Why the Windsor Framework rebellion matters and what’s next for Northern Ireland

Northern Ireland will probably continue without a devolved government, with all the implications that has for peace and stability, says Sean O’Grady

The prime minister did manage to carry a majority of his own party, with some rebels instead opting to abstain (PA)

Were it not for the out-of-season pantomime performance by Boris Johnson at the Commons committee of privileges, the main focus of parliamentary and political attention would be on the vote on the Windsor Framework. Arguably, it is the moment when Brexit finally “gets done”, and it was always expected to pass with Labour support; but it is also a moment that reminds us that, within the Conservative Party, the debate on Europe is still not over.

What is the vote about?

More than we thought it would be. Until this week, it was assumed that this vote would only be on a statutory instrument to implement the “Stormont brake”, a partial and conditional veto power on EU law for the devolved administration in Belfast. A vote on the overall Windsor Framework was expected later; new legislation will be required to implement some of the framework, such as an amendment to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 to implement the brake.

However, the vote became a means to demonstrate political support for, or opposition to, the overall agreement.

Does it matter?

Yes and no. The Windsor Framework will be enacted with cross-party support, but the rebellion led by the European Research Group (ERG) in alliance with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) of Northern Ireland reminds us that Rishi Sunak’s authority is not complete, and that his party’s civil war over Europe is far from over.

The prime minister did manage to carry a majority of his own party, with some rebels instead opting to abstain, but that is a fairly low bar for success given that the “payroll” vote of ministers and aides runs to more than 100 MPs. Sunak can’t be surprised or pleased that figures such as Boris Johnson, Liz Truss, Jacob Rees-Mogg and Mark Francois are fomenting trouble.

On the other hand, with around 30 or so supporters, the ERG is evidently not the power it was during Theresa May’s time as prime minister in a hung parliament, when the bloc of 80 to 100 backbenchers held the government to ransom.

It now seems likely that Northern Ireland will continue without a devolved government, with all the implications that has for peace and stability. When US president Joe Biden arrives for the 25th anniversary celebration of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the mood may be muted.

Why don’t the DUP and the ERG like the new deal?

For the reason that EU laws still apply in Northern Ireland. They view the Windsor Agreement as worse than the Northern Ireland protocol it will replace.

For the ERG, there are also other discontents about Europe, the general direction of economic policy (such as corporation tax rates), the refugee crisis and much else. Many yearn for the return of Johnson and Truss, or for some other populist nationalist figure to emerge, and resent Sunak as a usurper. Rebellion on this vote is an expression of wider dissent.

Was it a mistake for Sunak to force the issue now?

It might come to be viewed as useful that the vote coincided with Johnson’s historic appearance before the privileges committee, which attracted greater attention. It also demonstrates that the prime minister has his sights set on wider horizons than the grumbling of Eurosceptic obsessives.

In terms of restoring power-sharing in Northern Ireland, it may have been a mistake. Shortly after he and Ursula von der Leyen signed off on the Windsor Framework, Sunak did promise there would be a vote and that the unionist community would be given “the time and space they need” to respond. The DUP is still in the process of formulating its position, and doesn’t respond well to being bounced; holding a 90-minute debate on a constitutional matter added needless insult to injury.

What happens next in Northern Ireland?

Relaxations on paperwork will come into effect fairly rapidly. The easier “green lane” for goods moving from Great Britain to Northern Ireland should also soon be operational. Before long, businesses in Northern Ireland will be in a uniquely advantageous position, inside both the UK internal market and the EU single market.

However, the Stormont brake – designed to allow the Northern Ireland Assembly and its executive to veto new EU laws as they apply to the country – cannot be used until the executive is back up and running, and there is no sign of the DUP being ready to make that happen. The DUP will undoubtedly seek changes to the framework; with radical changes to a treaty text practically impossible, they may remain unappeased.

The stand-off could thus continue until elections for the assembly are due again in April 2024, and quite possibly beyond. A change of government at Westminster by January 2024, and a prospective loss of support for the DUP at Stormont, might provide an opportunity for a fresh start.