Football: Wembley Fiasco: Clangers and opportunism result in chaos

Inside football: Rejection of revised design calls into question the whole framework of funding public stadia in Britain

David Conn
Thursday 02 December 1999 00:02 GMT
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IF SPORT holds a mirror to society, England's attempt to build a national sports stadium has reflected an extremely unappealing image of ourselves. Yesterday's emphatic rejection of the design for the new pounds 475m Wembley, delivered in Parliament by the Minister for Culture, Media and Sport, Chris Smith, follows years of difficulties, recent weeks of bitter infighting, and will no doubt now prompt a further round of fury and recriminations.

Smith, referring to an independent report from the architects Ellerby Beckett that decided the design was "unsuitable" for major athletics events, a requirement of the pounds 120m Lottery grant, also announced a "thorough analysis" of decision-making by the Wembley National Stadium, and Sport England, the Lottery grant-giving body, in the design process. This suggests that the Government supports the British Olympic Association's view that the project has effectively been hijacked by football, which owns the development company, chaired by Ken Bates, chairman of Chelsea.

Insiders at Wembley, and Sport England, have this week been suggesting darkly that the objections to the design amounted to a belated, opportunist campaign from the Minister of Sport, Kate Hoey, and Simon Clegg, the BOA's chief executive, but they have now been backed to the hilt by Smith. Wembley is now faced with reworking the design by 15 December to accommodate athletics more effectively, or continuing to build a purely football stadium, which will mean it loses the Lottery grant.

The dispute between the BOA and Wembley is an intriguing tale of disputed accounts of meetings and interpretations of statements, but the Wembley fiasco has much broader implications, calling into question the whole framework of funding of public facilities in Britain, which the current Government inherited from the last.

Lottery grants given by bodies such as Sport England, at arm's length from the Government, have to be matched by private finance, and provide only capital, meaning building costs, rather than running or revenue costs. Lottery rules also require that grants are not given "primarily for the purpose of private gain".

The result at Wembley was the formation of a new trust, which had to buy the stadium from its then owners, Wembley plc, then run the stadium to make money, but not for private profit.

This has produced the uneasy spectacle of the Wembley National Stadium company becoming wholly owned by the FA, despite it being required to cater for other sports, and chaired by Ken Bates, Chelsea's chairman. As football matches, featuring the England team and FA Cup finals, will be the most regular events, football revenues are effectively supporting the stadium, which needs pounds 355m in loans from the City to make it viable. The project envisages an armoury of commercial facilities, including a hotel, visitor attractions and major banqueting and conference facilities.

In April 1998, the stadium was bought from its previous owners for pounds 103m, swallowing up most of the Lottery grant. The terms of the grant are not in doubt: the development company was required to build a stadium which could hold 80,000 for football and rugby league, 65,000 for athletics, and be capable of staging major tournaments in all three sports, clearly including the Olympics. The BOA supported the Wembley bid and asked in writing, in January 1998, that it be capable of holding 80,000, for athletics, in the event of it needing to host the Olympics.

What happened next is the subject of bitter argument and will be the starting point for the review announced yesterday by Smith. Correspondence between the architects, led by Lord Foster, and the International Olympic Committee, in July 1998, confirm that the IOC in fact has no minimum capacity requirement, such as 80,000, for an Olympic stadium.

Clegg, however, maintains he was never specifically told of this, a fact conceded by Wembley. A spokesman, Chris Palmer, said yesterday that Wembley relied on the correspondence, and did not brief Lord Foster to cater specifically for the Olympics. This has led to accusations in some quarters that the design made it difficult to host athletics and was in effect a football stadium.

Palmer refutes that, arguing that the design accommodates athletics. He agrees, however, that football, whose revenue will have to fund the pounds 12m to pounds 15m a year interest payments to the City, was given priority.

"As football was to be the main sport, we received a design for a great football stadium, capable of being converted," Palmer said. "We have been concerned throughout with the needs of the fans."

The resulting design, launched on 29 July this year, was for a 90,000- seat stadium in "football mode". The conversion to athletics, at 68,000, was to be done by building a concrete platform, replacing the lower tier of seats, at an estimated cost of pounds 20m, which would take six months. Wembley, and Sport England, point to Clegg's statement on the day of the launch that he was "extremely comfortable" with it, but Clegg's account is different.

