British marines are among the best fighting men in the world, but what they need now is an enemy to fight

Intended to root out al-Qa'ida, Operation Condor is regarded with scepticism in the Royal Marines. Kim Sengupta and Colin Brown report

The Royal Marines have taken their first prisoner in Afghanistan since arriving two months ago in the biggest British combat deployment since the Gulf, The Independent on Sunday has learnt.

The arrest of the man, described as an al-Qa'ida suspect with a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, is said to be a great relief to the Government, which is facing mounting criticism over the 1,700-strong British force failing to fire a shot in anger.

The gunman was captured in a village during Operation Condor, involving 1,000 troops supported by artillery, helicopters and US warplanes, which began on Friday.

But while ministers and senior military officers were declaring that the lone arrest showed there was an enemy to fight and find after all, local villagers claimed the gunman was an indigenous Afghan tribal fighter with no links to al-Qa'ida.

A former Labour defence minister, Doug Henderson, yesterday accused the Government of "hyping up" Afghan operations. But Geoff Hoon, the Secretary of State for Defence, insisted that the campaign had been a success and revealed he had authorised a series of smaller targeted operations by the Marines.

In the meantime the Ministry of Defence disclosed that the mysterious illness affecting 36 British servicemen in Afghanistan was "highly likely" to have been a virus known as "winter vomiting disease", which swept through Britain earlier this year.

The development follows a week of increasing controversy over the British mission, with accusations that the Government was using overwhelming spin to camouflage the fact that three separate operations had achieved little tangible success.

The mission has become mired in recriminations, accusations and confusion. The mood in the heat and dust of Bagram airbase, its headquarters, is fractious. The frustration of the marines at the lack of contact with the enemy was said to have been increased by unrealistic demands from politicians in London and a stormy relationship with the media.

So has the mission been an overwhelming success, as Mr Hoon and the MoD claim, or a failure which should be wound up? This is how the mission unfolded.

Ptarmigan

The first mission in Afghanistan, which began in the middle of April. Around 400 marines from 45 Commando were deployed in south-east Afghanistan accompanied by acres of coverage in the media. In reality it was an acclimatisation exercise and found little apart from some corpses left over from Anaconda. There was a flurry of excitement when journalists taken up to the hills were told that some sudden explosions were incoming mortar rounds. They turned out to be sheep getting blown to bits after stepping on mines.

Snipe

This one was meant to be for real. In a late-night briefing in a tent, Brigadier Roger Lane, the British commander told a group of us journalists that he was sending 1,000 men into the mountains. The Marines were told to expect up to 1,000 enemy fighters in the targeted area.

By the end of the 13-day mission the enemy had been neither been seen nor engaged. Nine caves full of arms and ammunition were, however, found in the Drangkhel Ghar range in Paktika. This was described as an al-Qa'ida arsenal and blown up. A local (allied) warlord claimed the arms were his. The military continued insisting that they were al-Qa'ida's.

Afterwards Brigadier Lane pronounced that the success of the operation should not be counted in the number of "body bags" but the fact that the enemy could no longer use a key base and supply route.

Condor

The Australian SAS became involved in a firefight, killed several gunmen, and requested assistance from Bagram headquarters. At the same time US warplanes bombed "enemy positions", killing 10.

Normally the response to the Australian request for help would have been by the US Army's 101st Airborne, who act as the Quick Reaction Force. But, according to American sources, the Marines, stung by criticism over lack of contact, demanded that they get the mission. Brigadier Lane announced the mission in an unexpected appearance at the 9am briefing at Bagram.

"It is clear that it is a substantial enemy force," said the Brigadier.

But Afghan officials claimed that the Australians had not, in fact, engaged al-Qa'ida but stumbled into a skirmish for land between two clans. Tribal elders insisted that the American warplanes had bombed a wedding party which had been firing celebrations shots into the air.

Yesterday morning's briefing, by the Marines spokesman, Lt Col Ben Curry, appeared to be aimed at primarily dampening down expectations. Senior military sources said that even if al-Qa'ida were there, the numbers were no more than 30 to 40 and most of them would be impossible to find in such a large area.

High up in the mountains, during Operation Snipe, a senior Marine NCO, a highly respected Falklands veteran, said quietly: "I am leaving this job very soon and I don't want my last operation to turn into some kind of a figure of fun. We have done very well in denying the enemy territory. But if AQT [al-Qa'ida/Taliban] is not here, then we should cut our losses and go home."

The Royal Marines are among the best fighting men in the world and they have done everything asked of them in Afghanistan in an exemplary fashion. They have, however, been honed for combat and lack of it is immensely frustrating.

Another NCO said: "It's obvious that the enemy has fled across the border into Pakistan. They can afford to wait there until we go away and the Americans go away, and then they will return."

The main problem has been a shortfall in intelligence. Local warlords have become adept at supplying the Americans with false accusations. One, Padshah Khan, managed to get the US Air Force to bomb 100 of his tribal rivals by informing them they were Taliban and al-Qa'ida.