One hour in 'The Den' that may seal Blair's fate

Someone, said Michael Howard, could not be telling the truth. Tony Blair insists he did not authorise the naming of David Kelly. Sir Kevin Tebbit, the most senior civil servant at the MoD, says the decision was taken at a meeting chaired by the PM. Here Francis Elliott reconstructs the fateful meeting of 8 July 2003 that holds the key to one of the most explosive political questions being addressed by Lord Hutton

It was a weary and haggard Tony Blair that stepped down the aisle of the Boeing 777 to face the travelling press pack during his return from a tour of the Far East.

At his last encounter with the journalists one had shouted: "Do you have blood on your hands Prime Minister?"

Blame for the suicide of Dr David Kelly was being laid at his door and drastic action was required to tame the storm.

He had already set up an independent judicial inquiry into the death of the weapons scientist: now, three days after the death on 22 July, he had to face the press.

In the skies above Shanghai, at the centre of a scrum of reporters - some standing on seats to hold tape recorders in his face - Mr Blair was asked the crucial question: "Why did you authorise the naming of David Kelly?"

"That is completely untrue," snapped Mr Blair.

"Did you authorise anyone in Downing Street or in the Ministry of Defence to release David Kelly's name?" the reporter, Paul Eastham from the Daily Mail, persisted.

"Emphatically not," Mr Blair said. "I did not authorise the leaking of the name of David Kelly."

It was, by any standards, a strong denial and one that kept the pack at bay. The search for how Dr Kelly's name entered the public domain moved from Mr Blair himself and towards the MoD, particularly Geoff Hoon, Secretary of State for Defence.

Last week, however, six months after that mid-air briefing, Mr Blair began to pay for his denial.

With the precision of the QC he is, Michael Howard has zeroed in on the evidence given to the Hutton inquiry by Sir Kevin Tebbit, the most senior civil servant in the MoD, in particular Sir Kevin's claim that the "policy decision on the handling ... had not been taken until the PM's meeting of Tuesday [8 July]".

In the bear-pit atmosphere of the Commons, a far cry from Court 73 in the Royal Court of Justice where Mr Blair was last cross-examined on the Kelly affair, Mr Howard demanded to know how he could reconcile his words on the plane with those of Sir Kevin. "Either the Permanent Secretary or the Prime Minister is not telling the truth," the Tory leader thundered. The official note of that fateful meeting, alluded to by Sir Kevin and seized upon by Mr Howard, records that it lasted for just one hour.

It took place in the Prime Minister's study, known to staff as "The Den".

Typically, Mr Blair likes to chair meetings in the room seated on a small pink sofa, his jacket slung over the back. Others must find whatever perches they can or stand.

The ground floor room opens on to No 10's rose garden and on fine days Mr Blair sometimes holds meetings around a small table just outside his study.

The weather on 8 July is unlikely to have tempted the Prime Minister outside and in any case his mood just after lunch that Tuesday would have been sombre.

At 1.30pm some of his most senior aides began to gather. With him were John Scarlett, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Alastair Campbell, Mr Blair's former director of communications and strategy, Jonathan Powell, his Chief of Staff, and Godric Smith and Tom Kelly, his two official spokesmen. Like all Mr Blair's most important meetings it was informal: no note-taking mandarins were present.

It was, in fact, the last of four such meetings he had held in two days to decide what to do with Dr Kelly. The civil servant had admitted to meeting Andrew Gilligan, the journalist who had accused Downing Street of "sexing up" the dossier that outlined the Government's view on Iraqi WMD, but, infuriatingly for Mr Blair, was refusing to confirm that he was the source.

The Prime Minister had held off going public with the information that Dr Kelly had come forward for four days. He was under pressure from Mr Campbell who, in the words of his diary, wanted "the source out". His civil servants, however, were cautioning that they could not be sure that Dr Kelly was the source. Then there was the tricky issue of what the scientist might say if cross-examined in public, sceptical as he was about many of the Government's WMD claims.

At one point as he agonised about what to do, Mr Blair had been shown a draft press release, prepared by the MoD, for use if Dr Kelly's name had to be rushed out. With it came a Q&A prepared for the press officers to help them handle the inevitable flood of enquiries.

Still uncertain of what to do, the Prime Minister refused to allow the release to be sent out.

By the time the crucial meeting began that Tuesday afternoon Mr Blair thought he had hit on a way of escaping criticism that he was suppressing the fact the source had been found while not, himself, pushing the name out into the public domain.

The Intelligence and Security Committee, an unelected group of MPs and peers that was conducting its own investigation into the dossier, would be offered a chance to interview Dr Kelly in secret but would announce the fact that an official had come forward in a letter to be released to the press. It was a clever ruse and it might have done the trick had not the ISC chairman, Ann Taylor, put a spanner in the works by refusing to accept No 10's request to cooperate by inviting Dr Kelly to give evidence. Significantly, although Mr Blair has told the Hutton inquiry he said that the matter was at all times to be handled by Sir David Omand, his security adviser, and Sir Kevin, neither was present at the meeting when the news of her refusal came through.

