The Secret IRA Meetings: Calculating side of the Prime Minister exposed: Ministers kept in dark about secret contacts were worried by optimism at Number 10, reports Colin Brown

JOHN MAJOR told close friends that a peace settlement in Northern Ireland could produce a 'Falklands- style' boost to his election prospects at the next general election.

The Prime Minister saw peace in Northern Ireland as a great prize, which was achievable, and could lift his leadership out of its disastrously low standing in the opinion polls.

According to his friends, Mr Major believed it could become his own 'Falklands factor' - like the victory that helped Baroness Thatcher recover from the pit of unpopularity to win the 1983 general election.

The secret contacts with the IRA clearly fuelled that belief. Many of his own ministers and backbench MPs feared he was being naive in believing the IRA would put down their arms, but Mr Major was clearly acting on information they did not have.

'John's problem is that he gets these enthusiasms and it's risky, like going overboard in backing Manchester's bid for the Olympics,' said one minister last week.

His supporters feared Mr Major would be too closely associated with failure, when the hopes of peace were dashed. 'I can't see anything coming from it. But my worry is, what happens then?' said another of his ministers.

The Prime Minister caused anxiety among his friends when he put Northern Ireland at the top of his priorities, and intensified the meetings with the Northern Ireland parties.

He changed two keynote speeches - the Guildhall on 15 November and the Commons on 18 November - to send clear messages to the IRA that if they abandoned their arms, Sinn Fein would be allowed to the negotiating table. Before then, he had rarely devoted speeches to Northern Ireland.

Of his reticence, he said: 'I spend a great deal of my time, perhaps more I suspect than many of you realise, thinking and talking and wondering about the particular problems and the particular opportunities . . . for I do not always believe we should talk about problems, that actually exist in Northern Ireland.'

Those close to Mr Major said he genuinely thought there was an opportunity he had a duty to seize; they were allowed to believe it was the IRA bombing in the Shankill Road last month which he felt had changed attitudes decisively towards peace.

His main adviser on Northern Ireland is Rod Lyne, the Prime Minister's private secretary responsible for foreign policy at Downing Street and one of his most trusted aides.

Senior officials at the Northern Ireland Office were anxious to tone down Mr Major's apparent optimism. There were signs of tension within the NIO over his peace initiative.

The tensions were increased by the tight net in which information about the process was kept. Senior officials at the NIO were excluded. Only key officials and ministers with a need to know were kept informed.

The disclosure of the secret contacts will confirm the view of the Prime Minister's supporters that he is a clever negotiator, as the Maastricht treaty demonstrated. One minister said last week that if anyone could bring the warring factions to agreement in Ulster, it was Mr Major.

It has exposed his calculating side. It will also severely test the leadership qualities he showed under fire at the election. As Enoch Powell said of Lady Thatcher when the Falklands task force was dispatched, this crisis will test of what metal Mr Major is made.