Leading article: A little biotech knowledge may be a catastrophic thing
Support truly
independent journalism
Our mission is to deliver unbiased, fact-based reporting that holds power to account and exposes the truth.
Whether $5 or $50, every contribution counts.
Support us to deliver journalism without an agenda.
![Louise Thomas](https://static.independent.co.uk/static-assets/support-us/louise-thomas.png)
Louise Thomas
Editor
The thought of researchers at a Dutch university deliberately turning the deadly but relatively difficult-to-catch bird-flu virus into a highly infectious airborne super strain is enough to make even the staunchest advocate of scientific progress turn cold.
Not because the work should not have been done: efforts to gauge the threat of mutation – and, therefore, pandemic – are entirely valid. Rather, the issue is what happens to the knowledge of how the experiments were done. In the wrong hands, it could be turned to inconceivably devastating effect, dwarfing even the threat of a dirty nuclear bomb.
The US government watchdog charged with deciding what details should be published must tread a careful line. But it must also err on the side of caution. As has been so perilously proved with nuclear-weapons technology, the genie, once out of the bottle, is impossible to recapture.
Join our commenting forum
Join thought-provoking conversations, follow other Independent readers and see their replies
Comments