Putin will win his sham election – but there are dangers at home for the Russian president

Another Putin ‘victory’ will lead to more repression for the Russian people as the regime slides further towards a totalitarian state, writes Ben Noble. But there is danger on the horizon for a president whose real support is much lower than the Kremlin claims and who may not be able to resist mass dissent

Sycophantic coverage of Putin on state television portrays him as the great leader to which all Russians should be thankful (AP)

Vladimir Putin is guaranteed victory in the March 2024 presidential election. The Kremlin will point to the official result as proof that Putin is popular – that Russians overwhelmingly support him, the political system he has led for nearly a quarter of a century, and the country’s ongoing war against Ukraine.

The president’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, has even said that the “presidential election is not really democracy, it is costly bureaucracy”, as Putin is certain to win, given the consolidation of society around him.

But the reality of support for Putin in Russian society is far more complicated.

There are certainly Russians who are ardent supporters of Putin. But there are others who detest him. And there is a much larger group in between – those who try to avoid politics as much as possible and have ambivalent feelings about the president.

It might seem to those outside Russia that Putin’s regime relies heavily on people who need no encouragement to show their active support for the head of state. Members of this group certainly feature prominently in propaganda pieces. But it is the passive support given by the ambivalent middle group that is the real foundation of Putin’s rule.

Many people will vote for Putin, not because he has their enthusiastic support, but because the sitting president has created a system in which there appear to be no credible alternatives to him as leader. The former leading figure of the opposition, Alexei Navalny, presented himself as one such alternative – but ended up dead in a remote Arctic prison colony, killed for daring to expose the corrupt brutality of Putin’s autocracy.

For those Russians who need further convincing to vote for the head of state, sycophantic coverage of Putin on state television portrays him as the great leader to which all Russians should be thankful.

In his 29 February “state of the nation” address, Putin also made classic pre-election promises of increased state support for Russian citizens, especially for families with children.

Those who need more convincing still will face pressure in the workplace to vote the “right” way, especially if they form part of the many millions directly employed by the state.

Flags are waved during a ‘Glory to the Defenders of the Fatherland’ concert in Moscow (AP)

On top of these pre-vote steps, the authorities can use ballot stuffing and fiddling with online voting figures, alongside other fraudulent techniques, to get the result they want.

All of this shows that it takes extraordinary resources to engineer thumping election victories. So why does Putin bother with elections?

The simple answer is that the benefits to the regime outweigh the costs.

Most importantly, elections provide an opportunity to demonstrate dominance, not only to the Russian population, but to members of the elite. The ability to secure overwhelming electoral wins – even with widespread use of manipulation – signals a continued grip on power. That will likely make members of the elite pondering a post-Putin world think twice.

A heavier reliance on coercion is the most likely response, but that’s costly, too – and it’s not clear that the state currently has the coercive capacity to deal with mass dissent

In addition, electoral legitimacy – even that provided by rigged elections – remains an important part of Putin’s claim to authority. That explains why he carried out an elaborate set of constitutional changes – formally approved through an improvised nationwide vote in 2020 – including changes allowing him to run for the presidency again in 2024 and 2030. He had previously made clear commitments not to amend term limits.

The 2020 changes were a logical move for a personalist dictator without a clear succession plan. But they were in flagrant violation of constitutional norms – and yet further examples of Putin’s mendacity and repudiation of institutional constraints.

What of Putin’s next presidential term? Once the 2024 election is out of the way, the Kremlin will worry less about making Russians upbeat before the vote and will focus more on implementing the policies it wants, including those that won’t go down well with the people.

After the last presidential election in 2018, the Russian government announced pension reforms that proved deeply unpopular – and resulted in a sharp drop in Putin’s approval figures.

The Kremlin won’t want to see this repeated. However, it will need to find ways to source the manpower and resources to satisfy the voracious appetite of Russia’s war machine.

Instead of the announcement of a full-blown mobilisation – in contrast to the “partial” mobilisation called in September 2022 – the authorities will likely ramp up less visible ways to secure new troops.

Many will vote for Putin, not because he has their enthusiastic support, but because he has created a system in which there appear to be no credible alternatives to him as leader (AP)

With the election done, the prospect of even more repression also seems likely, with the regime shifting even further along the spectrum from authoritarian to totalitarian.

Putin is acting like he’s at the height of his powers. Navalny is dead; Western unity in support of Ukraine is strained; and Putin is guaranteed formal victory in the election.

There are, however, clear liabilities in the domestic political system Putin has created. The regime needs the middle portion of society and the elite to remain on side and in line. It has been successful in achieving this so far, including through the careful distribution of resources and the use – or threat – of violence.

But what happens if the Kremlin no longer has sufficient resources to co-opt support? A heavier reliance on coercion is the most likely response, but that’s costly, too – and it’s not clear that the state currently has the coercive capacity to deal with mass dissent.

Vladimir Putin may have the ability to engineer an electoral victory. He may be presented by the Russian authorities as an invincible leader. But we should not forget the vulnerabilities created by – and for – Putin’s self-centred presidency.

Ben Noble is an associate fellow of Chatham House, and associate professor of Russian Politics at UCL