Why no-deal Brexit is back on the table now

There are plenty of hurdles before Britain manages to leave the EU with a deal, writes Sean O'Grady

The Commons won’t guard against a crash out (UK Parliament)

This time next year, as Del Boy used to say in Only Fools and Horses, the United Kingdom should have completed its Brexit transition period and be ready to start its new relationship with the European Union. According to the revised (19 October) Political Declaration agreed between the EU and the UK, which outlines this new future, it will be an “ambitious, broad, deep and flexible partnership across trade and economic cooperation with a comprehensive and balanced free trade agreement at its core, law enforcement and criminal justice, foreign policy, security and defence and wider areas of cooperation”.

The aim is for this be concluded by 31 December 2020, when the transition period ends. (This being a period when the UK continues to operate as if it was a member of the EU, but without a voice in it and no longer legally a member state.)

Now the government has decided to put this end point for the transition period into law. It is only 12 months away now, but was designed to be much longer when Brexit was scheduled to be complete by the early part of 2019.

The EU, and the government led by Theresa May, had agreed that if the talks had not concluded by the end of 2020, there could be an extension running all the way to the end of 2022, if both sides agree. That, it seems, is now being ruled out.

This means that no-deal Brexit has been slapped firmly back on to the table. All the uncertainties and fears that disrupted national life in the run-up to the putative (and missed) Brexit deadlines of 29 March, 30 June and 31 October will, around this time next year, be repeated. If the transition period ends without a new UK-EU trade and security treaty than, apart from some bare bones” administrative arrangements, the UK will become a “third country” and have to fall back on Wold Trade Organisation rules on trade, and other international frameworks, where possible, for other areas of cooperation.

The difference now is that while the old House of Commons was willing to act and to legislate to prevent a no-deal Brexit without formal parliamentary approval, for example under the Letwin Amendment, this new Commons will do no such thing.

Thus, this time next year, the Johnson government may well be going through another round of no-deal preparations, another massive publicity exercise, and, very likely, be engaged in frantic late-night last-minute talks, which may or may not rescue the situation.

The government may have two principal motives for their strategy. The first is to force the pace of the talks believing that the EU will only take the British seriously if they threaten no deal. No deal may well hurt the British more than the EU; but it would undoubtedly be inconvenient and damaging to European enterprises and individuals who need to do business with the UK.

The flaw in this argument is, of course, is that the tactic didn’t in fact work in the run-up to 31 October in gaining what the prime minister called a “fantastic deal”, because it was mildly altered version of the one offered by the EU about 18 months before – the economic border down the Irish Sea. This time the UK may not be so lucky.

The other motive is to get the whole traumatic chapter of Brexit “done” as soon as possible so that the next election is not tangled up in the same issue – even though it worked well for the Conservatives in this year’s general election.

Although the date of 31 December 2020 is built in to UK law, it can of course be amended in the usual way if circumstances demand it – as previous rounds of UK withdrawal laws have had to be altered. With a large majority, this can be done rapidly whilst parliament is sitting; if not then the government would have to recall parliament at time when MPs and the rest of the nation would rather be enjoying Christmas. There would be further crises.

One other option would be for a simple free trade agreement to be concluded, and then for technical talks on other areas of cooperation to rumble on quietly (or as quietly as such things can) for years afterwards. In any event, having the new treaty ratified ​by about 30 national and regional parliaments and assemblies across the EU will take many months even if things are provisionally settled by 31 December 2020.

Brexit, in other words, will not only not be “done” by Christmas 2019, but not even by Christmas 2020, and very possibly long after.