David Cameron planned sanctions on two Israeli ministers – would it have worked?

Sean O’Grady looks at the chances of a cross-party consensus on how to deal with the Gaza crisis

In a remarkably candid interview, David Cameron revealed that, as foreign secretary in Rishi Sunak’s government, he was preparing to place sanctions on two members of the Israeli cabinet in protest at the conduct of the war in Gaza.

Israel’s finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich, and national security minister, Itamar Ben-Gvir, represent the more extreme nationalist end of opinion within Benjamin Netanyahu’s government and air opinions not obviously compatible with the accepted rules of war, the sanctity of human rights, and United Nations resolutions.

Smotrich appeared to suggest it might be “just and moral” to withhold food aid from Gaza, while Ben-Gvir supported the expansion of settlements in the West Bank, illegal under international law, and deeply provocative to Arab opinion. Cameron suggested that personal sanctions would be the best way to put pressure on Netanyahu to abide by international law and move towards a ceasefire. It highlights the dilemmas over Middle East policy that have confronted successive British foreign secretaries.

Why didn’t the Sunak government apply sanctions?

This isn’t clear from Cameron’s public comments. Presumably, he judged that such personal sanctions were symbolically powerful – and directed at the more militant elements of Israeli opinion – but not as provocative and destabilising as, say, the partial arms embargo to which the incoming Labour government eventually agreed.

Presumably the general election intervened and, very likely, American opinion was sought.

Would it have made a difference?

No. Personal sanctions, as recently imposed on Vladimir Putin and members of his circle, are embarrassing but they don’t change policy; it is more of a symbolic diplomatic gesture, and a warning of possibly more serious moves to come. It would probably have annoyed Netanyahu and possibly made him even more defiant. That also seems to be true of the recent modest withdrawal of certain arms export licences to Israel given that the UK sells relatively few weapons of war to the country.

Cameron has urged the government to ‘look again’ at sanctioning Israeli ministers (PA Wire)

What would make a difference?

Fundamentally, only a cross-party, multinational coalition of Israel’s friends and allies, and with the United States at the head of it on a bipartisan basis, has a chance of diverting Israeli opinion. Anything less has proved demonstrably futile, and resulted in the humiliation of president Joe Biden, let alone the likes of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan.

Are there precedents for UK sanctions?

Certainly. Even relatively supportive governments such as those led by Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair have felt the need to restrict arms sales to Israel, sometimes for prolonged periods. But without much lasting effect, it must be added.

What are the chances of a consensual policy in the UK?

Slim. The official Conservative line now is relatively sympathetic to the new Labour government. Andrew Mitchell, shadow foreign secretary, hasn’t rejected Lammy’s limited arms embargo. However, this cross-party line is unlikely to survive for much longer. Both the remaining candidates for the Tory leadership would make the party the most pro-Israeli it has been since Britain, France and Israel colluded in attacking Egypt over the Suez in 1956.

Kemi Badenoch and Robert Jenrick seem to be in a competition to show how supportive they are not only of Israel’s right to defend itself but the specific military offensives pursued by the Netanyahu government, up to and including the invasion of Lebanon and the belligerence towards Iran. They, as well as many Tory MPs and some on the Labour side, display scepticism towards the legal advice Lammy says persuaded him to impose the arms embargo.

Such divisions are obviously reflective of those (far more consequential) highly polarised attitudes in America. So Netanyahu is pressing on with his wars in the hope of making significant progress by the time of the US presidential elections and the return of Donald Trump. Even more dangerously, Netanyahu seems set on dragging in America, while making decisive strikes against Iran, preferably its nuclear weapons programme.

What are the consequences for British politics?

Sadly, the Middle East has become a domestic political football, kicked around by those who may have ulterior motives. Put plainly, Islamophobes who previously paid scant attention to the Gaza Strip, the Bekaa Valley or the aims of the Houthi rebels, are suddenly experts on the conflict and militantly pro-Netanyahu simply because of their hostility to Muslims. They have created the myth of two-tier policing of protests, and vilified as terrorists those who have spoken out, demonstrated and campaigned against the wars (matters not helped by in some cases by signs and banners in favour of Hamas and Hezbollah).

On the other side we find antisemites of the far left and far right, cranks and neo-Nazis,  demonising and attacking Israeli people or Jewish communities whether they happen to be involved in the conflict or support Netanyahu. Such trends have distorted local politics and the loss of some Labour-leaning seats at the general election; and inflamed already emotive arguments on social media. If the intention of Hamas in perpetrating the atrocities on 7 October was to provoke global division, they succeeded.