Richard Overy: Europe is in tatters

A month ago, at the mass demonstration in Hyde Park, I saw a woman walking solemnly along with a placard bearing the words, "I never thought I would say vive la France". The war against Iraq has produced a sudden and unexpected shift in European alignments and attitudes. When the dust of war has settled, Europe will be a different place.

It is difficult to recall that only two years ago Tony Blair was elected on the promise that he would make Britain a central player in the expanding EU. In the past six months this is a bridge he has burned to a cinder. Many of our European partners are strongly opposed to the war. Even in those countries such as Spain and Italy, where there has been government support for the Anglo-American axis, an overwhelming majority of the population is opposed to war and hostile to Britain's determination to build on its so-called "special relationship" with the US.

During the past 20 years British prime ministers have actively preserved close co-operation with successive US presidents. The Thatcher-Reagan years were succeeded by the relationship between John Major and George Bush senior in the first Gulf War. The close links Blair established with Bush's successor, Bill Clinton, were effortlessly superseded by an apparently even closer political alliance between Blair and Clinton's Republican successor, George W Bush.

If there is nothing new in the British getting into bed with the Americans, the nature of Europe and European aspirations has changed. Since the Iraqis were expelled from Kuwait in 1991, Europe has adopted the Maastricht Treaty, established a common currency explored the possibility of a common foreign and defence policy, and begun the process of incorporating the former states of the communist bloc. Britain's involvement in this process has been uncertain. Popular opinion appears to be strongly opposed to further loss of sovereignty and to the euro. Blair has now made it crystal-clear that a common European approach to major issues of foreign policy and war is not part of the British agenda.

Why the Government has single-mindedly pursued a strategy designed to distance Britain yet further from Europe is difficult to understand. Blair is keen to play a role on a world stage, which may not be possible using Europe as a base. By tying himself so closely to US policy since the attacks of 11 September, he may persuade himself that he is now a global statesman. The recent images of Bush and Blair standing together with earnest expressions of statesmanlike intent could not have been accomplished in the context of a multilateral Europe. Blair is now said to be the second most popular man in America. This is a remarkable accolade for the leader of a medium-sized European state, but it has been bought at the expense of being one of the most despised leaders in Europe.

For European critics of the British position these are old arguments about how seriously committed Brit- ain is to Europe. What has sharpened the tension during the Iraqi crisis is Blair's refusal to listen to the European position and his unswerving pursuit of an Anglo-American axis with a right-wing US administration committed to satisfying its country's hawkish mood. Anti-American sentiment in Europe is at a peak. Blair's deliberate pursuit of an Atlantic axis risks a backlash against Britain too.

For many Europeans, Britain's decision for war is comprehensible in terms of the British obsession with the Second World War. The singularly inapposite references recently made by British ministers has shown just how right this perception is. For French defeat in 1940 to be used as a way to put Chirac in his place would be outrageous if it were not so risible. It is ironic that over the past three months Germany has been in the grip of a debate on British bombing of Germany during the Second World War, provoked by a book by the journalist Jorg Friedrich, in which he claims that British bombing was deliberately pursued against innocent civilians rather than factories or barracks. Britain's decision to go along with the bombing of Iraq in defiance of international law will be all too easy to elide with this debate. Europe is more aware than ever that Britain is the only belligerent state left in the modern Continent.

This unhappy reputation will not be dissipated after the war. There will be quite justified fears that nowhere will be safe from the massively armed Bush/Blair coalition. Blair will gamble that the larger EU is divided. Some former Soviet bloc states have thrown their puny weight behind Anglo-American aggression, perhaps mistakenly believing that this will help their claim to join the EU. Blair knows he has the support of Italy's Berlusconi, though not of the Italian people, nor of the papacy. He may hope that the peripheral states will resent the Franco-German coalition at the heart of a new Europe, and side with Britain.

Divisions will persist, making the EU more difficult to operate. Britain's preference for the US connection will harden those divisions. There are many Europeans who will not help rebuild bridges until Blair has gone. That is the price Blair's government will pay for the decisions it has taken over the past few weeks.

Instead, the war will produce a revolution in international affairs. Europe's unity is in tatters. The Anglo-American axis – self-righteous and exclusive – will refocus the way the major powers deal with crisis. The UN will remain disunited. Russia and China may find a common cause against the mono-polar world system. Perhaps this is a reconfiguration that Blair can live with, but it has within it a great many dangers, not the least being that if America ever feels it can dispense with its "special relationship", Britain will find itself isolated. We may pretend to be a world power at the side of an imperial America, but this is a shallow pretence. Britain has squandered the opportunity to be a better European player. This weekend, like the woman with the placard, I too prefer the French way to Britain's call to battle.

Richard Overy is professor of modern history at King's College, University of London, and author of 'Why The Allies Won'