The Lawyer: A flawed document, and the price to preserve unity

Saddam Hussein is a deplorable tyrant but despite losing the "mother of all battles" in 1991 the allies allowed him to remain in power. The Government's dossier sets out the history of President Saddam's grotesque misdeeds at length but does it justify an immediate war, which would destroy the lives of thousands of innocent people who suffer under his regime and turn their country into rubble? The short answer is that it does not even attempt to do so.

Anyone used to sifting "evidence" will soon spot the yawning gap in the argument. You only have to read Chapter 3, "The Current Position: 1998-2002". Past sins there are aplenty but there is no convincing evidence that Iraq is intending to attack anyone. In fact the idea that it had such an intention is frankly ludicrous unless President Saddam was intending to wipe out the US and the UK at the same time.

We must accept that the "evidence" largely comes from intelligence reports that are incapable of proper verification, but a government has to act upon such material on occasions. The position is different in a court. When proper evidence was required in two cases alleged to have al-Qa'ida connections that came to court in England, one was thrown out by the jury and in the other the US Government were unable to produce any evidence to support an extradition.

The chronology is important. The Gulf War ended in 1991 with Iraq crippled. Unscom was established to provide for intrusive inspections and to eliminate Iraq's chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles with a range in excess of 150km (93 miles). Over the next seven years large quantities of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles and production facilities were destroyed and nuclear materials were removed.

In January 1999 inspectors withdrew, unable to account for large quantities of chemicals that could be used in chemical warfare. The ability to monitor was gone. UN resolutions had probably been broken but there were no demands for war at that time, so what has changed? What is the "evidence"?

It is Chapter 3 that purports to set out "what we know of Saddam Hussein's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programme". The list is unimpressive, even allowing for favourable presentation.

It has to be conceded that almost all components and supplies used in weapons of mass destruction and ballistic programmes are dual purpose and could have innocent application.

The main chemical weapon production facility at al-Muthanna has not been re-built, but a new one at al-Sharrat has been constructed. There is no evidence that it is being used in connection with chemical warfare. The fact that it has guards is hardly surprising.

It is stated that most of the personnel involved in chemical research are still in Iraq. This does not mean they are engaged on the same work and they could hardly be deported. It cannot be disproved that Iraq has destroyed technical manuals as they claim.

Iraq is developing two short-range missiles with a range of 150km but the UN resolution permits this. A wish to develop missiles with a longer range does not mean they have done so.

It is stated that Iraq has tried to procure items that could be used in connection with the enrichment of uranium but there is no evidence that it has succeeded or that it has acquired uranium apart from that held under IAEA supervision.

It is not suggested that Iraq has already got a nuclear capability, let alone that it was intending to use it. The evidence that Iraq continues work on developing nuclear weapons depends upon a report that "uranium has been sought from Africa that has no civil nuclear application" (a fact repeated on at least three occasions in the dossier) and also attempts to acquire certain equipment that could be used for nuclear weapons. Neither was in fact acquired. In the case of specialised aluminium tubes it is conceded there is no "definitive intelligence that it is destined for a nuclear programme".

Even with the assistance of the gifted British Civil Service who drafted it, the dossier hardly presents a convincing picture. There are other countries, such as Israel, Pakistan, India and China, which have a nuclear weapon programme, but no one so far has suggested that this would be a justification for going to war with them.

The breach by Iraq of UN resolutions is a matter for the UN, not an excuse to embark on a war.

So what has changed?

The answer is that 9.11.01 changed everything for the United States. The hurried announcement by President George Bush after that tragedy of war against terrorism generally needs to show some results. Progress has been made in Afghanistan but Osama bin Laden may have slipped the net. If you wish to show your determination to smash up a particularly nasty regime with a bad track record, then Iraq is a good bet.

The strength of the political arguments in the Government that have gone on behind the scenes can be seen from the final words in the Prime Minister's Foreword. There is no cry for war or for immediate military action of the kind the US is proposing. The Foreword ends much more lamely: "The UK Government has been right to support the demands that the issue be confronted and dealt with."

Such is the price of unity. Such is the strength of the evidence.