It was time for plan B. A note of the meeting provided for the Hutton inquiry reads simply: "It was therefore agreed to fall back on a press statement."

Since no formal minute exists we cannot know who pressed for this course of action nor if anyone argued against it. We can be certain, however, that it was a decision taken by Mr Blair himself. Sir Kevin, arriving back from Portsmouth where he had been handing out medals, was simply told of the decision.

The MoD chief, along with Mr Powell and Mr Smith, then went to another office to finalise the statement that would lead to Dr Kelly being identified within 48 hours of its release.

Not only was the decision taken to release the information that an official had come forward, the MoD was told to change the question-and-answer material to be used by the press office, making it far easier for journalists to narrow their search for the mole.

Sir Kevin, under the cross examination of Jeremy Gompertz, QC for the Kelly family, confirmed that the brief prepared earlier was altered to contain more clues that would help to identify Dr Kelly as a result of a meeting chaired by Mr Blair.

It is these two decisions - to issue a press release and to alter the accompanying Q&A material - that Mr Howard intends to return to again and again in the frenzied days following the publication of the Hutton report, now expected at the end of the month.

Mr Howard's is a high-risk strategy but one that Mr Blair is confident he can beat. The wagons are being circled against the coming attack. It emerged last week that Downing Street had overseen the preparation of a last-minute submission to the inquiry, seeking to "clarify" the evidence given by ministers and officials.

No doubt that last-minute submission attempts to explain away apparent clashes between government figures such as those between Sir Kevin and Mr Blair. The MoD Permanent Secretary, who was once head of GCHQ, is too polished an operator ever to directly contradict the Prime Minister.

One aide familiar with the case being prepared said: "I think you will find that there will be a collective government view with a small 'g'."

Meanwhile, No 10 is co-ordinating a number of former Cabinet ministers to fan out across the airwaves in the crucial hours after the report is published.

Helen Liddell, the former Secretary of State for Scotland, is preparing to attack the Tories on their role in the outing of Dr Kelly. She will draw attention to a number of parliamentary questions put by Bernard Jenkin, the then shadow Defence secretary, which, she will argue, helped to force Dr Kelly's name out.

It is Mr Blair himself, however, who intends to shoulder most of the responsibility for defending his actions after the Hutton report.

When he appears on BBC1's Breakfast with Frost programme today, the Prime Minister will no doubt repeat his well-worn line that he will not pre-judge the inquiry.

We know, however, from his replies to Mr Howard at Prime Minister's Questions last Wednesday what the thrust of his defence will be.

Asked whether he stood by his denial on the plane, Mr Blair said: "I stand by the totality of what I said."

Even for those grown used to Mr Blair's lawyerly use of language it was a striking - and puzzling - word to use. Its purpose is made clear in the light of the full transcript of his airborne briefing.

It shows that Mr Blair sought later to soften what he had said earlier by justifying why the Government had confirmed Dr Kelly's identity.

"That's a completely different matter once the name is out there."

It's a fine point but could become a crucial one: Mr Blair will claim that he did not lie when he denied that he had authorised the naming of Dr Kelly because he made clear the difference between putting a name into the public domain and preparing to react should it emerge elsewhere.

He will say there is a world of difference between leaking a name and making preparations for when it comes out. He can admit to the second but not the first.

Meanwhile in his river-front suite of rooms in Norman Shaw North, a par- liamentary building some distance away from the rooms usually occupied by leaders of the Opposition, Mr Howard is sharpening his brief.

He has assembled a team of his brightest MPs and researchers led by David Cameron to fillet the report in whatever time Mr Blair allows him before he makes a Commons statement.

The real work has already been done, however. For whatever Lord Hutton concludes, Mr Howard thinks, from the evidence already on the record, he can prove that the Prime Minister lied.

The rest of us will have to wait for the "totality" of Hutton before we can know for sure.

Godric Smith: PM'S OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN

Helped to prepare the press release immediately after the key meeting at Downing Street on 8 July

Jonathan Powell: PM'S CHIEF OF STAFF

Helped to prepare release after meeting. Told Sir Kevin MoD were 'free to amend it in any way if they wanted'

Alastair Campbell: EX-HEAD STRATEGY/COMMUNICATIONS

Most keen to prove that Gilligan's story was wrong. 'Biggest thing needed was a source out,' he wrote in diary next day

Tom Kelly: PM'S OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN

Present at meeting and gave briefing the next day which provided additional clues pointing to Dr Kelly

John Scarlett: JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

In charge of September dossier. Has repeatedly denied No 10 over-rode objections of intelligence agencies

Sir Kevin Tebbit: PERMANENT SECRETARY MOD

Not present at meeting. Arrived after decision had been taken. Told Hutton that there had been a 'change of stance'