Russia – and Vladimir Putin – has a lot to lose over the poisoning of Alexei Navalny

The diplomatic and economic damage, however, could well go much further – and much further than it did with the UK and the Salisbury case, writes Mary Dejevsky

Alexei Navalny addresses supporters during an anti-Putin rally in Moscow (AFP via Getty)

It is not known who in Russia cleared the German air ambulance carrying Alexei Navalny for take-off from the Siberian city of Omsk. Navalny’s wife had appealed directly to president Vladimir Putin, and there are reports that German diplomats interceded at the highest level. But, whoever signed off on the final decision, it was always going to be fraught with risk for the Kremlin.

Just how much of a risk became apparent on Wednesday, when the German foreign ministry released a statement, saying that it was now “beyond doubt” that the Russian opposition leader had been poisoned with the nerve agent, novichok. A grave chancellor Angela Merkel then followed up with a call for an explanation from Russia for what she described as a murder attempt designed to silence this leading figure in Russia’s opposition.

The Kremlin, of course – whether or not the decision on the plane was taken at that level – was in a bind. It would have been condemned as inhumane if authorisation had been withheld, especially if Navalny had subsequently died. On the other hand, the moment Navalny left Russian air space, the Kremlin lost any control it might have had, both over what happened next and the message. That amounted to a huge concession, if it was made by Putin or anyone else.

Now it is worth underlining at this point that, for all the certainty that marks many official British statements and media coverage, the Germans are not saying definitively that “Putin did it”. Their tone is a little different from that taken by UK ministers within hours of the 2018 Salisbury poisonings.

It is also worth underlining that the Russian pilot who decided to make an emergency landing in Omsk, rather than proceed to Moscow, may have saved Navalny’s life, as may the doctors in Omsk who – despite their professed doubts about poison – administered atropine, the closest treatment there is to a novichok antidote, early on. The claim, made by some, that this was a brazen attack, with the Kremlin’s fingerprints all over it, designed to be found out and interpreted as a “two fingers up” to the west, does not stack up.

But... the German findings that probably the most influential Russian opposition leader was poisoned and that the substance used was the same as the one identified in the Skripal case – a military-grade nerve agent, moreover, that is associated with Russia, even though it was developed in the Soviet-era and can be found outside Russia – means that the Kremlin has a case to answer. Yes, everyone is innocent until proven guilty, and the Kremlin is all denials, but the onus is now squarely on Putin to make his case in the court of international opinion.

Russia said at the outset that an investigation would be launched just as soon as it had received chapter and verse from the Germans. Assuming that Berlin is sharing its findings with the Russian authorities – something, incidentally, that, according to the Russians, the British did not do in the Skripals’ case – that time has now come.

How transparent any such investigation might be is another matter. There is a big difference between this case and the Skripal case, which happened in UK jurisdiction. The right of third countries to intervene, as it would be seen here, in another country’s internal affairs is a perennial issue in international diplomacy. It lay at the heart of the controversy about the “right to protect” as a pretext for armed intervention – a principle that Russia, among others, opposed. Moscow might well argue that what (maybe) happened in Tomsk, stays in Tomsk, especially if it were to argue, as it could do, that novichok gives it a national security implication.

Whatever the fate of any Russian investigation, however, and whatever the possibility, or otherwise, for other countries to exert pressure on Russia to find, and punish, those responsible, the diplomatic fall-out has already begun. So long as there is no explanation from Russia, that fall-out will only become more damaging.

So far, Germany appears to be modelling its response on the UK’s efforts post-Salisbury to coordinate any action with its partners in the EU and its Nato allies. We could then be looking at a new round of diplomatic expulsions and maybe yet more sanctions, probably “targeted” against those deemed directly or indirectly responsible. The effect of such measures, however, would be limited; they would be little more than disapproving gestures.

The diplomatic and economic damage, however, could well go much further – and much further than it did with the UK and the Skripals. Where UK-Russia relations before the Skripals case were so bad, they could hardly become worse, Germany has taken a less ideological and more pragmatic approach to Russia over the years. There is thus a lot more to lose.

Angela Merkel’s relations with Vladimir Putin have been at times frosty, but talking and trade have gone on. Central to trade has been the building of Nord Stream 2, a new pipeline for Russian gas that bypasses Ukraine and is almost complete. Germany has pursued the project, despite the hostility of Ukraine and its EU supporters and fierce opposition and threatened sanctions from the United States. The functioning of this pipeline could now be in doubt – which would be a serious blow to Russia’s national pride, as well as its trade balance.

Russia could also lose the possibility of improving relations with France, as favoured by president Emmanuel Macron since he came to office. The mood towards Russia in the EU – which has long been balanced between the hawks of the former eastern bloc and the “realists”, as they might be termed, of “old” Europe – could also veer sharply towards the hawks. This, too, would be a disappointment to Russia, given that relations had been set to warm slightly with the departure from the EU of the cold-warrior UK.

Russia could also lose possibly its last chance for a while to improve relations with the United States – which still appears to be a goal of Putin. Discussions have been in train for a while for a full-dress US-Russia summit before the US election in November. It is hard to see how this could proceed, so long as there is any question about Kremlin complicity in the apparent attempt to assassinate a major political opponent. All the “Russia-gate” claims that Donald Trump is beholden to a malign Russia – claims that have faded in the past year – would return with a vengeance.

The attack on Navalny – who is probably as well recognised in the west as he is in Russia – also comes at a time when Russian diplomacy seemed to be moderating its hard-ball approach and the freeze that followed Russia’s annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 was starting to thaw. A growing cohort of younger diplomats was beginning to turn away from Russia’s traditional, almost devil-may-care, reliance on tough talk, preferring a new focus on the possibilities of “soft power”.

It should be apparent from this list that Putin stands to lose more than anyone from what has happened to Navalny. And he will lose much, much more – diplomatically and reputationally – if the Kremlin will not, or cannot, eliminate the presumption of guilt.

In the short term, Navalny has been removed from Russian politics and specifically from the campaign for this month’s regional elections, where his support for opposition candidates could have made a mark.

But would anyone in the Kremlin judge that this short-term “gain” would outweigh the more profound damage to Russia and its president? That is my question, and perhaps the most compelling reason why “the Kremlin” may not be the answer to the question of who tried to kill Alexei Navalny.