It’s time to be realistic about the war in Ukraine

Any resolution will proceed from facts on the ground as they are, not as we would wish they were, writes Mary Dejevsky

Western versions of the war need to stop sugar-coating the balance of advantage or playing down setbacks for Ukraine (Getty)

Have you noticed how we no longer wake up to news of the latest victories for heroic Ukrainians or the latest setbacks for savage Russians? How President Volodymyr Zelensky’s rallying calls – including his latest to the plutocrats in Davos – command a lot less of our airtime than they did?

Well, some of that change doubtless reflects the natural cycles of news. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine three months ago was so shocking, and the response of Zelensky and his fellow countrymen so courageous, that public interest was sky-high. Here was a war, a horrific, all-out war, in Europe, with a telegenic actor turned inspirational wartime leader, and brave Ukrainian Davids outwitting Russia’s clumsy Goliath.

Maybe, though, there is only so long that a mass audience can grapple with the unfamiliar names and places, many hours’ journey from our islands, once the first drama – and the immediate threat of a wider war – has worn off. It was probably inevitable that concerns closer to home would rise up the agenda, including, for the UK and all of Europe, the soaring cost of living (even if it was fuelled in part by the war).

It may also be that the war has become harder to follow. The bigger picture – a threat to the capital, Kyiv; a massive Russian tank column, destruction in Ukraine’s second city, Kharkiv, and the agonising last stand at the Azov steelworks in Mariupol – has given way to the comparative minutiae of smaller towns and river crossings in the Donbas. The maps that once showed clear lines between Ukraine’s blue and yellow and Russia’s red, white and blue now have more shading. On-the-ground mobile phone footage from civilians has largely dried up. Access for reporters is harder, as the war zone in the Donbas has widened.

I fear, though, that even all these factors together do not entirely explain the shrinking presence of Ukraine, especially in the broadcast media, and especially in the English-speaking world. The fact is that it is not just the prominence of Ukraine in our news media that has changed, but the tenor of the reporting. I would date the change from the fall of Mariupol on 17-18 May.

This is not just because a Russian victory in Mariupol was always going to mark a potential turning point in the war, which is why the city was so desperately fought over: it was a major port blocking Russia’s land route to Crimea, which had resisted since the first days of the invasion. It is because this is largely not how it was reported.

The UN and the International Red Cross appear to have brokered an agreement allowing the evacuation of the most badly injured (we saw some of that on our screens). The agreement also seems to have provided for the remaining 2,000-plus fighters to withdraw. This operation was described as an evacuation, and we saw very little of this. The Russians described it as a surrender – a word largely avoided in most English-language accounts – even if the soldiers became Russian prisoners of war.

The western world took its cue from President Zelensky, who praised the heroism of the fighters, and said they had been evacuated to prevent further suffering and could be exchanged for Russian prisoners in the near future. All of which may indeed be correct, may reflect understandable wishful thinking or be designed to keep up morale in the midst of a war. But neither the west, in the shape of the United States or Nato, nor the UK is a combatant – we have gone to great lengths to avoid any appearance of direct involvement – and we should not be glossing over the reality. Symbolically, and in practice, this was a big setback for Ukraine.

In the week or so since then, it has become harder to argue that Ukraine is winning. Little by little, it is being conceded that there is fierce fighting and that Russia has made some, albeit limited and maybe temporary, gains. On 19 May, in a striking change of tone, Zelensky said that the Donbas was being “destroyed” and that it was “a hell in there”. Three days later, he said that Ukraine could be losing up to 100 fighters a day, and gave losses since mid-April as between 2,500-3,000 Ukrainian troops killed, and up to 10,000 injured. Until then, Ukraine had given regular updates of Russian losses, but said little about its own.

Some suggested that Zelensky might be starting to accustom Ukrainians to the need for talks, with possible concessions; others that he was appealing to the west for more help. But it is hard not to note also that the reduced prominence for news from Ukraine – in the UK especially – coincides with a reversal of Ukraine’s fortunes.

What we have been hearing over the past week is a very far cry from recent talk to the effect that Ukraine can win an outright victory, recovering all its territory, including Crimea. It is a far cry, too, from the US defence secretary’s statement that the US wanted to see Russia weakened to the point where it could no longer mount any similar operation in the future.

Now the war is by no means over, with many military experts suggesting that it has entered a phase of attrition that could last many more months – or even years. It is also possible that the tide could turn again in Ukraine’s favour, or that Moscow could decide, for whatever reason, to call it a day.

In the meantime, however, it is high time that western versions of the war stopped sugar-coating the balance of advantage or playing down setbacks for Ukraine. Any resolution will proceed from facts on the ground as they are, not as we would wish they were. Nor can it be taken for granted that Ukraine will regain its territory on the battlefield.

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Zelensky gave some idea of Ukraine’s recent casualties and the losses it could be facing in the Donbas. But the scale of the damage to Ukraine goes much further. According to an estimate by the US-based Atlantic Council last week, 30 per cent of Ukrainian infrastructure has been destroyed. There are forecasts that Ukraine’s GDP could shrink by 30-45 per cent in 2022.

According to the finance minister, Serhiy Marchenko, the war has so far cost Ukraine 70 per cent of its expected revenues and it is running a deficit of $5bn a month. Some 6 million Ukrainians have fled the country, not all of whom will return, with 8 million displaced internally.

These are big losses by any standards, and they are steadily mounting as the war goes on. Until now, however, the damage to Ukraine is an aspect of the war that has tended to take quite a distant third place in most western reporting, behind the heroic determination of Ukrainians and the brutality and incompetence of Russia.

But the scale of the damage – in human, territorial and material terms – is now starting to fuel a very public dispute, so far confined largely to bystanders, about when and on what terms Ukraine might consider cutting its losses. Pretty soon, say the “realists” (including diplomatic sage Henry Kissinger); not before total victory for Ukraine, say the “idealists” (including our very own foreign secretary, Liz Truss).

Ukraine’s President Zelensky has so far played it both ways, hinting at concessions and a will to fight on. But one day, perhaps quite soon, he may have to choose.