When the UN troops have gone, how will this tiny, poor nation survive on its own?
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Your support makes all the difference.The UN-led transitional administration in East Timor succeeded, to an extent, in establishing security institutions. But the starting point could hardly have been more difficult: East Timor is an extremely poor country with a per capita income of about $430 (£300). About 70 per cent of buildings and most of the infrastructure had been destroyed. And the population was distinctly lacking in skills. During Indonesian rule, non-Timorese dominated the senior echelons and afterwards, until the elections in August 2001, UN officials did. The country did not have a constitution or a functioning legal system.
In terms of regional security, East Timor has to reach an accommodation with Indonesia on an array of economic, social, political and defence issues. While Indonesia has been distracted with its own internal crises, elements of its military and foreign policy establishments are either indifferent to or hostile towards its new neighbour.
There is a lack of effective policing capacity, despite an enormous influx of UN international civilian police. The cocktail of nationalities with different policing styles and a succession of poor senior UN police managers has recently been remedied; but somewhat late in the day.
The training of the East Timorese police force looks impressive, at least on paper. However, some of the new graduates are former Indonesian police, some have no credibility within their communities. On-the-job training by the international UN police has been poor.
Rival security groups have sprung up to fill the vacuum, often consisting of former members of Falintil, the armed wing of the guerrilla resistance.
Questions remain for the international community's legacy. Has it left the right legal, constitutional and institutional safeguards in place? Do they provide for civilian oversight, and are there proper processes for accountability and transparency?
How much longer will interest in East Timor be sustained by Europe, Australia, or Indonesia – what's in it for them? With a small army, East Timor's first line of defence will have to be diplomacy.
The writer served as national security adviser to the UN administration in East Timor from April 2001.
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