Still unaware of the IOC's position on stadia capacity, his concern was not about the platform per se, but about his original requirement that the stadium hold 80,000, in "athletics mode", for an Olympics. This was mentioned in principle in a meeting with then minister Tony Banks on 6 July, but then in a detailed presentation from the architects on 26 July, three days before the launch, Clegg says the Olympics was never even mentioned.

"It was clear to me then that our requirements for the Olympics had not been put into the design brief," he says.

Clegg says that he asked for and received assurances from the Government at the launch that the upgrade design would be produced, and only then did he say he was "comfortable". This produced plans presented on 6 October, which did not satisfy Clegg. There followed a meeting with Hoey on 19 October, after which the Ellerby Beckett Report was commissioned. That report has now buried the design - not only the upgrade, but the whole platform method itself, at least if Wembley still wants a Lottery grant.

The debacle is a major embarrassment for Wembley, the FA, Bates and Sport England, chaired by the former England player and TV pundit Trevor Brooking, although the Government, which has acted surprisingly boldly, will also face questions about why the process was allowed to go so far. This should provoke a wider inquiry than into the precise machinations of the Wembley project, involving the Lottery itself, which forces the funding of public facilities into an accident-prone hybrid of quasi-charitable status and aggressive commercialism - hence Wembley's domination by football and the formidable, financially driven figure of Bates. Smith's review will examine whether this chaos was the result of cock-up or conspiracy, but he should look also to the Lottery, which has been the mother of it all.

The Road To Wembley Review

17 December 1996

Wembley selected over Manchester as preferred site for English National Stadium. Lottery grant announced: pounds 120m. Manchester complains of bias, but is awarded pounds 90m towards a Commonwealth Games stadium.

2 April 1998

Wembley plc agrees to sell stadium for pounds 103m.

19 May 1998

Consortium led by Lord Foster commissioned to design project.

19 March 1999

Project taken over by Wembley National Stadium Limited, wholly owned by the FA, with Ken Bates as chairman. Stadium finally bought from Wembley plc.

29 July 1999

Official launch of project design. Simon Clegg, British Olympic Association, chairman says he is "extremely comfortable", having received Government assurances that the stadium is capable of upgrade to Olympic capacity.

6 October 1999

Architects present plans on upgrade. Clegg still concerned.

19 October 1999

Meeting with Department of Culture, Media and Sport. Clegg still concerned. Kate Hoey, Minister for Sport, commissions independent report from the American architects Ellerby Beckett.

2 December 1999

Chris Smith, Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, announces report findings. Platform design considered "unsuitable" for athletics. Wembley to review design by 15 December. "Thorough analysis" to be launched by officials of Department of Culture, Media and Sport into project's decision making.

Centre stage players

KEN BATES

The Chelsea chairman and the chairman of Wembley National Stadium Limited (the company planning the new stadium). His single-mindedness and wily business acumen make him the perfect man to head the project, but he has made no secret that he wants Wembley to be for football first and foremost.

KATE HOEY

Since becoming Tony Banks's successor as sports minister, she has become the self-appointed heroine of the non-footballing world (where Wembley is concerned, at least). She ordered the independent report that has shown the stadium's flaws and is unlikely to back down now from the fight for a truly national stadium.

TREVOR BROOKING

The mild-mannered, self-effacing former England international, now the chairman of Sport England. His main concern has been to get the stadium's designs to the planning stage and has, perhaps unwittingly, been led to believe that stadium will do what it says on the tin. Now caught in the middle of the furore.

CHRIS SMITH

The Culture Secretary is in a delicate position for three reasons. He must not do anything to endanger England's 2006 World Cup bid, a project the Labour Government has backed heavily. He must not be seen to ignoring Wembley's very real problems either. And he also has to explain how the situation has descended into farce without his intervention.

SIMON CLEGG

The chief executive of the British Olympic Association, which would arrange a future Olympic Games in this country. "I very much hope the designers can come away with a better design than they have to date," he said yesterday. "Our only interest in not to compromise the integrity of a future Olympics." Has a fight on his hands.

LORD FOSTER

The world-renowned architect who designed the new Wembley, and as such, has been working for Wembley National Stadium Limited. Would certainly not have done anything to deliberately damage the chances of a Wembley Olympics, but has been working to a brief handed out by a company primarily interested in football.

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