Saddam's latest move is the sign of an adroit tactician

The proof of the pudding will be in the eating. That will be the response of Washington to last night's apparent climbdown by Iraq, acceding to the unconditional return of United Nations weapons inspectors, four years after they last left the country.

Saddam Hussein's latest gambit is a classic from his repertoire. The last great crisis over inspections culminated in the Anglo-American bombing campaign of Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 – but only after more than 12 months of manoeuvring and brinkmanship in which Kofi Annan, the UN secretary general, even went to Baghdad to secure a deal which quickly fell through.

This time, under unprecedented US pressure, and signs that the hostility of the Arab world might be crumbling, President Saddam has moved more quickly. Blatant prevarication this time was not in order. The US had made clear that without action by the UN Security Council, and a satisfactory response by Iraq, it would take matters into its own hands, with the backing of those countries, notably Britain, that chose to join them.

Ever the adroit tactician, President Saddam has moved swiftly, at the very moment Colin Powell and his team were starting to prepare a draft resolution, containing at the very least a specific deadline for the unconditional and unfettered return of the inspectors and – if possible – unequivocal language spelling out that if not, military action was the inevitable consequence.

Assuming President Saddam is as good as his word, the first part of the resolution should become more simple. The latter however may be more problematic, as countries on the 15-member Security Council less supportive of the use of force press for Baghdad to be granted more time to satisfy the inspectors.

The reaction in the White House was not immediately forthcoming, but can easily be guessed at – a mixture of frustration, scepticism and an even greater determination to hold President Saddam's feet to the fire. The last thing Washington wants is a repetition of the events of 1997/98: a long crisis culminating in several days of air strikes that resolved nothing.

The announcement leaves a host of questions unanswered. It would appear Baghdad has dropped the demand contained in its first response to George Bush's speech to the General Assembly, that inspections be accompanied by a lifting of sanctions. But that condition may once more be raised.

More importantly, what does "unconditional" really mean? Will the inspectors really have unfettered and instant access to every site they want? That was frequently the problem during the fitful inspections between the 1991 Gulf War and late 1998, when the inspectors frequently voiced the suspicion that chemical and biological warms facilities remained, and that crucial equipment was removed from sites before their arrival.

Thirdly, what becomes of the deadline the US wants to impose? This initial display of co-operation is bound to make some countries more inclined to give President Saddam more time to prove his good faith. Why, if the inspectors are allowed back, not give them the time to do their job properly? In any case, after an absence of four years, the UN teams will require some while to assemble personnel and draw up a list of known and suspected sites before organised inspections get under way.

And what if the inspectors, after a reasonable period, come up with nothing, or nothing that measures up to the dire warnings issuing from London and Washington? The Americans are unlikely to be satisfied, buttressed by the old truism that it is impossible to prove a negative. As Donald Rumsfeld, the Defence Secretary, put it, the "absence of evidence does not mean the evidence is absent".

Thus the game of poker will continue. Saddam Hussein will calculate that he has done enough to weaken the US hand. Washington by contrast will do its utmost to maintain the pressure, voicing scepticism at every turn, continuing the visible military buildup around Iraq, and doing its utmost to retain control of developments at the UN.

President Bush will not be deflected. But last night the clean, quick progress towards a resolution of "the Iraq matter", once and for all, seemed a little less certain.

THE LETTER FROM THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER TO KOFI ANNAN

Dear Secretary-General,

I am pleased to inform you of the decision of the government of the Republic of Iraq to allow the return of the United Nations weapons inspectors to Iraq without conditions.

The government of the Republic of Iraq has responded to this decision, to your appeal, to the appeal of the secretary-general of the League of Arab States, as well as those of Arab, Islamic and other friendly countries.

Iraq has based its decision concerning the return of inspectors on its desire to complete the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions and to remove any doubts that Iraq still possesses weapons of mass destruction.

This decision is also based on your statement to the General Assembly on 12 September 2002 that the decision by Iraq is the indispensable first step towards an assurance that Iraq no longer possesses weapons of mass destruction and, equally importantly, towards a comprehensive solution that includes the lifting of the sanctions imposed on Iraq and the timely implementation of other provisions of the relevant Security Council resolutions, including 687 (1991).

To this end, Iraq is ready to discuss the practical arrangements necessary for the immediate resumption of inspections.

In this context, the government of the Republic of Iraq reiterates the importance of the commitment of all member states of the Security Council and the United Nations to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq, as stipulated in the relevant Security Council resolutions and article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Please accept, Mr. Secretary-General, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Dr Naji Sabri
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Republic of Iraq