Putin looms large over Russia’s vote on its constitution – but his power is not all that’s at stake

With new generations of voters freed from the baggage of the Soviet past, the country could become more of a parliamentary democracy, writes Mary Dejevsky

The Russian president has taken more of a back seat than he has in any crisis before (EPA)

Russia has just marked the 75th anniversary of the Red Army’s victory over Nazi Germany with a huge military parade through Red Square. As in the old Soviet days, some of the country’s state-of-the-art military equipment was on display; there was a fly-past and an address by President Vladimir Putin, looking every inch the commander-in-chief and latter-day tsar.

This show of officially sponsored patriotism served as the prelude to a week of voting in a referendum on changes to Russia’s 1993 constitution, which – if passed, and the incentives to vote include a lottery with big-ticket prizes – could allow Putin to occupy the presidency until 2036. Oh, and by the way, if you didn’t know already, Russia has fared particularly badly in the coronavirus pandemic. Well, of course it has, which is why the Red Square parade (with no masks and zero social-distancing) was not just gratuitously political, but reckless as well.

So here they go again, you might conclude, those subservient Russians and their power-crazed president, strutting around in their dysfunctional country where life is cheap. Let me offer a different reading.

The Victory Day parade was not the occasion President Putin had envisaged. It was a made-for-television spectacular, watched in person by no more than a handful of foreign leaders from the former Soviet states. The original plan was for a parade and celebration on the actual anniversary, 9 May. Western leaders were due to be arrayed on the podium, with the aim of opening a new diplomatic era six years after Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Covid-19 put paid to that.

Delayed at a late stage after the pandemic took hold in Russia, the parade became a largely domestic affair, commemorating an anniversary that could not – largely for domestic political reasons – be missed. This year is probably the last major Second World War anniversary where even a few veterans would be able to attend. The experience of that war and the victory of 1945 remain a potent unifying force in Russia – one of the few since the humiliation (as many Russians see it) of the Soviet collapse.

With this in mind, I noted three points from Putin’s address on Red Square: the sombre, rather than triumphalist, tone; the tribute to “all countries of the anti-Hitler coalition” (in other words, none of the recent sparring with Poland and others over history), and third, the small diplomatic olive branch he extended: “We understand how important it is to strengthen friendship and trust between nations, and are open to dialogue and cooperation on the most pressing issues on the international agenda. Among them is the creation of a common reliable security system, something the complex and rapidly changing modern world needs.”

Now to the constitutional referendum, which was postponed from April. Yes, the parade can be seen as a ploy to encourage turn-out, and it is true that the letter of one of the amendments would allow Putin to “reset the clock” on existing term limits. But two big qualifications are in order.

The first is that, while all attention, especially abroad, has focused on the opportunity for Putin to go on and on, this is not all that is being voted on. Other changes protect pensions and welfare benefits, while yet others alter the balance between the legislature and the executive in a way that – in theory – shifts power towards the legislature, and away from the president.

With new generations of voters freed from the baggage of the Soviet past, this could make the Russia of the future into more of a parliamentary democracy. Could the changes, then, be less about the current president’s supposed quest for immortality than about securing stability post-Putin, while his personal popularity practically guarantees a “yes” vote?

The second qualification is that recent history provides a different rationale for a constitutional change that would allow Putin to stay at the Kremlin into his eighties. Both in 2007-08, when Putin chose not to breach the then two-term presidential limit, and in 2011, when he was contemplating a return to the top job, there was intense speculation about the succession and open jockeying for position – trends that threatened to become destabilising. Leaving open the prospect that he might seek the presidency again banishes – or at least delays – such speculation, which had started again the moment Putin won what was seen as his last presidential election in 2018.

For the record, I doubt whether Putin will stand again in 2024. If there has been a theme to his two decades in power, it has been about trying to make Russia stable and secure. That is why, despite blandishments, he ruled out a third consecutive term in 2008, and chose the technicality of essentially swapping jobs with his prime minister. It should never be forgotten than Putin trained as a lawyer.

And so to coronavirus. The impression created by much of the reporting is that Russia has coped worse than many other countries. In fact, this is based largely on reports from less developed areas of the country, complaints from medics, and the raw figures for the incidence of cases (currently 600,000). Seen comparatively, however, Russia has not been doing badly.

The number of cases reflects Russia’s relatively strong testing capacity. The country’s death toll currently stands at 8,600, which is a rate per million of 57 – far lower than that of the United States (at 366 per million), or the UK (at 632). This has prompted questions about the accuracy or honesty of Russia’s reporting, but its criteria are very similar to Germany’s. Other explanations could include lower life expectancy, so fewer very old people to contract the virus; relatively low population density, and relatively high standards of public health. With some exceptions, hospital capacity – in a health system still undergoing post-Soviet reforms – has also held up well.

What struck me more about Russia’s pandemic than the actual figures, however, was how closely its approach, from the Kremlin downwards, has followed that of many European countries. Putin has taken more of a back seat than he has in any crisis before. Mayors and regional governors have been largely left to make decisions based on local requirements. Lockdowns were imposed and public compliance was good. Cities, including Moscow, built “instant” hospitals. Fleets of volunteers were mobilised. Russia has tried to match international reporting standards.

Cynics might say that Putin was less prominent so that he could disclaim responsibility if it all went wrong. But there is another explanation: that post-Soviet Russia is maturing into a country where the centre delegates more to local authorities, who have their own electoral mandate to act. In such a vast country as Russia this would make sense.

The results of the constitutional referendum, when they are announced next week, will be scoured for what they say about Putin’s authority. His ratings – still high by international standards – are lower than at any time since he became president, and the possibility of e-voting will invite claims of fraud. We can expect a lot of headlines about Putin’s manipulation of a national crisis and a suspect political system to remain in the Kremlin forever.

Another way of looking at this week in the life of post-Soviet Russia, however, might be to consider the extent to which Russia has been behaving as almost any other country, from the approach of its leaders and the response of its citizens, to constitutional changes designed to survive the tenure of one president to a military parade that could well be the last of its kind. Could it be that Putin’s legacy to Russia will be to leave it – perhaps as he hoped – as much more of a “normal” country than it was when he entered the Kremlin?