The UK should not rule out sending troops to Ukraine – despite Putin’s nuclear threats

Moscow wants us to know how upset it is that David Cameron has said Ukraine can use British weapons in strikes inside Russia. But backing down in the face of Russian threats is the worst option. The UK should join France in making it clear that all options are on the table in support of Ukraine, writes Keir Giles

David Cameron meeting Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on Friday (PA)

The Kremlin has responded with predictable theatre to comments from foreign secretary David Cameron after he said Ukraine is free to use weapons supplied by Britain to launch strikes inside Russia.

That theatre was both diplomatic, with the British ambassador summoned to the foreign ministry in Russia on Monday to warn of retaliation, and nuclear, as Moscow announced it would be holding exercises involving tactical nuclear weapons in the near future in order to remind the world yet again that it has them.

During his recent visit to Kyiv, the foreign secretary stated clearly that it was Ukraine’s decision how to use British weapons, and said Kyiv “absolutely has the right to strike back at Russia”.

That’s in sharp contrast to the position taken by the United States, which has consistently forbidden Ukraine from using the weapons it supplies to hit targets in Russia itself, and even discouraged Kyiv from doing so using its own home-grown capabilities.

Lord Cameron’s comments last week follow Britain repeatedly taking the lead in supplying weapons systems such as long-range missiles or main battle tanks, and showing that the fear of “escalation” that so constrains Washington and Berlin stems from a highly successful Russian con trick. 

But that moral authority has been shaken over recent months by Britain’s reluctance to re-equip its own armed forces in the way it is urging other European states to do – and the way grand announcements of defence investment turn out on closer inspection to be both inadequate and deceptive. 

This limits the direct military aid the UK can provide. Cameron suggested Britain’s long-term commitment to supporting Ukraine would now be largely financial, since “we’ve just really emptied all we can in terms of giving equipment”. And sadly, he immediately undermined the effect even of that commitment by once again ruling out the presence of Western troops in Ukraine.

French president Emmanuel Macron has repeatedly warned that European troops could be forced to intervene if Ukraine alone is unable to halt Russia’s aggression. It’s vital that Russia understands that, since the last thing Moscow wants is to be involved in a direct military clash with Nato countries.

And yet, other European leaders have reacted with horror to the suggestion. “I don’t think it is right to have Nato soldiers killing Russian soldiers,” Cameron said at the end of his visit to Ukraine. That may be true today, but it’s good to remember that the whole purpose of Nato is to stop Russian soldiers being where they have no right to be – if necessary, through the use of armed force.

In any case, publicly ruling out a Western troop presence in Ukraine makes no more sense now than it has ever done. Whether or not it’s a realistic proposition for individual Nato countries, just the possibility is one of the Kremlin’s greatest fears. So when Cameron and others publicly bar that option, all it does is reassure Putin that his worst case scenario is off the table; that way, he can continue the war with much less concern for the possible consequences.

It’s like facing a bruiser in a boxing ring and reassuring him that you’re going to fight with one hand behind your back. Instead, more European leaders – and the UK – should follow Macron’s lead, and preserve what defence analysts call “strategic ambiguity” (to the rest of us, simply not telling your adversary what you’re not going to do).

British planners will have given careful thought to whether Cameron’s go ahead for Ukraine might bring reprisals against the UK, over and above the inevitable threats and rhetorical froth from the Kremlin’s blow-hard mouthpieces.

Over the course of the last two weeks, Europe as a whole has woken up to the campaign of sabotage and disruption that Russia has been waging across the continent. There’s no doubt Russia could step this up still further. Moscow’s war on the West is now barely hidden, and for as long as the West does not respond, there are few downsides for Russia in waging it.

Using an extended network of proxies means the Kremlin’s intelligence chiefs won’t be too concerned if they are caught in the act; since the crooks and patsies it recruits abroad will be considered even more disposable than its own personnel. And since Russia is already overtly acting as a rogue state, there’s no damage to reputation or relationships to be concerned about.

We should expect proxy attacks against the UK and across Europe to continue. As well as their direct effect on hampering support to Ukraine, they have another useful purpose for Moscow: whether or not they succeed, they’re useful for gathering information on a country’s will and capacity to prevent more serious sabotage and respond to it.

There’s one traditional way of hurting the West that Russia may not yet have employed. Throughout the Cold War and even beforehand in tsarist times, Moscow poured effort and resources into sponsoring and equipping terrorist groups to carry out attacks against European cities. That would be a more random campaign of violence than the targeting of European logistics and supporters of Ukraine that we see now, and have much greater impact.

And the fragmented and diverse societies in today’s European cities, with both substantial immigrant populations and widespread sympathy for anti-Western causes, would provide far more fertile ground for recruitment than Moscow found during the Cold War.

But Europe need not be just a passive victim. At the beginning of this year, I wrote about the West’s under-used ability to influence Russia’s choices. The UK had made its deliveries of Storm Shadow an explicit consequence of specific Russian actions; now, it seems, the US has done the same with its long-awaited supply of longer-range ATACMs missiles. And to nobody’s surprise except perhaps in the White House, the sky has not fallen.

Britain’s explicit endorsement of strikes into Russia could also have been presented as a consequence for Russia’s attacks against Europe, and with a promise that more would follow. What’s more, explicitly allowing Ukraine to strike Russia with British weapons as well as its own opens up other possibilities for targeting Russia’s ability to wage war.

Ukraine has already carried out strikes at Russian locations that build and store the drones and missiles used to kill its innocent civilians, and at the energy infrastructure that helps Moscow pay for them. This limited number of pinpoint strikes is in stark contrast to Russia’s lengthy campaign of indiscriminate bombardment of Ukrainian cities, where hospitals, schools and apartment blocks are all valid targets for Moscow.

But further attacks could see Ukraine helping Europe, instead of the other way round. European countries can do little about the Russian electronic warfare installations that have been sowing havoc with European air and maritime traffic. But for Ukraine, no holds should be barred and it’s in everybody’s interest that the jamming should be deterred or disrupted.

When considering how far the West should go in working with Kyiv, the fundamental question is still the same: whether Europe wishes to stop Russia in Ukraine, or allow Moscow’s war of reconquest to claim more victims further West. Both simple morality and practical common sense have always argued for the maximum possible support for Ukraine so it can continue to form the front line of Europe’s defence. Britain’s endorsement of Ukraine’s right to defend itself is a long overdue step in the right direction.

Keir Giles works with the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House. His next book will be ‘Who Will Defend Europe?’ (October 2024)