Expert View: How big is the real terror risk?

Terrorists, it seems, have had a busy Christmas. Or maybe the security services have made it appear that this is the case. In the past two weeks, the headlines have been dominated by issues such as whether to place armed guards on all flights bound to the US, the repeated grounding or delaying of BA flight 223 to Washington based on supposed intelligence, and the Air France cancellation of flights to Los Angeles. The stakes were upped still further when the Bush administration announced that passengers from countries not in the US visa waiver programme would be electronically finger printed and have their pictures taken.

What is happening? Are sound risk management practices being implemented?

The authorities seem to imply that we should trust them as this appears to be safer than to let us know what is really going on. The issue is then: can we trust them? Are the authorities honest and competent enough to be trusted? If we take honesty as a given one can be less sure about their competence. They admitted, for example, that the Air France cancellations were based on faulty evidence.

Indeed, to achieve their anti-terrorist goals, the authorities must earn the public's trust. It is doubtful whether the passengers on last Sunday's BA 223 flight felt that way toward the 23 US agencies which determined their fate for three hours or more on the Heathrow tarmac.

The US siege mentality is starting to backfire. The rampant anti-Americanism is getting worse by the day. The fingerprint checks and pictures demanded for visitors will not alleviate this. In passport and security queues, one hears Europeans cursing the Americans for the long lines. Indeed, what the US authorities must do is to work on rebuilding their bridges with the outside world to win back public trust. America can do this best by opening its doors wider.

A further issue is the seemingly inability of US authorities and their European counterparts to engage in proper, well-thought-out risk communication. This leads to a schism between the communicators and their audiences. One reason may be that the authorities have seen little need to communicate in the past.

This behaviour is no longer acceptable. Passengers need more information than usually provided before they will accept these levels of disruption. This can only happen if the relevant authorities overhaul their communication departments. The US Navy embarked on such an activity a few years ago and initial findings show that it has been well received by its personnel.

Finally, some element of efficacy must be included in the security procedure. Why should the US guidelines be tougher than the European ones? Isn't the UK as exposed to terrorist threat as the US? The same goes for airport security measures, which still seem to be haphazard depending on which airport one uses.

For example, on a recent trip within Canada, passengers were asked to tolerate a 90-minute security check-in Ottawa as the officers enforced Israeli security standards, yet in Toronto, on the same day, passengers had only a 10 minute wait with security guards who had no idea what Israeli standards meant. Similarly, European security levels vary. Authorities should consider establishing an international airport security regulator to set uniform standards in all western airports.

Air travel security must be overhauled. But this can only be done with well though-out risk communication and management strategies that will win passengers' trust.

Professor Ragnar Lofstedt is director of the King's Centre for Risk Management at King's College London