Maureen Freely: Turkey wants to be a modern European nation

There is a growing hope that we are seeing the demise of an entire class of political antiques

Are they with us or against us? Not all concerned observers would put it quite so crudely. Not everyone wants to sound like Bush. But it's still what everyone wants to know, and for obvious reasons. If the war on terror moves to Iraq, Turkey could soon become Bush's most significant ally. But can we depend on them? How many of them have pro-Islamist sentiments? How many of these will vote for the new Islamist party in the upcoming election?

How serious is Turkey really – about joining Europe? And bearing in mind Cyprus, the Kurds, the unresolved economic crisis and Turkey's poor human rights record, how serious should we be about letting them in?

All reasonable questions, if you're looking at Turkey from the West. But as I sit here on the European shore of the Bosphorus, all I notice is what they miss out on. The preoccupation is with Turkey's general usefulness, or the trouble it could cause if it went the wrong way. Because the interest in Turkey is crisis-led, there is rarely an opportunity for European journalists based here to give a sense of the many and dramatic social changes that Turkey has seen since first applying to join the EU.

Granted, the degree of ignorance about things Turkish is not as dire as it once was. When I first set foot in London in 1966, and told classmates that I had grown up in Istanbul, their first comment was usually something along the lines of 'Did you ride to school on a camel?' Today, their children know better.

And while it is true that people boarding planes for Bodrum and Marmaris tend to have a greater interest in beaches than in politics, their stock response when they return is how different the people were from their expectations. This suggests an interest in knowing more about the country than the current rules of reporting allow.

For example. How have ordinary people kept themselves going over the past three years, in spite of earthquakes, stock market crashes, huge rises in unemployment, devaluations and never-ending political soap opera? More to the point, who are these people?

The standard (and correct) platitude is that 99 per cent of them are Muslim, and mostly Sunni Muslim, but that occludes a large minority of Alevi Muslims.

Alevis do not face Mecca when praying, are egalitarian in outlook, have traditionally supported left or non establishment parties, believe in education for women, and do not make women cover their heads.

They have often been very critical of hardline Islamist parties, while at the same time they are proud to identify themselves as Muslims. A large proportion of Turks who identify as Kurds are also Alevis. Another large proportion are Sunnis who also identify themselves as hardline Islamists.

In spite of these dizzying but extremely important distinctions, there is a lot of common ground. Like all the other groups that make up the complex demographics of Anatolia, they have been part of a massive movement over the past four decades from the countryside to the city, and from the cities of Turkey to the cities of Northern Europe.

Although it could be said that the family and community links have survived and even sustained this new Turkish diaspora, the people inside those families have modernised at a rate that indigenous Europeans would find terrifying and crippling. And yet they've not just survived but prospered.

Before the recent economic crisis, the Turkish economy was growing at a faster rate than any country in Europe. This is caused and fuelled by the steady growth in the number of Turks going into higher education and also by the rise and rise of a new middle-class.

It is important to remember that the people who voted for the hardline Islamists that had Europe so alarmed during the Nineties were as much part of this trend as those who identified as pro-Westerners. Yes, the Islamists wanted more Koranic schools. And yes, they made a big deal about covering their women. But bright, middle-class covered women were just as keen to get an education. If not all of them have succeeded, it's largely due to a university law banning women wearing headscarves from university campuses.

Even last summer, the threat that these women supposedly posed to Western democracy was something most middle-class Westernised Turks felt very keenly. But with the economic crisis soon to enter its third year, the most remarkable thing is the growing area of consensus amongst political enemies.

It doesn't matter who you're talking to; they can be Islamist or Westward-looking, covered or uncovered, cleaning the park or running a bank – they all express an utter despair about the political classes. They do not feel they represent the Turkish people and, if you use a traditional European understanding of a representative government, they are right. Domestic policies are rarely electoral issues, but now more than ever they are what most people care most about.

Strangely enough, they don't want to see their hard work go under-rewarded anymore. They want a decent and stable standard of life. They want their children to have educations. For a rapidly growing majority, Europe equals a chance for prosperity and their children's only hope. This is why even the new Islamist AK party is in favour of joining the EU. The only party now opposing union is the anti-West, nationalist MHP.

Tomorrow it could be different; in Turkish politics it almost always is. But there is a growing hope that we are seeing the last days of a creaking and outmoded political machine, and the demise of an entire class of political antiques. After decades of false dawns, no one is expecting great things overnight from Ismail Cem's New Turkey.

There is great disquiet about the Iraq question, and the economic crisis is far from over. Turkey is still the IMF greatest debtor. Bush looms large, and may force Turkey to support a war about which even the military is extremely skeptical. But at the same time, there is a hope that Turkey is at a turning point, and that a new political class will emerge to take into Europe.

Which is why the question we should be asking is not: "Are they with us or against us?" but, bearing in mind how much they have to give: "What can we do to bring them closer?" This month's political crisis has delayed the passing of the EU laws that would have done away with the death penalty, paved the way for teaching and broadcasting in Kurdish, and lifted restrictions on freedom of assembly.

Only two years ago, the passage of such legislation would have been unthinkable – in spite of steady and very courageous lobbying on the part of Turkish as well as Europe-based human rights organisations. Now – thanks to the growing support for European union – it has overwhelming support.

It would be a tragedy for Turkey, for Europe, and for the human rights movement if we allow Bush's war on terror to get in the way of the laws going through. It would be hypocritical, and politically stupid, to stand by and let the US put unfair pressure on Turkey to fit in with its Iraq plans, if we also have qualms about being put under the same pressures.

What's the point of belonging to the same union, if we're not looking after each other? If we want Turkey to change its outlook, we need to change our, too. And the first thing we need to do is examine our own prejudices.

mfreely@rosebud.u-net.com