War with North Korea is now the unavoidable choice facing America

There seems no hope of a benign outcome. Kim Jong Il is bent on provoking America, which has no alternative but to respond

As usual, the Europeans are wrong. In their determination to convict President George Bush of serial naivety, a number of European commentators have been accusing the United States of concentrating on the wrong enemy. Why go to war against Saddam, on the suspicion that he might eventually acquire weapons of mass destruction, while ignoring North Korea which is on the verge of possessing nuclear weapons and already has the missiles to deliver them?

But this charge against the Americans is based on two false assumptions. It underestimates both their realism and their power. It seems as if some Europeans only became aware of the North Korean threat within the past few weeks. That was not true in Washington. I was told in late 2001 that the administration was fully apprised of the need to keep one eye on Kim Jong Il, and North Korea was included in the "axis of evil". The Americans are fully aware of the risk that Kim Jong Il might decide to indulge in some provocation during the invasion of Iraq. If so, he would be underestimating his adversary. The Americans possess more than enough firepower to make war on North Korea and Iraq simultaneously – though North Korea would be the harder target.

From the outset, the Bushites were unhappy with the North Korea strategy which they inherited from President Clinton: a Koreageld policy. In return for Kim Jong agreeing not to press ahead with a nuclear programme, the US would give him aid to help avoid the worst effects of the famine which his economic policies had created. There were moments in the late Nineties when millions of North Koreans were virtually starving. Mr Bush and his team rapidly concluded that the Clinton policy was weak, immoral – and likely to fail. They have been proved right, so only the little problem of what to do next remains.

The historical profession must take some of the blame for the West's intellectual confusion over North Korea and our reluctance to take early, decisive and ruthless measures to crush the threat. Historians' rationalist propaganda has undermined political will. From the mid-19th century onwards, most historians became increasingly preoccupied with social and economic forces, while convincing themselves that the "great men" school of history was hopelessly unsophisticated. If only.

Such historical delusions have now been refuted by much of the history of the 20th century, itself hopelessly unsophisticated. That bloodstained century was overshadowed by the determining influence of great, evil men: Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Mao, who all fused statecraft and mass murder. Had they never lived, the world would be different and better.

Their lesser imitations still afflict us: Mugabe, Saddam, Kim Jong Il. Those who would like to see history as a backward projection of the social sciences do have one point in their favour. The science of psychopathology should yield insights, into the present as well as the past. It might help teach us how to deal with such deranged dictators.

In Mugabe's case, little can be done as long as his fellow African leaders refuse to face up to his destructive malice. It would be hard to create a military option without the local equivalents of Kuwait and Qatar. Moreover, containment is an option in Zimbabwe, albeit a profoundly uninspiring one. After all, Mugabe can do no more than wreck his own country and bring discredit on sub-Saharan Africa (which its governments deserve, unfair though it is to their peoples).

But containment has not worked against Saddam, nor against Kim Jong Il. It appears that the latter has set himself on a course which can have only one outcome: a collision with America. If so, we will be facing a war that makes Desert Storm II seem like a picnic in the desert. There is every reason to hope for another walkover against Saddam. There is no hope of a walkover against North Korea.

The military options are already being considered in Washington, and they all involve great risks. Even if the answers are secret, some of the crucial questions are obvious. Does the administration know where Kim Jong Il's nasties are stored? If so, could they be destroyed in an Osirak-type raid – as in the Israelis' destruction of Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981 – or would it be necessary to use small nuclear weapons in order to guarantee the destruction of hardened silos? Equally, when would it be possible to deploy an anti-missile defence system within reach of North Korea's coast, to ensure that any missiles fired by Kim Jong Il would be shot down?

But North Korea also poses a grave conventional threat. Kim Jong II has said that if attacked, he would consign South Korea to the flames, and he has the capabilities to do so. North Korea has overwhelming conventional forces massed along the border with the south, plus artillery which could pound South Korea to pieces in a matter of hours.

So, how quickly could the Americans throw back the onslaught and destroy the artillery? Is it not inevitable that any conventional war lasting more than a few hours would involve thousands of American casualties, tens of thousands of South Korean casualties, and many tens of billions worth of destruction of property? In short, is there any sensible way of fighting a war with North Korea without a massive pre-emptive attack, and would conventional weaponry be enough to make that attack effective?

Apart from the military hazards in North Korea, there could also be diplomatic complications. The Chinese regard Korea as part of their sphere of influence, and would be disturbed by any dramatic manifestation of American power there.

Some Chinese leaders would be tempted to bargain a trade-off: North Korea for Taiwan. Here, the Korean imbroglio connects with the general issues of American/Chinese relations. The US view is simple. These days, there is little sentimental attachment to Taiwan and no reluctance to contemplate a long-term reunion of the two Chinas, but only on the right terms. Rape will not be permitted; no union by force.

The Chinese use aggressive language, especially when they believe that they are merely asserting their rights. Unlike North Korea, however, China is a rational power. They may want Taiwan back, but they are not going to provoke a clash with the US. So any diplomatic problems of China are resolvable. In US/Chinese relations, clarity is the enemy of conflict, while mutual self-interest could be the basis of a weary alliance.

Self-interest is a concept unknown in North Korea. If it were possible to draw Kim Jong Il's nuclear fangs, it might also be possible to revert to containment, and thus stabilise the situation until the Stalinist theme park was eventually overthrown.

At present, however, there seems no hope of such a benign outcome. Kim Jong Il is bent on provoking America, and America has no alternative but to respond. There seems no way of avoiding a terrible war on the Korean peninsula.