Like it or not, Johnson is right to align defence and foreign policy

It is high time that the UK reassessed its position in the world, taking account not just of Brexit, but also of the end of the Cold War, writes Mary Dejevsky

The review will look at ‘the procurement process used by the armed forces and other security services’ (AFP/Getty)

Here is one straight out of Sir Humphrey’s playbook. What is envisaged by the prime minister as the most comprehensive reappraisal of UK foreign and defence policy not just for years, but for decades, perhaps even for half a century, is officially being referred to as “The Integrated Review”.

After weeks of speculation – an “integrated security, defence and foreign policy review to reassess the nation’s place in the world” was announced in the Queen’s Speech in December – its remit was published for the first time this week, in terms clearly designed not to frighten the horses.

Led by senior civil servant Sir Alex Ellis, the review will not touch two of the UK’s key spending commitments: the 2 per cent of GDP guaranteed to defence, and the 0.7 per cent of gross national income (GNI) earmarked for international development. In all, the presentation on the Downing Street website for the most part eschews any sudden movements. Indeed, it says that implementing the review’s recommendations will take many years.

But the horses – in terms of the top brass, the foreign aid constituency and, to a lesser extent, the diplomats – are frightened. They have been worried ever since the review was mooted, and have been making known their hostility in the time-honoured way: by damning it with faint praise.

It is a really excellent idea, they have said, but with just a few shortcomings. They have gently suggested its emphasis or timing is not quite right. Might it not have been better to wait until after the Comprehensive Spending Review? Meanwhile, at least one defence-specialist think tank is promising (threatening?) to keep a beady eye on the process.

So what are they worried about? Some concerns are specific. Sections of the military fear that setting defence capability in a wider foreign policy context could deprioritise weapons and technology procurement, perhaps even shifting the emphasis from hard to soft power. The foreign aid lobby fears that the Department for International Development (DfID) could be shoehorned back into the Foreign Office, with its power to make decisions and spend downgraded accordingly (while DfiD was spared in the latest cabinet reshuffle, seven junior ministers now span the two departments, compared with four before, which some see as a sign of things to come).

A more general concern is the fear of change that resides in all entrenched institutions. Since this government came to office, however, that fear has assumed a very particular shape: that of the prime minister’s unconventional adviser, Dominic Cummings. It is sometimes hard to identify what it is about him that his detractors hate most: his refusal to conform to civil service manners? His criticism of military overspending? His pride in being a disruptor?

Nor are all of these concerns baseless. While a senior civil servant is to head the review and its remit seems designed to soothe, there are plenty of hints that the desired outcome is quite radical change. The review, promised the Downing Street press release, will “go beyond the parameters of a traditional review” by considering all the “opportunities and challenges the UK faces”, and determining how “the whole of government can be structured, equipped and mobilised to meet them”. The word “overhaul” is used.

The press release states explicitly that the review will look at “the procurement process used by the armed forces and other security services”, and aim “to create a more coherent and strategic approach to our overseas activity” – not something likely to appeal to those who see diplomacy, aid and the military as separate power centres. Cummings’ influence might also be detected in the undertaking to “utilise expertise from both inside and outside government”, the idea being to ensure that “the UK’s best foreign policy minds are feeding into its conclusions” and – wait for it – “offering a constructive challenge to traditional Whitehall assumptions and thinking”.

That the figure of Cummings looms so large in the general perception of the review, however, is regrettable for two reasons. First, because an exercise that is both highly necessary and long overdue risks being seen less as a government project than a Cummings one. Second, because it could allow any influential constituency that dislikes the findings to dismiss them – and try to block them – as the fantasies of an eccentric foe.

It would be unfortunate, to put it mildly, if Cummings’ presumed association with the “Integrated Review” was allowed to diminish its importance. For it is high time that the UK reassessed its position in the world, taking account not just of Brexit – which ends more than half a century in which UK foreign policy looked to continental Europe – but also of the end of the Cold War.

It is understandable that no such comprehensive review was conducted before. The end of the Cold War was so dramatic and unforeseen that there was little time to consider its longer-term implications. It is possible that the enlargement of the EU was too far and too fast, and I – along with others – would regard the expansion of Nato as a historic mistake. Many say the same about Brexit.

That there is now no turning back, though, does not mean that there are not policy adjustments that the UK can and should make. The review offers an opportunity to do this. Relations with friends and enemies – including the United States, the EU, Russia and China – must be examined, with the national interest paramount.

A second priority would be to bring the UK’s defence and other interests into line. As this could well mean cutting our coat according to our reduced economic cloth, this will not sit well with sections of the military. But Cummings is not wrong to single out not just overspending but unwise spending by the military, the “revolving door” between the upper echelons of the Ministry of Defence and arms industry.

Few still defend the government’s decision to build not one but two aircraft carriers, without the means to equip them. The UK has one of the most top-heavy armed forces in the industrialised world, even as its recruitment drives fall short. Yet the five-yearly defence reviews have come and gone, with scant change in either spending or philosophy, as a military definition of national security, rooted in hard power, goes unchallenged. It is entirely right that defence and the military should not be considered in isolation but as part of maximising UK capabilities across the board.

The six-month timetable for such a review is ambitious, and some have interpreted Boris Johnson’s decision to appoint a civil servant to lead it as a setback for Dominic Cummings. I would see it rather as an attempt to secure the confidence of the top brass and make clear that this is a government, not a Cummings, review. This, in turn, should make it more likely that its recommendations, if signed off by the prime minister and the National Security Council, have a sporting chance of being implemented. Watch out, though: if this review is to be as fundamental as it should be, the largely discreet skirmishing of recent weeks will be as nothing compared with the battles to come.