrily other proposals on the domestic agenda, such as the introduction of foundation hospitals. Politically, Mr Blair cannot afford a war that "takes as long as it takes", especially if the death toll soars. He needs the war to be over very quickly, within weeks rather than months.

A war of liberation

Like some of his US counterparts Mr Blair raised the prospect of ecstatic cheering in the streets of Iraqi cities and described the conflict as "a war of liberation". At their joint press conference last week President Bush stated emphatically: "We will liberate you." He managed to make it seem like a threat. Evidently that is how some Iraqis perceive it as well, which is not that surprising when the uninvited agents of their liberation bomb their buildings and kill innocent civilians. It is possible that when the regime falls there will be celebrations amid the rubble, but these will be muted if it appears that in the short term Iraq will be managed by a US-based administration.

UN involvement

Mr Blair must succeed in ensuring that Iraq's transition to a self-governing state is managed under the UN. So far he has blurred differences with President Bush by referring vaguely to "UN involvement". This could mean anything from the UN officials making the tea in Baghdad to the establishment of an international body to manage the transition. Any solution other than a handover supervised by the UN would lead to more unrest in what is already an inflammatory situation.

Weapons of mass destruction

One of the many shifting causes of war is the firm claim that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction. The UN weapons inspectors failed to uncover them. So far, Saddam has not used them in the war, and no weapons have been found by the US and UK forces. A failure to uncover a range of modern, lethal weaponry, ready for use, would confirm the old policy of "containment" was working. Robin Cook has stated publicly that he saw no evidence, while he was at the Foreign Office, that Saddam was accumulating more weapons. Mr Blair's arguments for this war have changed on an almost daily basis, but he needs those weapons to be discovered soon.

Israel/Palestine

Once the war has ended, or perhaps before, substantial progress must be made to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict, with the active involvement of President Bush. Within hours of his statement about the "road map to peace", selected US journalists were briefed that he was doing this only to help Mr Blair – that it was not very significant. But the Prime Minister needs it to be significant. Progress on the Middle East would, to some extent, soothe Arab nerves and address their justified fears of double standards. Mr Blair has been strong on this, risking the irritation of Bush in pushing him further than he wanted to go. If progress is not made, his famed influence over Bush will be seen to be meaningless.

War costs

In the US economists are raising questions about whether President Bush has done his sums. He is cutting taxes, as well as embarking on a war of indeterminate length. In Britain, Gordon Brown has announced that the cash allocated to war has risen from £1.75bn to £3bn. This is at a time when the Chancellor is borrowing more than he planned to pay for the investment in Britain's decrepit public services. If the cost of the war soars, Mr Prudent will be left with some awkward, imprudent choices over how to pay for it. Those restless Labour MPs, and probably the Chancellor, will not thank Mr Blair for this expensive diversion.

Relations with Europe

Mr Blair has described his "historic objective" as ending what he called "Britain's ambiguous relationship with Europe". At the moment it is more damned ambiguous than it was even under Margaret Thatcher. Partly, Mr Blair has encouraged that ambiguity by scapegoating the French. In Giles Radice's excellent book Friends and Rivals, the author quotes a speech from James Callaghan made in 1972: "If we are to prove our Europeanism by accepting that French is the dominant language in the Community then the answer is quite clear and I will say it in French to prevent any misunderstanding: "Non, merci beaucoup." As Callaghan might say: "Plus ça change." Blair has opted for the easier, less "bold" route, splitting with the EU and backing Washington, undoing much of his under-praised work in building more fruitful relationships with Europe in his first term. Somehow or other – although I fear it is too late – he must work to repair the relationships; otherwise he will leave Britain where it was under Mrs Thatcher and Mr Major: on the outskirts of Europe and a junior ally of the US.

These are big hurdles, but I do not think they are unfairly placed before Mr Blair. He has placed some of them there himself. In one sense he has placed all of them there himself by backing Bush's timetable for war before a diplomatic solution had been explored. What makes the political course so daunting is that he cannot control the terrain. He is navigating a course partly determined by Saddam, Bush, Chirac, Sharon and military leaders. Still he must reach the finishing line or face the prospect of being a diminished leader with a big but unpredictably restive majority in the House of Commons. Mr Blair would not like being such a leader.