Gunboat diplomacy won’t solve Greece and Turkey’s feud in the eastern Mediterranean – despite what Erdogan seems to think

Both sides need to agree a diplomatic solution as all the nations involved in the region will regret further escalation, writes Ahmed Aboudouh

Turkish seismic research vessel 'Oruc Reis' as it is escorted by Turkish Naval ships in the Mediterranean Sea (TURKISH DEFENCE MINISTRY/AFP via)

Nearly a century ago, fierce mediations between Turkey and Greece – who were backed by Italy, France and the British, among others – took place in a bid to demarcate modern Turkey’s borders. The arduous talks followed the end of the fourth Greco-Turkish war and resulted in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which officially ended the Ottoman Empire.

Now there is another power dance being performed in the eastern Mediterranean, over the rich gas deposits discovered there during the last few years – with the spectre of war looming in the background.

Greece, a country owns thousands of islands, is set to maximise the use of oil and natural gas within its borders. Its campaign rides on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (not signed by Turkey), which states that coastlines of inhabited islands generate continental shelves or Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) the same as any coastal land formation.

This means the EEZ of the tiny last Greek island of Kastellorizo, only a few kilometres off the Turkish coast, is enough to make Ankara feel imprisoned. Greece also threatened to expand its borders in the Aegean Sea, a move that would be seen by Turkey as “casus belli” or cause of war.

Turkey is not going down without a fight. In December, it signed a specious demarcation agreement with the UN-recognised government in Libya, which didn’t recognise the Crete (with a population close to Athens) or any of the other Greek islands. Greece responded earlier this month by signing a similar deal with Egypt.

Days later, Turkey sent the Oruç Reis seismic survey ship accompanied by naval vessels into the disputed waters south of the island of Kastellorizo. France, Italy and Greece have engaged in military drills in the region as tensions continue to rise.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced on Sunday that “Turkey will not bow to the language of threats, intimidation and blackmail, especially in the eastern Mediterranean, and will continue to defend its rights under international law and bilateral agreements”. His threats come amid an EU ultimatum that if Turkey doesn’t de-escalate tensions in the Mediterranean within one month, It will likely be subject to EU sanctions.

While officials from both Greece and Turkey have said they want a diplomatic solution, with talks taking place with German foreign minister Heiko Maas in the last few weeks, neither are backing away from their claims.

Turkey sees the west’s unequivocal support for Greece and Cyprus an act of containment, and infringement of its sovereignty. But Erdogan’s gunboat diplomacy is making the Greek, and the whole EU lot, sweat. No one wants to see a major conflict between Nato allies in the Mediterranean.

The situation is complicated by how many other nations want a piece of the energy reserves in the eastern Mediterranean, and the conflicting loyalties created by some states being members of Nato, or the EU, or both.

That is not to say that Erdogan’s behaviour is not predictable and proves how his ideological Ottoman vs Kemalist mentality is central to how he deals with issues. As Max Hoffman, the expert on Turkey at the Center for American Progress, rightly said in a tweet. When Erdogan “feels he doesn’t have a seat at the table, he generally flips the table over.”

All nations involved are facing economic carnage thanks to the coronavirus pandemic and should have bigger things to worry about. Turkey is facing double the problem due to an ongoing domestic economic crisis. Oil and gas prices are stagnant at a dangerous low, and Turkey can’t afford an endless standoff against the EU, a policy which could eventually trigger sanctions on its energy and financial sectors.

But for Erdogan, this is a historical moment that will define Turkey’s position in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East for years. The 2015 discovery of the Egyptian Field Zohr, the biggest gas hub in the region, made the Mediterranean a mighty prize.

The discovery of the energy reserves, which has piqued the interest of many nations around the region, came parallel to a nosedive in Erdogan’s approval ratings at home and the rise of an agenda flecked with nationalism as the president looks towards an important election in 2023.

Erdogan is already making his presence felt in Washington as part of the heated discussion over the course of US foreign policy after the coming presidential election. The Democratic presidential contender Joe Bidens made hostile remarks against Erdogan, which surfaced earlier this month – saying that Washington should embolden Turkish opposition leaders “to be able to take on and defeat Erdogan”.

But Biden’s take is somewhat starred-eyed. His belief that the west’s problems with Turkey will vanish once Erdogan disappears is merely wishful thinking. In the Mediterranean overlapping faultlines, injured pride and historical outrage throughout the decades since the Lausanne Treaty make the Mediterranean a tough geopolitical game of thrones.

Erdogan’s brinkmanship is carefully measured not to cross any “red lines” drawn by European hawks, such as French President Emmanuel Macron. These red lines most likely include sending Turkish drilling ships to Crete or sinking the Total or Eni energy giants’ survey ships near the coast of Cyprus.

This is why Turkey’s calculations are probably based on maintaining pressure without triggering an all-out confrontation with European powers, Egypt or Israel – but being forceful enough to pull the US in to mediate a final solution.

It is the same strategy that ended up forcing the US to oversee a ceasefire this month in Libya between Eastern troops of Khalifa Haftar, and the Turkish-backed government of Tripoli.

The international law is on Greece’s side, but, no one should underestimate Turkey’s determinism to get its share in the Mediterranean golden pot.

Erdogan must abandon his dreams to rewrite the Lausanne Treaty – diplomacy has to prevail. But as Germany's foreign minister Mass said recently: “Even the smallest spark can lead to a catastrophe.”

A US intervention may be required to solve a major conflict that will draw the Mediterranean future for decades. And in an election year, President Trump will likely keep looking somewhere else.