Lawrence Freedman: Will this new strategy in Iraq defeat the rebels?

The problem for Saddam supporters is that the tide of history is against them

In terms of casualties and incidents, November represented a severe escalation in the fighting in Iraq. It also saw important shifts in American political and military strategy in response to a security situation far tougher than had been anticipated in the run-up to the Iraq war. Can the new strategy work against what is clearly a determined and organised enemy?

The fact that the Americans must change their strategy indicates the extent to which they are suffering from the mistakes made under the old, especially during the period of transition over April. First, the troops entering Baghdad and the Sunni areas were in war-fighting mode, concerned about their own protection and not taking any chances with an enemy that was already assumed to be hiding among the civilian population. In many areas, the image of liberator gave way to occupier with distressing speed.

Secondly, they lacked the troops to assert total control over the country. It was remarkable to seize control of a country with three divisions; unfortunately occupation required something approaching ten. There was a qualitative issue as well. The United States lacks training and doctrine for the peace-keeping/nation-building roles. The US Army has seen this as a secondary and inferior form of soldiering, unlike the British Army, which has always accepted it as core business.

Lastly, having decided not to deploy more US troops, the Iraqi Army - having fled the field - was not reconstituted. It never made sense to dismiss large number of armed men without guaranteeing their pay and using these to get them back into some operational shape under a new command.

Belatedly. local forces are being rebuilt but that will take time, and it will do no good to send unprepared forces into the field. It is also too late to try to solve the problem through a massive insertion of US force. While new troops will be needed, not least because many of those who have been in Iraq from the start are jaded, the basic - and largely correct - message now is that the critical answers are to be found in political progress rather than military strength. The task of a military strategy is to create the conditions in which the political strategy can prosper - not an alternative.

To achieve that it is necessary to understand the opposition and its strategy. Despite talk of large numbers of outside militants coming in to Iraq to have a go at the Americans, the basic resistance is still largely to be found among groups loyal to Saddam Hussein, who may even have been prepared for this role prior to the coalition invasion. Their numbers are probably in the thousands rather than in the tens of thousands, but they appear to have access to decent stocks of weapons, notably rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and some support among the Sunni population.

This is as much resistance against a Shia ascendancy as against a US occupation. The relative calm in Shia and Kurdish areas (by far the bulk of Iraqi territory) renders the current situation manageable, and it also indicates that the consequence of the coalition leaving Iraq in a hurry would not be a return to Ba'ath rule but a civil war.

The US dilemma can be presented in the old Vietnam terms of "hearts and minds" versus "search and destroy". Under hearts and minds, the militants are deprived of their popular basis through civic action and restrained use of firepower. Under search and destroy, the effort is put into finding and destroying enemy units. The problem with search and destroy is that the methods used can alienate the population further and boost support for the enemy.

On the other hand, relying on hearts and minds can be demoralising if no response is made to regular attacks; in practice winning hearts and minds is only going to be achieved by a successful political strategy that sees sovereignty handed over to a legitimate Iraqi government in which Sunnis can find some reassurance.

Furthermore, this is not the time nor the place for the Americans to adopt unfamiliar tactics. US traditions and training push them towards search and destroy. Unlike in Vietnam, they ought to be able to use modern forms of surveillance and fast communications to bring down fire quickly on enemy units caught when mounting their attacks. The possibilities and pitfalls of this were seen in Monday's attacks, which saw many militants killed, but also eight civilians.

These are not the sort of wars that end with a decisive victory and a formal surrender. At some point it might be noted that the attacks have petered out and that the "Sunni triangle" has become relatively calm, and largely patrolled by Iraqis. The alternative is that it starts to become a no-go area, where Americans dare not patrol and central authority cannot be established.

The problem for Saddam supporters is that they are essentially seeking to sustain the position of a once powerful minority and, in that sense, the tide of history is against them. Even if Americans give up, it is unlikely that the Iraqis who remain will do so. Iraq would then be the opposite of Vietnam. There the Americans tried to use armed force to shore up a failed political order; in Iraq they are attempting to pave the way for one that has yet to be tried.

The writer is professor of War Studies at King's College, London