Has Brexit made Scottish independence more unlikely?

Polls suggest that a second referendum would likely see Scotland vote to leave the union but in practice, now Britain is not part of the single market or customs union, it could be far more difficult to implement, argues Sean O’Grady

Nicola Sturgeon campaigning in South Queensferry (Getty)

Nicola Sturgeon can at least be given credit for admitting that, for an independent Scotland, there will be a border with the rest of the UK and that it might not be as it exists today: invisible apart from the “Welcome to Scotland” signs on the motorway.

As first minister and leader of the Scottish National Party she could hardly do other than recognise the obvious, and she has: “This is the frankness that certain sections of the media will seek to stir up trouble on – I am not denying that we would need to confront and resolve the issues of being in the European Union for the border between Scotland and England.”

The specifics of the border was not much of an issue in the 2014 referendum, because the assumption then (and one reason why independence was rejected) was that either the whole of the UK or Scotland independently would all be part of the EU single market and customs union, and thus trade in goods and service could continue unimpeded (though possible changes to the currency and other changes would complicate matters).

Now, post-Brexit, some painful ironies have emerged. Having voted against leaving the EU and being dragged out of Europe against its will, according to the SNP, resentment at English dominance of the UK and the arrogance of the Conservative government (with modest support in Scotland) has fuelled support for Scottish independence.

However, now that the UK has left the EU, including its single market and customs union, it makes Scottish independence a much more tricky proposition in practical terms for unimpeded trade between Scotland and its largest single market, the rest of the UK. Sometimes the anomalous position of Northern Ireland is mentioned as a possible way around the difficulty of a new EU border between England and Scotland, but it is not an encouraging precedent. First, it is fair to say it has not worked smoothly in recent lengths. Second, if there should be no hard border with England on the land, then it would require a border to be relocated across the North Sea and English Channel between the rest of the EU and Scotland. That, even if it was acceptable to the EU would mean frictions at the border of the EU single market. As Ms Sturgeon points out, these already exist for Scottish exporters, but they would still be in place if there are to be no checks on the England-Scotland border.

Ms Sturgeon says – with echoes of the Brexit debates – that all this can be sorted out with goodwill in negotiations. But hard logic means that not all of it can, and perhaps not even the establishment of a common travel area for people or workers, as the UK still enjoys with Ireland. This is because judgements around this will depend partly on what London wants. As when Britain found itself at a disadvantage in negotiating a free trade deal with its much larger neighbour, so too will Scotland find it difficult to assert itself against its own larger neighbour to the south.

Brussels too would seek a say in the proceedings, given that Scotland would be an EU member, or close to it. Take fish, for example. After Scotland’s territorial waters are established, the question arises as to who can fish them. The EU would want a certain (preferably total) free access under the Common Fisheries, but the British/English would also request a quota, in return for concessions on some other area of policy – say free access to the UK’s customers for Scotland’s established fund managers.

Plainly, the arguments about a Scottish exit from the UK echo those made for UK exit from the EU – “Scexit” echoing “Brexit”. In both cases, it is perfectly fair to claim that sovereignty and democracy matter, and to argue that medium-sized (UK) or small (Scotland) nations can survive independently, inside or outside the EU. Nearby examples for the SNP to point to would be Ireland (which left the UK a century ago), Norway and Denmark, say. If Britain can better make decisions on its own to suit its own interests than in the EU, then the same goes for Scotland taking back control of its destiny, and with a seat at the top table in Europe Scotland could find, or re-establish, markets in the EU, the biggest single market and economic bloc in the world. It could enjoy the leverage this huge bloc enjoys in forming trade deals with the US or China or India, arguably superior to the ones London could secure on its own (and assuming Liz Truss would not put Scottish interests first). As with any nation, with the right policies, and maybe some luck, Scotland could prosper outside the UK; but erecting new trade barriers with England will be a handicap.

It is also true, painfully in the case of Ireland and, arguably the UK, that a long period of adjustment may follow from such an adjustment to new economic arrangements, and that the “divorce” is usually acrimonious. A London-based Scot having to pack a passport to pop home for a long weekend might seem outlandish, the sort of notion Ms Sturgeon dismisses as irrelevant or empty threats from the English, but she has also to reflect on the realities of Brexit and what it has done to relations with old partners and allies in the EU. She should not assume that Boris Johnson and the English nationalist wing of the Conservative Party are going to do her any favours before or after the referendum. They will be very happy to educate her in the harsh realities of life outside the UK. Johnson might even be rude enough to tell her she cannot have her cake and eat it. Cheeky, but correct.