War In the Balkans - The Deal: Terms leave room for manoeuvre

THE DEAL struck yesterday between the two peace envoys and Slobodan Milosevic deals a huge blow to Serbia, but as the analysis of the text shows, it also provides room for manoeuvre and parts of it will allow the Yugoslav president to proclaim a victory of sorts to his people.

1 An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.

Despite this, Mr Milosevic's generals may yet ignore orders from Belgrade to stop attacking the Albanians at the very point at which they have driven most of them out of the province. Mr Milosevic will be watching keenly for signs of a revolt and will doubtless fire many of them in the coming weeks.

2 The verifiable withdrawal of all military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo according to a speedy time schedule.

This is a disaster for Belgrade. In a province where 90 per cent of the 1.8 million population is hostile, Serbia can only keep a grip through a massive security presence. Serbia will try to haggle over the meaning of "speedy" and will try to convert some of its security forces overnight into members of the local civilian administration. After all, they will still control the local councils until a new UN government for Kosovo is appointed.

3 The stationing in Kosovo, under a UN mandate, of effective international, civilian and military presences that could act in line with a possible decision according to Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.

Another heavy blow to Belgrade, though Mr Milosevic will try to conceal it by saying it is better to have a UN mandate over Kosovo - Yugoslavia is a founder member - than Nato on its own. The UN involvement will also bring the Russians on board and possibly some other friendly states.

4 An international security presence, with fundamental participation by Nato, must be placed under unified command and control and authorised to maintain safe surroundings for the population in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return of displaced individuals and refugees to their homes.

This was the key point for Nato in its talks with Russia which argued for a separate Russian military presence. The presence in Kosovo of Nato troops, which Belgrade vowed never to accept, is especially humiliating for Serbia. Kosovo may end up with Russian-controlled zones. But Nato appears to have seen off the threat of the "soft-partition" of Kosovo into "eastern" and "western" blocs.

5 The establishment of a provisional administration for Kosovo as part of the international civilian presence that would be decided upon by the UN Security Council under which the people of Kosovo would enjoy meaningful autonomy within the FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).

Mr Milosevic came to power in 1987 on a pledge to scrap Kosovo's autonomy, which he then did in 1989. Now he has to stand back and watch Kosovo receive much greater powers of home rule than it ever dreamt of enjoying in the old Yugoslavia. Mr Milosevic will pass over this point, however, and stress the fact that autonomy is better than independence and that Yugoslavia and Serbia's internationally recognised frontiers are not going to be altered.

6 After the withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel would be allowed to return in order to fulfil the following duties: contact with the international civilian mission and international security presence; mark mine fields and participate in clearance; maintain presence at places of Serb national heritage; maintain presence at key border crossing points.

This is the carrot for Serbia and the worst part of the deal for the Kosovo Albanian refugees. The last thing they want to see is Serbian officials when they go home. Mr Milosevic is doubtless scanning the map of Kosovo marking out as many places as possible as sites of Serbian heritage, where his personnel can be stationed. The issue of the "agreed number" of Serbian officials will be one of the areas where all Serbia's formidable diplomatic skills will doubtless be displayed. The West will want the number kept down to a few hundred; Russia will want more and Belgrade will strenuously demand thousands.

7 The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the surveillance of the UNHCR and free access for humanitarian organisations to Kosovo.

The "all" is what the 800,000 refugees from Kosovo have been waiting desperately to hear. Serbian officials destroyed tens of thousands of Albanians' documents as they were expelled from the country, to ensure they did not return. That was apparently a complete waste of time as the new UN administration will issue provisional documents of its own. Serbia will be hoping its remaining permitted quota of border officials will have the authority to screen out returning KLA fighters.

8 A political process geared at establishing a provisional, political, general agreement that guarantees meaningful self-rule for Kosovo with full consideration of the Rambouillet agreement and principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY and other states in the region, as well as demilitarisation of the KLA.

Both sides can claim something in this convoluted formula. The Rambouillet agreement of March, which the KLA backed and which held out the prospect of an independence referendum, will only be "considered". That means nothing. The KLA will also bridle at talk of Yugoslavia's territorial sovereignty and at their disarmament, just as Nato's bombing campaign has enabled their numbers to climb from 5,000 in March to about 15,000 today. The KLA will doubtless try to become Kosovo's new police force. Meaningful self rule suggests, but does not spell out, free elections. These ballots will obviously be won by ethnic Albanians, but which kind? Men loyal to the KLA under Hasim Thaqi, or the old moderates loyal to Ibrahim Rugova?

9 A general approach to economic development and stabilisation of the crisis region. That would entail the implementation of the Pact on Stability for Southeast Europe with broad international participation to enable further improvement of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional co-operation.

A sop to Serbia's disgruntled neighbours, several of whom have offered their air space to Nato and who have suffered economically from Nato's campaign.

10 The end of military activities would entail the acceptance of these principles as well as agreement to other previously identified and demanded elements...

The West is shy of verbal agreements with a master tactician like Mr Milosevic, so no end to Nato's campaign until the Serbian army packs up in toto. Belgrade may be hoping pressure will build on Nato to end the campaign before it has really pulled out of Kosovo.