Iraq is starting to look a scary place, despite the overthrow of Saddam

To save the Iraqi occupation from becoming a Vietnam, Afghanistan or Chechnya, the Allies must get out of the picture

It is not the triumph of peace and democracy. Nor does it look like becoming that any time soon. But neither is it like the Americans in Vietnam, the Soviets in Afghanistan, the Israelis in Beirut or the Russians in Chechnya. It may yet become one of the foregoing, or some strange combination of them, but it's too early by far to do anything other than admit to confusion - and a great deal of worry.

In the last 24 hours American troops have come under repeated attack in Iraq. Two soldiers are missing, presumed abducted. Another killed in an ambush in the south, and another killed in Baghdad. There have been assaults too on Iraqis deemed to be collaborating with the occupiers. Fuel pipelines are being sabotaged.

Much more significant are the attacks on electricity sub-stations which have cut power in Baghdad, leaving tens of thousands of people sweltering in their homes without air-conditioning or power to keep their foodstuffs fresh. The US troops are fearful of attack and, as a consequence, frequently hostile in their dealings with the population. They haven't been able to guarantee either basic services or security. On the occasions when they have attempted to enforce the latter, they have too often been heavy-handed and blundering.

The example of the British Army in Belfast in the early 1970s is instructive. Harsh countermeasures play straight into the hands of those who want to isolate the Allied forces.

In the south, British troops came under attack and sustained casualties for the first time since the war ended. Yet I don't believe the Amara attacks represented a shift in the strategic realities in the south. The Shia leadership in the area does not love the occupiers, but it is still willing to work with them. What happened at Amara was one of those local disasters that shock but do not necessarily illustrate a larger truth.

Except, perhaps, what should be self-evident: Iraq is not governable without the consent of its people. The British are not dictating the terms of their occupation in the south, rather they are learning that their writ can only run as far as the local leaders are willing to allow. For now there is still a spirit of co-operation, but the tragedy at Amara is a vision of what may happen if the militia leaders decide that the British are the enemy.

What both Britain and the US surely know is that Iraq is unlike any military or foreign policy adventure undertaken by western powers since the Second World War. Not since military administrations were imposed on Germany and Japan have the armies of democratic nations removed a sovereign government and set out to become the government themselves.

It is intended to be a short-term arrangement, but as of now the US and Britain represent the governing power in Iraq. This imposes an obligation well beyond those defined under the Geneva Conventions: George Bush and Tony Blair took Saddam away, now they must deliver something much better.

On one important level they already have. Iraq is no longer a country that has prisons crammed with political detainees. There are no murder squads shoving bodies into mass graves. You are free to chant whatever slogan you want, and the wealth of the nation is no longer the private property of Saddam and his cronies. All over the country, private radio stations and newspapers are opening up.

Would any of this have happened without the war? Of course the answer is no.

I would bet my salary that if you took an opinion poll of Iraqis and asked if they were glad Saddam was gone, the answer would be an overwhelming yes. But the problem comes when you get into the supplementary, but equally important, questions. For example, ask Iraqis if they are glad that it was the Americans who overthrew Saddam, and the response is generally more equivocal. They understand that none of the neighbouring Arab states would ever have overthrown the monster, and that they themselves would have been massacred had they tried to rise up.

But none of this makes for widespread and prolonged gratitude to the Allied forces. America and Britain have never been loved or even liked in Iraq. I heard many cries of "thank you Bush" and "thank you Tony Blair" in Baghdad and Kerbala. But every single time, the gratitude was followed up with the emphatic advice that the Allies should go home soon. The current security considerations apart, ask yourself why George Bush hasn't done a victory walkabout in Baghdad (he did fly over Baghdad, I heard one US official say somewhat plaintively). Both he and his commanders know it would likely lead to a riot. It's why Donald Rumsfeld didn't venture beyond Baghdad airport when he visited.

There is a groundswell of resentment born of many factors: the effect of sanctions, US support for Saddam in the past, civilian casualties in the war, failure to deal with the looting and lawlessness, the absence of vital services months after the fall of Saddam. Add to that mix the rise of factional militias and the violence caused by resurgent Baathist elements, and post-Saddam Iraq starts to look like a scary place. Could much have this been avoided with proper planning? We know it could. The first weeks and months of occupation have been a catalogue of failures, for many of the reasons outlined earlier. Under the new American pro-consul Paul Bremer, things seemed to be getting a little better, but we are in very incremental territory here.

So if there is, as most fair-minded observers agree, a deepening crisis in Iraq, how do the occupying powers react? Before setting out to write this piece, I was wondering if the solution should be to "internationalise" - ie to get a new UN resolution that would lead to the deployment of more Arab-friendly forces such as Malaysians or North Africans. Having thought it over, I am not so sure. There is no guarantee that those who want to fight will be any less inclined to take on UN troops. The solution is to "Iraqise" the situation. The immediate priorities are to set up an Iraqi administration and get Iraqi police and troops on the streets in place of white western boys. To save the occupation from becoming a Vietnam, Afghanistan or Chechnya, the Allies need to get themselves out of the public picture very quickly.

So far there have been lots of promises about establishing a representative Iraqi authority, but precious little sign of it taking shape with the necessary speed. The key words here are "speed" and "representative". Without the backing of real leaders - be they religious, tribal or political - the Allies will find themselves stymied at every turn. I look back over what I've written about Iraq since the occupation began and find a recurring theme: It's bad, but there is still hope. The violence of this past week has shaken that conviction, but I am not yet panicked. The danger comes if the Allies decide to step up the fight in response to attacks. Greater aggression is the easiest way to lose the peace.

The writer is a BBC Special Correspondent